

Query returned 52 of 927504 total documents.
Displaying hit: 1

Next

Request Upload

Request Translation

Original Document Information

Document #: CMPC-2003-00015083 Classification: [REDACTED]
English Title: Investigative reports by the Iraqi Intelligence Service about failed bombs intended to destroy the residence of the US Ambassador in Jakarta, Japanese Embassy and American Airlines in Philippines [REDACTED]
Language: ARABIC
Document Date: [REDACTED] Total Pages: 71 Inclusive Pages: 70 Oversized Pages: [REDACTED]
Document Type: HANDWRITTEN NOTES/ NOTEBOOK, LETTER Format: PAPER ORIGINAL
Agency: DIA Project: IRAQI FREEDOM
Country Of Information: IRAQ

Title:

Country Of Origin: [REDACTED] Originators Classification: TOP SECRET

Translation Information

Translation #	Classification	Status	Translating Agency
CMPC-2003-00015083-HT	[REDACTED]	PARTIAL COMPLETED	DIA

Linked Documents

Original Document	CMPC-2003-00015083
Translation	CMPC-2003-00015083-HT (Multi-Part) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> cmipc-b/CMPC-2003-00015083-HT.pdf cmipc-m/CMPC-2003-00015083-HT.pdf

Related Document Numbers

Document Number Type	Document Number
Harmony Number	CMPC-2003-00015083

Keyword Categories

Keywords

TERRORIST OPERATIONS

Biographic Information

Name: 'ABD-AL-AZIZ, MAHFUZ 'ABD-AL-WAHAB

Sex : Male

Photograph Available

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS) , M16

Comments: Page 34 and 57

Name: 'ABD-AL-HADI, TALIB

Sex : Male

Photograph Available

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS)

Comments: Page 9

Name: 'UBAYD, FARHAN HAMID

Sex : Male

Photograph Available

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS) , M4

Comments: Page 4

Name: AHMAD, SAMIR MAHMUD

Sex : Male

Photograph Available

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS) , 2ND DIVISION

Comments: Page 20

Name: BARAKAT, MUHSIN DHIYAB

Sex : Male

Photograph Available

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS), M1

Comments: Pages 4 and 45

Name: DAWUD, HAYDAR MUSLIM

Sex : Male

Photograph Available

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS)

Comments: Page 10

Name: FAYYAD, KHALIL IBRAHIM

Sex : Male

Photograph Available

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS) , M16

Comments: Page 34

Name: HAMID, FARHAN

Sex : Male

Photograph Available

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS)

Comments: Page 34 and 63

Name: IBRAHIM, IBRAHIM KHALIL

Sex : Male

Photograph Available

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS), M 6

Comments: Page 4

Name: IBRAHIM, KHUDAYR ISMA'IL

Sex : Male

Photograph Available

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS) , M4

Comments: Page 34

Name: ISMA'IL, KHALID IBRAHIM

Sex : Male

Photograph Available

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS)

Comments: Page 60

Name: JASIM, 'ABD-AL-WAHAB 'AMMAR

Sex : Male

Photograph Available

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS) , M4

Comments: Page 27

Name: JUM'AH, SAHIR SHAHADAH

Sex : Male

Photograph Available

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS), M14

Comments: Page 27

Name: MAHMUD, DIYA' 'ABDULLAH

Sex : Male

Photograph Available

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS)

Comments: Page 62

Name: MAKI, AS'AD

Sex : Male

Photograph Available

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS) , M4

Comments: Page 46

Name: MUSA, QADDURI 'ABD

Sex : Male

Photograph Available

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS)

Comments: Page 10

Name: SALIH, TAHA MAHDI

Sex : Male

Photograph Available

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS) , M16

Comments: Page 27

Document Remarks

██████████ This 71 pages file contains reports within the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), dated between 3 June 1992 and 10 May 1994, regarding an investigation made about the failures and premature exploded bombs, and other explosives. These bombs were intended and planed to destroy targets, including the residence of the US Ambassador in Jakarta, the Office of the American Airlines and Japanese Embassy in the Philippines, targets and installations in Iran and other undisclosed locations elsewhere. - Pages 4-40, 45-48, and 50-71: Minutes of an agenda dated 15 Feb 1994, by the investigative committee of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), headed by Muhsin Dhiyab, about inquiring and investigating reasons way some explosive devices (Bombs), manufactured by Directorate 16 were malfunctioned and failed to blast. The investigation had revealed the following failed explosion attempts and others that exploded prematurely before hitting its targets, which caused the death of a number of operatives: - A bomb exploded prematurely, caused the death of a collaborator inside Iran - A bomb planted inside fuel reservoirs in Iran, but the Iranian authorities have recovered before it explodes. - A bomb intended to destroy the American Ambassador's residence in Jakarta had failed - A bomb designed to destroy the office of the American Airlines and the Japanese Embassy in the Philippines, has exploded prematurely and damaged the front entrance of the Office. This was resulted the death of an Officer, and wounded another. - One hundred bombs sent to different countries around the world, had get through successfully, except five bombs shipped to Egypt with five Fedayeen, whom were captured soon after they arrive at Cairo Airport. - Poisoning attempts failed in a number of occasions, against unidentified individuals. The file also mentioned what had went wrong, and the problems of premature explosions that caused the death of a number of officers, agents and collaborators. In addition, recommendations were made for quality assurance methods to tackle such problems, while stressed safety standards and evaluating the personnel and the techniques of assembling, handling, and transporting. -Pages 41-44: A handwritten report dated 25 Oct 1992, addressed the Technical Consultant, recommending a mine inspection schemes, while referring mines delivered to the Mujahidin Al-Khalaq Organization. The report includes mines technical specifications and mines that exploded prematurely and killed people. -Page 49: A memo dated 20 Apr 1993, within IIS related a presidential order of honoring martyrs who were killed by bombs while handling.

Batch Information	
Batch Number: 3128-10	Boxes in Batch: 6
Capture Information Capturing Unit:DIA/CBIST Date/Time of Capture:24 APR 03 Country of Unit:UNITED STATES Place of Capture:AZMERLI RESIDENCE Coordinates:331929.5N 0441826.8E	
Transmittal Information Transporting Unit:CBIST Date/Time of Arrival:8 MAY 03 Point of Contact: [REDACTED]	
Comments [REDACTED] IIS OFFICER/CHEMICAL WEAPON SCIENTIST RESIDENCE DOCUMENTATION	
[REDACTED]	

CMPC-2003-00015083

Full Translation of Pages 1-71

Page 1

(TC: This page is a triage cover page)

Page 2

(TC: This page is a triage cover page)

Page 3

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
Intelligence Service

Top Secret


Notification

Date: 10 May 1994

Ref: M1/ 1/ 3/ 231

To/ the M2

In reference to your administrative order # 725, dated 7 March 1994, attached is the comment of the IIS director, dated 7 May 1994, regarding his supervision on the performance of Al-Ghafari Project, M16/ 2 (section level). We will take care of the rest of the orders mentioned in the comment. Please review and take the necessary action, with respect.



Chief of the Committee
10 March 1994

Remarks:

The comments of the IIS director have been submitted to Mr. Khalil Ibrahim, the Director of Al-Ghafari project to deal with them directly.

2 June 1994



Page 4

Top Secret and Confidential

Results of the Investigating Committee's Works

1- The Case:

As the approval of IIS director was granted on 15 February 1994, and pursuant to administrative order # 725, dated 7 March 1994, an investigating committee was formed, chaired by M1Director, Muhsin Dhiyab and with the membership of:

- Mr. Farhan Hamid 'Ubayd, section director and M4 representative
- Mr. Ibrahim Khalil Ibrahim- section director and M6 representative

This committee was formed to give explanations of the reasons behind the malfunction of some devices that were manufactured by M16, which led to failure of some missions as follows:

- a- A collaborator in Iran was killed by a device that exploded prematurely.
- b- A hand of another collaborator was severed for the same reason
- c- Another device, attached to a fuel container, did not explode in Iran, which led to detecting and disarming it by Iranian authorities – as stated in excerpt number (1).
- d- These incidents occurred several times. Our system became familiar with this phenomenon; malfunction of devices and uncontrolled explosions. However, these incidents have led to losing some of our sources along with disclosure of our operations, and causing political losses, as stated by the M10 general director. The study of the committee was presented before the director of the IIS on 26 November 1993, pursuant to administrative order number M1/2/1/1120, dated 26 April 1993 –as stated in excerpt number (2).

(1-13)

Page 5

2- Previous Information:

- a- When the First Gulf War broke out, a committee was held to carry out commando operations. This committee, equipped with explosive devices, aimed to attack some hostile targets throughout the world. Thus the following was concluded:

First: Four tasks were carried out; two were successfully completed as planned, the third was planned to blow up the residence of the American Ambassador in Jakarta but the explosive device misfired, and the fourth was targeted to blow up the American Airlines office in the Philippines but exploded during installation, killing an officer and wounding another. Both were affiliated with the IIS. The committee was unable to figure out the cause of this uncontrolled explosion.

Second: There was no difficulty in transporting more than one hundred explosive devices to different countries, except for five that were destined for Egypt by five commandos who were arrested immediately upon arrival at Cairo Airport.

Third: Part of these topics was the subject matter of the committee formed pursuant to administrative order number 120/1496, dated 26 April 1992. Representatives of M1, M4, M16, and M14 were members on the committee.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This indicates a possible leak of information, which would be credited to the wide number of people who were informed, and the inadequacy of safety and security measures, as the M14 representative said, as stated in excerpt number (3).

Page 6

Fourth: According to notification number D4/ 2, dated 2 January 1992, the M4 thinks that the uncontrolled explosions were attributed to a defect in the timing devices, which were produced by the M16 -Technical Consultant Department, as stated in excerpt number (4).

- b- As the approval of the IIS director was granted on 21 February 1993, a fact-finding committee was formed to investigate the these defective devices occurring while carrying out special operations, as follows:

First: On 16 March 1993, an explosive devise burst while installing. This incident caused the death to a source.

Second: On 18 July 1993 a booby-trapped case was blown up by a source because, as it was believed, he tampered with it.

Third: On 27 December 1992 an explosive device blew up while a member of Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization was installing it.

Fourth: On 14 January 1993, an explosive exploded, killing two of our sources while crossing in the south.

Fifth: 13 cases recognized, as well as a booby-trapped car, in which the explosive devices did not explode. Investigations revealed the reason of that was a defect in the detonator.

Sixth: There are unsuccessful tasks in which poisonous substances were used. A task targeting an individual who used a poisonous substance for two years did not perish. A duty of Ministry of Interior was to poison a target. Although he consumed the whole dose, he is still alive and in good condition, as stated in excerpt number (5).

Page 7

Seventh: The aforesaid committee was unable to hold someone directly responsible for that, but it came up with the following suggestions:

- Associate with the Secretariat of the System Al-Ghafiqi Project, M16/ 2, and Special Substances Section (toxics) in an attempt to avoid failures while carrying out special tasks. Reduce the number of people who access the information. The general director of M1 did not back this suggestion up, stating it would not stop these malfunctions and reduce losses. Then, on 26 October 1993, the Director of the Intelligence Service gave orders to start discussing the matter with the M16 Director, Technical Consultant. In the end, the intelligence director concurred with the committee on the recommendations, except to associating the project and the section with the Secretariat. Consequently, M16 was informed of the following, as per notification of M1/ 2/1 / 414, dated 1 February 1994: In coordination with the MIC, the devices are being rechecked by M16 them and reduce detonation failure. The concerned personnel of the technical department are fully responsible for any failure that may occur in future, as stated in excerpt number (5).

- c- On 25 October 1992, a detailed report was submitted to the technical consultant, Director of M16, concerning a field experiment conducted in the presence of representatives of M4 and Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization, who had complained about the performance of the explosive device. The field experiment showed:

First: Four devices and a detonator, out of nine, exploded, representing 55%.

Second: The fifth, which was timed to explode in six hours, blew up after an hour and a half of activation.

-4-

Page 8

Third: The sixth did not blow up because the wire connecting the battery was cut-off.

Fourth: The seventh, which was timed to explode after four hours, did not explode after more than six hours of activation:

Fifth: These devices were selected from a large number of devices that were sent back by the Iranian Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization. This organization said these devices were deficient. This experiment proved that the organization's allegations were correct, regardless of the justifications given by Al-Ghafiqi Project Manager and the Director of the Timers Section, the makers, as stated in excerpt number (6).

- d- Responding to the suggestion mentioned in intelligence service letter number 14/ D2/ 2/589, dated 20 March 1993, intending to honor the two martyrs mentioned under clause B, fourth article, the President commented "This would strengthen our ties with them. But has it come to the intelligence services' attention that the organization that delivered the explosives might have tampered with the explosive devices in order to hurt the installers?" as stated in excerpt number (7).
- e- On 23 March 1992, as per orders from the M1 former Operation Manager regarding conducting field visits to observe the performance of the technical teams, Chief Engineer Muhsin Dhiyab visited Al-Ghafiqi Project and the M16/2. The following notes were submitted to the Secretariat at that time:

First: The technical consultant assigns some affiliates to perform anonymous tasks without the knowledge of Al-Ghafiqi Project Manager and the competent section head. The assignees are not allowed to inform their bosses of targets and details of these tasks.

- 5 -

Page 9

Al-Ghafiqi Project Director and the competent section head upheld these kinds of duties when they were asked by members of our committee.

Second: The work site and the workshops are not arranged. Machinery, equipment, and other services are covered with dust and dirt, which look like old vocational workshops. Members on this committee came to this conclusion when they visited the project site on 24 March 1994.

Third: At that time, there were Palestinian employees working at the workshops without restrictions or precautionary security measures. They mingled freely with affiliates on that project.

Fourth: The affiliates have lots of problems.

Fifth: Conducting tasks takes the shape in a vocational way. There is no quality control or measuring of performance of the results.

Sixth: Labor procedures do not adopt safety, security, and professional measures.

Seventh: Workers are evaluated very well, but they lack capabilities and tendencies to become knowledgeable and courageous, as stated in excerpt number (8).

3- Committees Activities:

- a- The committee reviewed the background of the case and reviewed some of the paperwork of previous committees dealing with failures that occurred in previous assignments where explosive devices were used. The committee has visited the work site of Al-Ghafiqi Project, discussed the matter of the timers' manufacturing with the project director, the competent section head and the workers, and written down some explanations, as stated in excerpt number (9).
- b- Check the security backgrounds of some personnel working in the field of producing timers. They are:
 - Engineer Talib 'Abd-al-Hadi

M6

- 6 -

Page 10

- Technician Haydar Muslim Dawud
- Technician Qadduri 'Abd Musa

A member of the committee, who is an affiliate of the M6, declared that everything is correct.

- c- Testing six timers out of 19 reveals they are functioning effectively, except for one that exploded at the time of activation. This malfunction happened due to the fact that it required connection to electrical currency in two stages, which was agreed on. This raised doubt that the assignee may have committed a mistake or have not abided by instructions, and as a result, led to the explosion.
- d- Six timers were tested. The first exploded at the specified time, the second exploded 4 minutes before the specified time, the third, the fourth, and the fifth blew up 10 minutes before the time planned, and the sixth exploded 22 minutes after the set time, as stated in excerpt number (10).
- e- The committee has noticed that the workflow goes in a rudimentary way because there was no systematization or arrangement. The status of affairs was as mentioned in the visit report dated 23 March 1992, mentioned in (e), (2) above.
- f- The committee has noticed that the malfunction issue was not given enough concern by M16. However, they settled for notifying just the section head in order to take some measures. This was forwarded by notification of M1/3/1/414, dated 1 April 1994, which was mentioned in (B), (2) above, excerpt number (9).

- g- The Project Director and competent section head blamed the executive authorities in that they committed technical and procedural mistakes while assembling the explosive devices and connecting them to batteries. As a result, this would lead to uncontrolled explosions or failure to explode.

In such cases, there should be safety precautions built into the product.

- 7 -

Page 11

The committee has consulted the Project director and competent section head on the issue in order to come up with an acceptable conclusion and disregard blaming the executive authorities. On the other hand, the executive authorities blame the manufacturing authorities. The committee was surprised as the two parties, executive and manufacturing, submitted the enclosed report, excerpt number (11), which summarizes the following:

First: Before 1986, the work and the results were better than now. There were no malfunctions. Earlier failure resulted from being connected to Technical Consultant and to the Palestinians. They requested their affiliation be to the leadership of the IIS. They claimed to reconsider the project structure and change it to be a directorate instead of a section.

Second: The leadership of M16, Technical Consultant, was busy laying down plans and conducting researches not feasible to their work field and discarded what was useful to their job.

Third: The Technical Consultant limits their work, deprives them of their authorities, and treats them as workers, causing this result, but they declined to write that down in the report.

Fourth: Personnel of the project have different specialties. The specialty and will to work were not taken into consideration while choosing to work in this project. Most of them are transferred from other departments (punished). The project has not been provided with cadres having the required specialties. They said that the affiliates need encouragement and enlightenment.

Fifth: Some devices, substances and detonators existed before the First Gulf War. Their efficiency and quality were affected due to not being stored under good conditions.

** They are right concerning Palestinian members. If they have the possibility to transfer them, why do they not do that and utilize them in different places.*

Present names and general ideas.

- 8 -

Page 12

Sixth: The recognized conditions forced us to resort to local markets and purchase devices and low-level substances not suitable for this kind of work.

Seventh: They are not provided with proper precautionary measures suitable for their kind of dangerous work conditions.

This is true, but they are responsible for any failure

Eighth: They are not evaluated despite the fact they make the explosive devices and support the assignees' success. Affiliates of M4 and M14 are evaluated but M16/ 2 are not.

What are the reasons?

Ninth: The project faces the problem of issuing allowances for housing and food to affiliates traveling to governorates. This problem burdens affiliates and creates discouragement among them.

They present the proposed freedoms for studying

Tenth: Because of the embargo, they lack devices and substances needed for the manufacturing process.

Present the needed location

Eleventh: They demand:

- To be granted more freedom to work and be free from so many restrictions.
- To be given privileges granted to intelligence teams.
- To be housed in suitable dwellings.
- Reconsider the structure, the cadres, and the association to the Technical Consultant.
- Reconsider the cadres of the project and provide it with qualified personnel
- ...Etc.

To be looked into it

Submit names of unqualified personnel and nominate qualified personnel

Page 13

4- Reasons behind the failure to complete tasks:

In light of what was stated above, we have reached the conclusion that reasons leading to the failure of completing tasks lie in the following:

- a- Low quality manufacturing, especially timers and igniters, which are made of cheap and bad-quality components prone to lose some of their characteristics while exposed to factors such as heat, humidity, vibration, low battery, and resistance to shock. Consequently, producing explosive devices require high accuracy and advanced care during transportation, storage, installation, and activation. The assignees and sources should be highly qualified and given a high level of training. This mechanism, prepared by technical consultant, M16, showed failure and irrelevance to circumstances, conditions of the work, and assignees executing the tasks.
- b- Although the former committee announced its recommendations indicating that M16 should reinspect the manufactured substances, develop their technical status, reduce failures, and hold itself completely responsible for any failure of any task that may occur, as stated in excerpt number (5), the committee has not observed that the technical consultant and his personnel were not highly concerned about such a case. At this time they will be responsible for failure occurring in most tasks.
- c- There is conviction indicating that the failure of tasks....

- 10 -

Page 14

....is accounted for by the sources themselves. Take into consideration that this would be in very limited cases because it is inconceivable that the source would deliberately risk his life. But it happened due to lack of knowledge or being out of their control, especially when we know that some of people who died are:

- An officer assigned to special operations in the IIS
- Some sources affiliated with Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization
- Some sources affiliated with the Kurdistan Democratic Party

What was known about these people is that they were well-qualified to carry out such duties.

5- Suggestions:

In light of the dangerous status of this issue, the heavy losses in the arena of politics, intelligence, and finance, the difficulty to convince sources to use these explosives because they have killed a lot of people using them and some have not exploded, to avoid atrocities like Lockerby, and the former committee recommendations did not positively improve the status, which require making decisive decisions regarding the seriousness of the matter, the committee believe and stress that the following suggestions are better means for achieving the goal in this field.

- 11 -

Page 15

What is the requested process?

What are the measures?

Page 16

- a. The question of the Service Director to the technical consultant regarding the repetition of failures and flops, and not taking the appropriate actions according to the previous recommendations of the investigation committee, especially that mentioned in paragraph 2. The recommendations were sent to the Technical Consultant Division according to notification of Directorate 1/2/1 number 414 on 1 Feb 1994.
- b. Studying the subject of reorganizing Al-Ghafiqi Section by a committee to be formed in the Service, according to a suggestion of the section's head and Division's head /slip of paper No 12 / *(we did not find it)*
- c. Adopting new work procedures to suit the duties and missions, after the failure of the previous duties.
- d. Carrying out duties and missions in a way that enables us to identify problems, disclaim responsibility, and relinquish the state of "floating" the responsibility *(we did not understand the paragraph)*
- e. Providing good devices, parts and equipment to manufacture reliable and good products that can resist weather, chemical, and electrical conditions that may appear during the mission, taking into consideration the qualifications and conditions of the sources.
- f. Adopting a program to qualify and train the sources and those who work on special duties to decrease catastrophes and failures.
- g. Adopting new work procedures regarding vocational safety, security and quality control. These procedures should be mandatory for all sections and divisions.

12

Page 17

- h. Having a file for failed missions to review and study the file to benefit from it in setting future plans to avoid such failures later.
- i. Evaluating the affiliates continuously and excluding the unqualified individuals in term of educational, technical, security and personal level.
- j. Supporting work, scientifically and technically, with qualified individuals from the other divisions of the Service or from national organizations
- k. Reconsidering the subject of the qualified individuals from the Penal Section and Al-Ghafiqi Section who work in other sections and in positions that do not suit their specializations. Most of the aforementioned individuals have high degrees and were replaced with less qualified individuals.

With appreciation



Ibrahim Khalil Ibrahim
Committee member
Section's Head-
representative of M6



Farhan Hamid 'Ubayd
Committee Member
Section's Head-
representative of M4



Muhsin Dhiyab Barakat
Head of Committee
Representative of M 10
24 Apr 1994

13

14

Page 18

Opinion and Decision



To write to Directorate 2
19 Feb



Director of the Service
15 Apr 1994

Director of the Service

Mr. Director of Directorate 4
Kindly



16 February

Kindly review...and we agree with the suggestion to form an investigation council to look into the reasons that led to these incidents
With appreciation

Deputy Director
14 Feb 1994

Secret and Personal

Deputy Director

Kindly review... What has been mentioned regarding the "timers" given by our Service is a dangerous thing and we should know its real reasons. Accordingly, we agree with the suggestion to form an investigation council from Directorates 1, 4 and 6 to look into the matter...with appreciation



14 Feb 1994

Page 19

Information Form 11

Presidency of the Republic
Intelligence Service

Mr. General Director of Directorate 4
Subject: Timers

1. We received the approval of the Service Director on 12 Jul 1993 to supply the Kurdistan Democratic Party with (30) timers, manufactured by Directorate 16, to carry out operations against Iranian establishments.
2. In order not to reveal the methods of our service in using the new devices, second-hand timers, according to a request of the concerned directorate, were manufactured, because the beneficiary party is one of the collaborating parties with our service and it is not one of the trusted Service sources.
3. The representative of the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Iran informed us of the following information when we met him on 12 Feb 1994:
 - a. One of their members was killed by a bomb carrying one of the timers mentioned above. The battery and the operating wires were connected, but the timers did not work.
 - b. A bomb exploded in one of their member's hand, which led to its amputation. The battery and the operating wires were connected, but the timer exploded prematurely. The timer was supposed to explode after four hours.
 - c. The party laid a bomb on a fuel tank in the Kharishah area, but the timer did not work. Iranian authorities were able to discover the bomb and disassemble it that day.
 - d. The party tested the rest of the timers, and found that some of them are not working and some of them do not work if...

(1-2)

Page 20

Information form 11

Presidency of the Republic
Intelligence Service

Mr
Subject:

...they were moved after connecting the battery. Some of the timers are not accurate.

- e. The party sent back the 19 timers that were given to them
- f. The same problem happened to the timers given to the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization. The problem was discussed with comrade Khalil Ibrahim Fayyad, head of the section, during his meeting with the organization on 28 May 1993.
- g. These accidents became obvious and repetitive due to the increase in accidents that our sources suffer from. This will make the sources lose their trust in the devices we give them and will make us lose our sources.

Kindly, review...and we suggest forming an investigation council to find out the delinquent party and to avoid such failures and problems in the future...with appreciation

As'ad
13 February

Signature
Munir Mahmud Ahmad
Director of the Third International Division
13 February

Page 21

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
Intelligence Service
Notification



Secret and Personal

Information form 4

Date: 20 Feb 1994
Ref: M4/74

To / Directorate 4 /7

We got the approval of the service director to form an investigation committee from Directorates 1, 4, and 6 to know the real reasons for breakdown of some devices manufactured by Directorate 16 that led to failure of some special duties. The representative of Directorate 4 is Mr. Farhan Hamid 'Ubayd, head of Division 2/2.

Kindly review and take the necessary action...with appreciation

Enclosures
Copy of the approval



Directorate 4 / MD 2

(1-1)

Secret and Personal

Page 22

In the Name of God Most Merciful Most Compassionate

Mr / Director of the Intelligence Service

1. The following is the minutes of the committee assigned to find the reasons of the repetitive failures of Directorate 16, in order to know the weaknesses that led to losing some sources, aborting some operations, and suffering some political losses.
2. The representative of Directorate 16 did not clarify and explain some paragraphs mentioned in the investigation, and this was mentioned in the attached memorandum
3. The committee did not pay attention to the technical aspects and did not (Illegible) the representative or discuss his notes before giving the final decision and presenting the recommendations. The suggestion to connect the two sections with the secretariat will not stop the failures or decrease the losses. We have to know the real reasons of the concerned division by asking that division to present a report in which they illustrate the reasons of failures and their suggestions to deal with the problems before approving the recommendations of the committee.

Kindly, review...with appreciation

26 Oct 1993

Page 23

Top Secret

A committee's report

Referring to administrative order number 120/1496 on 26 Apr 1992 regarding forming a committee to study the issue of the explosive devices dispensed by Directorate 16 to Directorates 4 and 14.

The following actions have been taken:

1. Introduction

Directorate 16 dispensed explosive devices to Directorates 4 and 14 to be used in Umm Al-Ma'arik. During the conference of Directorate 16, the Director of the Intelligence Service issued his directions as follows:

- a. Showing how and for what purpose the 139 explosive devices were dispensed
- b. Results of use, accuracy of impact, and destruction force
- c. Any other remarks that can be useful in developing the explosive devices in the future
- d. Technical evaluation for the reason why the explosive device used by Directorate 4 in the Philippines detonated prematurely

In light of what has been mentioned, Directorate 1 addressed Directorates 4, 14 and 16 through 8 official letters. They reached no result. This is what led to forming the above-mentioned committee.

2. The committee held many meetings, and after the investigations, the committee reached the following:

A. The number of dispensed devices was:

- Directorate 4 31 explosive devices
- Directorate 14 75 explosive devices

This means that the total is 106 explosive devices, not 193 as mentioned in the correspondence.

Representative of Directorate 16 pointed out that 87 of the 193 explosive devices ...

(1-5)

Page 24

Top Secret

...that were produced according to the request to Directorates 4 and 14 were not received because the operations finished. Directorate 16 secured the explosive devices for future use.

B. Directorates 4 and 14 dispensed the explosive devices they had, as clarified in attachments 1 and 2 that show:

- Name of the party that received the explosive devices
- Date of receiving
- Results of usage

C. Summary of usage / attachment 3

1- Directorate 14 returned 16 explosive devices and Directorate 4 returned 9 explosive devices to Directorate 16. The total was 25 explosive devices.

2- Directorate 4 dispensed the following:

A. 15 explosive devices to Abu-al-'Abbas and Abu al-Tayyib Group/ The devices have not been used yet.

B. 7 explosive devices to the Egyptian Fedayeen (Commandoes) / they were arrested along with the devices by the Egyptian Police at Cairo Airport.

3- Directorate 14 dispensed the following:

A. 15 explosive devices to Abu Dawud, Abu Al-'Abbas, and Abu Al-Tayyib Groups / The devices have not been used yet.

B- 5 explosive devices to the representative of the Arab Liberation Front / The results are not known yet.

C. 4 explosive devices to Ibrahim Qlaylat/ The results are not known yet

4- 10 explosive devices were used by Directorate 4 to bomb 2 headquarters, 4 vehicles, and 6 Iranian individuals. The accuracy of impact and destructive force were very good, and everything went according to the plan.

Page 25

5- 3 explosive devices were used by Directorate 4 to burn the Japanese embassy and the American Airline office in Manila (Philippines). The accuracy of impact and destructive force were very good, and everything went according to plan.

6- 1 explosive device was used by Directorate 4 to destroy the residence of the American ambassador in Jakarta, but the device did not work and the reasons are unknown.

7- 12 explosive devices were destroyed by Directorate 14.

8- An explosive device exploded prematurely, led to death of a first lieutenant, injured an employee belonging to the service, and destroyed the front side of the American Airlines office (the target) in the Philippines. Directorate 14 made the device and Directorate 16 made the timer.

3. The representative of Directorate 16 presented the attached report that includes some negative remarks about work procedures that affect the results, and he suggested:

- a) Parties benefit from explosive devices and when executing the mission should let the bomb manufacturers in Directorate 16 be involved in planning and give them enough information before they manufacture the devices.
- b) No mediators (third party) should be allowed to request the devices. Customarily, Directorate 4 asks Directorate 14 to provide it with explosive devices to be used by members of Directorate 4, and then Directorate 14 requests the devices from Directorate 17.

4. In its letter number 1 on 8 Jan 1992, Directorate 14 pointed out that the technical evaluation for one of the devices exploding prematurely (item 8 paragraph 2) is...

(3)

Page 26

... the timer did not work correctly because:

- either a mistake was made by the executors
- or there was a technical fault in the timer

In spite of that, the investigation committee formed for this purpose was unable to determine the real reason.

5. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This means that there is an indirect leak of information, and the reason might be the large number of individuals who knows about the explosive devices or a deficiency in security procedures.

6. Recommendations

In the light of what has been mentioned, the committee recommends the following:

- a. Asking Directorates 4 and 14 to contact the groups that were given explosive devices (Abu Al-Tayyib, Abu Dawud, Abu Al-'Abbas, and representative of the Arab Liberation Front) to find out the results of using these devices and to find out what happened to the devices they still have. The directorates should also inquire about the possibility of retrieving the devices that have not been used in order to give Directorate 16 a chance to deal with the problem to guarantee that the secret of these devices will not be revealed in the future.
- b. The parties that use the devices are to supply Directorate 16 with detailed technical information about the target, and to discuss the information related to the design of the explosive device to insure it suits the target in order to get the best results.
- c. Directorate 16 is to improve the executors' efficiency, especially affiliates of Directorate 14, by

Page 27

...increasing mandatory rehabilitative and training courses

- d. Increasing procedures of security safety of its three aspects (establishment security, individual security, and documents security) to keep secrets and decrease the number of those who communicate with Directorates 4, 14 and 16 regarding designing and manufacturing the devices.
- e. Directorates 4 and 14 are to supply Directorate 16 with the technical results of using the devices for the goal of developing the manufacture of the devices.
- f. The beneficiary parties, especially Directorate 4, should request the devices directly from Directorate 16 without mediating with Directorate 14, unless there are members from Directorate 14 participating in the mission.



Member
Taha Mahdi Salih
Head of Division/Directorate 16
3 Jun 1992



Member
'Abd-al-Wahhab 'Ammar Jasim
Head of Division/Directorate 14
3 Jun 1992



Member
Sahir Shuhadhah Jum'ah
Head of Section/ Directorate 14



Head of committee
Muhsin Dhiyab Barakat
Directorate 6/ 2
3 Jun 1992

Page 28

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
Intelligence Service
Notification



Date: 2 Jan 1992
Ref: M4/D4/2

Secret and Personal

Mr. / General Director of the Secretariat

Your secret and personal notification 5260 on 31 Dec 1991

We have no negative remarks regarding the bombs, except one accident, which is the explosion of the ninth bomb that was sent to the Philippines. The explosion led to the death of one of the fighters and the injuring of another. We think that the reason for the explosion was the timer, taking into consideration that Directorate 14 has the accurate evaluation for the accident.

Kindly review...with appreciation



The acting General Director of Directorate 4
1 Jan 1992

To ask directorate 16
Signature
2 Jan 1992

(1-1)
Secret and Personal

Page 29

Mr / General Director of Directorate 1

Executing the order of the Intelligence Service Director on 21 Apr 1993, an investigation committee was formed to find out the reasons for some special operations' abortions due to the explosion of some devices prematurely, the explosion failure of devices or the failure to use poisonous substances. The committee held many meetings to discuss the subject and some specialized officers were asked to attend. The committee also sent one of the committee members to Intelligence Systems of the Northern and Eastern Zones to take a field look on the reason for failures and the way to deal with such cases. The committee came to the following:

1. Failures in using all types of explosive devices:

Types:

- a. On 16 Mar 1993, a plastic ground explosive detonated while the source, 'Ismat Husayn Hajji Al-Dawsaki, was connecting the fuse, and led to his death.

The reason for the failure might be:

- 1- A technical fault in the mine's manufacture and connecting methods

(1-8)

Page 30

2- Misuse of the source using the mine and not dealing with it as he was trained

In both cases, it is hard to find the real reasons because the source died and we have no decisive indications.

- b. On 14 May 1992, the source was supplied with a booby-trapped case, and on 18 Jul 1992, the case exploded while he was tampering with it. We found out that the case exploded while the source and his cousin were tampering with it, which means that the reason for failure is misuse of the case.
- c. On 27 Dec 1992, a time bomb exploded inside a hotel while one of Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization members was setting the timer. The reason for the failure might be:
 - 1- Technical fault in the bomb
 - 2- Because the bomb was transferred to Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization by a mediator, who was not trained in using the bomb
- d. On 4 Jan 1993, two of our sources died, while crossing a marsh to carry out a duty, when a time bomb exploded.

2

Page 31

By reviewing the report of the investigation council, formed according to administrative order number 37, dated 23 Jan 93, we could not confirm any intended act that was conducted to detonate the bombs. Therefore, the incidents can be attributed to the following reasons: First: Technical failure, caused by the Technical Consultant Department as a result of not preparing it perfectly. A technical defect can occur during severe conditions and crossing rivers, causing a blast resulting in human and material losses, along with the political cost by uncovering our sources and activities inside Iran.

Second: It is possible that the bombs were affected by shock, due to the long trip and rainy weather, along with not transporting them correctly according to the given instructions.

-3-

Page 32

In addition, the carelessness of the executing elements regarding the correct way to handle these bombs by not complying with the instructions and training given by the officers and technicians of the Technical Consultant Department have caused many similar incidents previously.

2. Blasts incidents out of the specified times:

It is credited to two reasons:

A) A technical failure of the bomb

B) The most probable reason is the inaccuracy of the tracking officer, who provided the source a bomb with a two-hour timer instead of a bomb with a four-hour timer.

3. Blast failures:

Thirteen blast failure incidents were identified, along with the failure of a booby-trapped vehicle.

-4-

Page 33

The failures were ascribed to M 16, but the real reason is the failure of the battery and fuse, which are not by the IIS.

Poisons:

It was clear to the committee that individuals who were targeted using toxic materials haven't died, although some of them were targeted for two years. Furthermore, there are several failures that led to the uncovering of resources and arrests made on them because the targets felt physical symptoms. For example, when we assigned M 16 to make a poisoned food in order to poison several targets, we were informed later that they were vomiting and did not die

-5-

(TC: Pages 34-36 are not scanned in sequence. They are arranged according to the original sequence)

Page 36

Recommendations:

The committee sent in their report to the Technical Consultant Department as to the cause for the failures. The committee also discussed the matter with them. The department stated that it was the mistake of the source or the officer who misused these bombs or materials, although they were previously instructed on the correct measures to be taken. The committee could build a clear picture about the matter due to the death of several sources. But the committee recommended insuring the following procedures to avoid such failures in the future:

- A) The materials or equipment should be delivered to the concerned person by the staff of M 16, along with training him on using them precisely and in detail.
- B) Checking the materials and equipment, manufactured by M 16 with the coordination of the MIC in order to improve its technical level and avoid failures. The M 16 is developing equipment with the coordination of the MIC to deterdevice

-6-

Page 35

the capability of measuring and testing batteries and fuses to ensure their efficiency in order to achieve a high rate of success. The concerned personnel in M 16 will be responsible for any failure occurring in the future.

- C) Limit these duties to the specialized personnel in M 16 and specialized committees in the IIS. They should check equipment validity and prepare forms before handing it over to the concerned individuals. The forms should be destroyed after executing the mission.
- D) Reevaluate the Head of the Poisons Preparation Section by the Secretariat and M 6.
- E) Although the Chemical Preparation and Explosives Divisions are subordinate to the Technical Consultant Department they fell under the M 16 administratively.

-7-

Page 34

Therefore, the committee suggests making it part of the IIS Secretariat in order to control the operation of the two divisions, keep their confidentiality, and provide them with the required support due to the sensitive nature of their duties.

F) The M 16 should stop giving excuses after failures.

Please execute and order

Regards

(Signature)
Farhan Hamid
Member (M 4)

(Signature)
Khudayr Isma'il Ibrahim
Head of the Committee (M 1)

(Signature)
Safi Bahr Hazza'
Member (M 5)

(Signature)
Khalil Ibrahim Fayyad
Member (M 16)

-8-

Page 37

(Crests of the Republic and the IIS)

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
Intelligence Service (IIS)
Office of the IIS Director

Top Secret and Confidential

Ref No M 1/2/1/4014

Date: 1 Feb 94

To: Director of M 16

The approval of the IIS Director was obtained based on the recommendations of the committee, headed by the Head of the Intelligence Section in M 1, with the membership of the Head of the Northern Section, the Head of the Opposition Section in M 4 and the Director of the Operations Department in Al-Khafiqi Project. The committee was formed to discuss the failures occurring in explosives and chemical materials used in executing some special duties. The approved recommendations are as follows:

1- The materials or equipment should be delivered to the concerned person by the staff of M 16, along with training him on using them precisely and in detail.

-1-

Page 38

B) Checking the materials and equipment manufactured by M 16 in coordination with the MIC in order to improve its technical level and avoid its failures. The M 16 is developing equipment, with the coordination of the MIC, with the capability of measuring and testing batteries and fuses to ensure their sufficiency in order to achieve a high rate of success. The concerned personnel in M 16 will be responsible for any failure that occurs in the future.
C) Limit these duties with the specialized personnel in M 16 and specialized committees in the IIS, where they should check the equipment's validity and prepare forms about it before handing it over to the concerned individuals.

-2-

Page 39

The forms should be destroyed after executing the mission.

4. Issuing a form to follow up on the stages of the mission, including the duty requirements and training procedures. The form has to be signed by the officer affiliated to the beneficiary and the technician, affiliated to M 16. After performing the mission, another form should be completed regarding the success rate of the mission, along with the failures and mistakes without mentioning any information...

-3-

Page 40

about the target, in order to avoid such failures by M 16 in future by concentrating on technical issues written in detail.

Please exadevice and take the required procedures.

Regards

(Signature)

For M 1 Operations Director

29 Jan 94

Muhammad

29 Jan 94

Khudayr

29 Jan 94

-4-

Page 41

Top Secret and Confidential

Ref. No. 13/27/10

Date: 25 Oct 92

To the Technical Consultant

Subject: Checking bombs

The Mujahidin-e-Khalq was provided with several sticking and normal devices in various batches. The devices were delivered by As'ad Makki, the representative of the Special Work Team. The organization stated that one of the devices blew up accidentally and led to the death of one of their members while he was connecting it to a battery.

In reference to your orders according to the letter, we met with their representatives in the attendance of Farhan Hamid, the Head of Iran Section and As'ad Makki. We suggested testing the bombs in the field, and the representatives of the organization agreed on the suggestion. Therefore, we headed at 0930 on 24 Oct 92 to Al-Khalis Camp, which belongs to the organization, and met the Security and Technical Supervisor of the camp. We agreed on testing randomly-selected devices. Some were tested by them and did not blow up. We moved to the test field, 15 km away from the camp. We selected 8 devices with different timers; two types of each timer. The selection was also random and included the devices that were tested by them and did not blow up. We connected each device with 20 m long blast cables and adjusted the timers. The blast times were as follows:

A) Sticking magnetic device: It is timed at 6 hours and connected to a battery, belonging to us.

Operating Time: 1435 hrs

Blast Time: 2040 (it exploded at the specific time)

-1-

Page 42

B) Sticking magnetic device: It is timed at 2 hours and connected to a battery, belonging to them. It was tested by them and did not blast.

Operating Time: 1446 hrs

Blast Time: 1648 (it exploded at the specific time)

C) Sticking magnetic device: It is timed at 2 hours and connected to a battery, belonging to us.

Operating Time: 1449 hrs

Blast Time: 1645 (it exploded at the specific time)

D) Sticking magnetic device: It is timed at 3 hours and connected to a battery, belonging to us.

Operating Time: 1448 hrs

Blast Time: 1746 (it exploded at the specific time)

E) Sticking magnetic device: It is timed at 3 hours and connected to a battery, belonging to them.

Operating Time: 1449 hrs

Blast Time: 1727 (it exploded at the specific time)

F) Sticking magnetic device: It is timed at 6 hours and connected to a battery, belonging to them.

Operating Time: 1440 hrs

Blast Time: 1605 (it exploded before the specific time; 90 minutes after the operating time)

-2-

Page 43

G) Sticking magnetic device: It is timed at 4 hours and connected to a battery, belonging to us.

Operating Time: 1430 hrs

Blast Time: It did not explode due to a cut in the battery cable caused by the blast of the close devices.

H) Four-hour timer of the same type that they provided it with. It was connected to a battery, belonging to us and an electric detonator.

Operating Time: 1327 hrs

Blast Time: 1727 (it exploded within the specific time)

Based on the conducted test, none of the devices exploded directly after connecting them to batteries. In addition, all timers were operational and adjusted, except for two cases. After testing the unexploded device, mentioned in clause (G), it was found that its cables were affected by the blast of the close devices. While the device, mentioned in clause (H), did not explode due to two probabilities. The first is the invalidity of the electric detonator and the decay of its chemical components, where a similar detonator was opened before the representatives of the organization and found wet. The second probability is the failure of the timer and this will be specified later after testing it.

-3-

Page 44

Here are three probabilities regarding the case mentioned in clause (F). They are as follows:

First Probability: Placing a 90 minute timer by mistake during manufacture.

Second Probability: Programming the timer mistakenly. Although the programming process is conducted while transporting the bombs and equipment from place to place quickly, due to a lack of time and urgent orders from various parties, along with the difficulty of these operations, it is a weak probability because it is done by two individuals. The first individual is responsible for programming the timer and the second individual is assigned to recheck the programming.

Third Probability: It is possible that the beneficiary misused them in some way and that led to the killing of one of their members because no such case occurred in the test, conducted under our supervision.

Based on the field tests and what was mentioned before, the bombs are operational if used and stored correctly according to the instructions.

Page 45

Presidency of the Republic
Intelligence Service

To: M 4 Operation Director
Subject: Investigational Committee

In reference to the approval of the IIS Director, dated 15 Feb 94, regarding administrative order number 527, dated 7 Mar 94. We are attaching the conclusions of the investigational committee concerning the discussed topic.

Please exadevice

Regards

Enclosures:

Report of the committee (13-page)

Primary documents (5-page)

(Signature)

Head of the Committee

Muhsin Dhiyab Barakat


Representative of M 1

7 May 94


Page 46

4. To prevent this type of situation from happening again, we made a suggestion to the organization's representatives. This was to leave the timer's wires and the electrical detonator hanging out, and not tied to the explosive charge, so the party using this charge, to test the preset time for detonation. This was accomplished by tying a light bulb to the wires coming out from the timer and operating it by connecting it to the battery. When the light lit up after the preset time, the technician using the device would disconnect the battery and discharge any possible current available, then connect the detonator wires with the timer wires, and prepare it for use, after inspecting the preset time,
5. We said before that we took back the devices that did not explode and removed the hardened explosives from the device, even though it is a dangerous procedure, to extract the timers and detonators. We did this to test and find the reason why the devices did not explode and to find the real cause of this situation.


Please read. Regards



As'ad Maki
Special Team Representative
Directorate 4
25 Oct 1992



Mahfuz 'Abd-al-Wahab Al-Shaykh
Senior Engineer
Directorate 16/2



Khalil Ibrahim Fayyad
Engineer illegible Chemists
Directorate 16/2
25 Oct 1992

-5-

Top Secret, and Confidential

Page 47

102

Opinion and Decision

I have read, and noted the remarks
I directly supervise the activities of this section

Iraqi Intelligence Director
7 May 1994

Top Secret

To the Iraqi Intelligence Service Director

Kindly read the recommendations of the committee which was formed to investigate why some of the devices manufactured by Directorate 16 malfunctioned, which effected the outcome of some of the special team tasks.

We solicit your directions to approve recommendations of the committee

Regards,

Comrade Muhsin Dhiyab

Please study



Director General of directorate 4

7 May 1994


To the Chairman of the investigation

Addressed to the Iraqi Intelligence Service Director's notes

Page 48

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Gracious

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
Iraqi Intelligence Service
IRIS



Number 725
Date 7 Mar 1994

Administrative Order

Acting upon the Iraqi Intelligence Service Director's approval, and upon the powers vested in me per Administrative Order Number 7422, dated 30 July 1986.

I sanction forming a committee headed by Muhsin Dhiyab Barakat (SATTs M1), in addition to the individuals mentioned below, as members of this committee.

On behalf of the Director
Iraqi Intelligence Service
6 Mar 1994

Name:

1. Farhan Hamid 'Ubayd, Section Director, Directorate 4
2. Ibrahim Khalil Ibrahim, Section Director, Directorate 6

Copy to:

The chairman and members of the committee
Directorate M4/7, your letter number 702, dated 2 Mar 1994, for reference

Page 49

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Gracious

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
The Secretary



((Top Secret and Confidential))

Number \3\91\2548\k
Date 30 April 1993

Presidency of the Republic
Intelligence Service
Service Director Office
Number: 508
Date: 1 May 1993

To Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service
Subject: Honoring Martyrs

President Saddam's orders regarding the recommendations mentioned in letter number \140\d2\2\589, dated 20 Mar 1993, the following:

((This could expose our connection with them. Did it occur to the Intelligence Service that the party who delivered the explosives might have tampered with it so that it will explode in the affiliates of the IIS instead!?!))

Take the necessary actions, with regards

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be a stylized 'S' or 'Saddam'.

The Secretary of the President of the Republic
30 April 1993

(SATTS H\29\4)

To the Secretariat
Review, and give your comments
after you coordinate with
Directorate 4

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be a stylized 'S' or 'Saddam'.

1 May 1993

Page 50

Secretariat
Intelligence Service
Follow-up (tracking) directorate – Section 2
Technical Division

Form Number MF2

Field Visit Report

1. Visit Number: 1
2. Time and date of visit: 10:45, 23 Mar, 30 Mar 1992.
3. Location visited \ directorate: Directorate 16/2, Al-Ghafiqi Project
 - a. section: Al-Ghafiqi Project
 - b. division: four divisions were visited
4. Name of visitor and his designation: Chief Engineer Muhsin Dhiyab Barakat
5. Details of the visit, matter checked and identified:

Evaluation and notes

- a. Attendance roster: used
- b. skeleton crew attendance roster: used
- c. daily activities and tasks logbook: used
- d. a log book for recording the value of services rendered to recipient parties: not used
- e. unsuccessful missions log book: not used
- f. a logbook for recording major malfunctions and problems that are used as examples to be learned from in future cases: not used
- g. monthly minutes of meetings and conventions: not used
- h. comments and methods of evaluating performance: not used
- k. Plan, budget, annual secret report: not used

Note: The person conducting this visit should read the visitors directives guide (form number MF1\...)

Page 51

- a. The annual inventory and the methods for increasing the stock balance: no inventory is available and there are no standard procedures. There is no set time for conducting the annual inventory.
- b. Record of names of companies and parties dealt with for business purposes: Not available
- c. A file of all the training and development lectures given to the affiliates of the party visited and the affiliates of other parties (leaflet announcing the training lecture and the contents of the training): Not available. There is no plan for training or lectures
- d. Policies and rules for conducting import work: Not available and never used before
- e. Forms showing the steps to be taken for protecting security.
- f. Forms showing the procedures to provide safety for workers (industrial safety procedures manual book).
- g. Procedures and plans for development and modernization of work.
- h. Schedules and methods used to manage cadre promotions and transfers between governorates and other formations.
- i. Sheets showing technical and commercial specifications for equipment and devices, in addition to installation, operation, and maintenance procedures.
- j. Inspect selected areas of operation for the divisions, and sections in detail to make sure that performance is up to standards.

Page 52

Problems and obstacles standing in the path of work and workers:

a. **Problems facing work** (Give a brief description. Details will be attached to the visit's report if the need calls for it): The areas of the carpentry and smithery workshops are inadequate. All divisions are understaffed. The section director and the technical advisor assign affiliates work without informing the division's director, which causes negative repercussions

b. **Negative and Positive Comments** (Give a brief description. Include details in the visit's report):

First: Work areas and workshops are untidy. Machinery, equipment and other installations (utilities) are covered with dust and dirt. It looks like an ancient private workshop.

Second: Palestinian individuals are working in the workshops freely without any control, or security procedures, or precautions. They are also mixing and mingling (interacting) with the directorate's affiliates in every aspect.

c. **Employees personal problems and work related problems:** (Give a brief description. Include the details in the visit's report):

First: Some employees are living in remote areas. They have transportation problems.

Second: Some employees work in hazardous conditions. They are not being compensated like other government and security services employee working in hazardous conditions

Third: A group of the institute's graduates are in custody of workhouse materials they don't want to handle

Fourth: Personal needs (the most important are):

Employee 'Abd-al-Sattar Madi Mutwih is suffering from an illness and his son is deaf. He can't treat h

is son in Iraq. He is asking to be nominated to work in an embassy as a guard.

Chief physicist 'Abd-al-Kazim Muhammad Nayif has a civil service record of 24 years. He has held the position of section director, division director, and now is working as a technical officer. His company's car has been taken away from him and he is asking to be given a company car again.

Page 53

7. The Visit's findings:

- a. Carrying out duties and tasks: Work is being carried out literally, exactly according to instructions. No quality control, measurement of the product's competence, and production
- b. Course and Procedures of Work: The standard course of action. Work standard procedures are not being followed or applied. In spite of its importance, security, professional, and quality control standard procedures are not being complied with.
- c. Evaluating Employee's Performance: Good. There is a lot of potential but needs encouraging and incentives
- e. Administrative Units: Division directors complain that the section director and the technical advisor assign jobs to their employees without their knowledge, causing a communications gap and an administrative problem, and making it difficult to control employee actions
- f. Others: None

8. Recommendations and Suggestions:

Direct the project to adopt the attached standard procedures as applicable, and adjust (alter) it to suit their scope (field) of work. Give more attention to security, and professional (industrial) safety procedures. Standardize time (set certain periods of time to carry out certain jobs), adopt quality control, and set up standards and goals to measure and evaluate performance, production and products. In other words, adopt the concepts of modern industrial management.



30 Mar 1992

Name and signature of the person who conducted the visit

Muhsin Dhiyab Barakat

Chief Engineer

The above information is not final. Better results can be achieved by apply experience to reach the desired results.

Page 54

Answers given by Mr. Khalil Ibrahim, Director, Directorate 16/2

1. Was the committee's recommendations, mentioned in letter number M1\2\1\414, dated 1 Feb 1994, forwarded?
2. What did the Director of Directorate 16 order you to do in light of the committee's recommendations, which are referred to above? What were his orders in this regard?
3. What did you do to stop sources and collaborators from being unable to use explosive charges correctly?
4. Are there any reasons that prevent adopting a process or suitable steps to stop failures in charges, and avoid charges exploding in the face of sources and collaborators?
5. Do you have other issues you want address that will help the committee's mission, explained in administrative order number 725, and dated 7 Mar 1992 which may help the committee find out the real reasons why certain special missions that depend on explosive charges manufactured by your department have failed.

Answers

1. Yes, I have been informed of the committee's recommendations mentioned above.
2. After the recommendations were issued, the Director of Directorate 16 summoned me to his office and briefed me on the recommendations and gave me the following instructions to carry out accordingly:
 - a. To reconsider methods adopted in examining the explosive charges. These are testing the timer, batteries, detonators, and explosives.
 - b. To adopt a new form for the missions
 - c. To deliver the explosive charges directly to the sources and collaborators, train them how to use it, and take part in planning attacks to strike targets with parties executing the mission.

I would like to point out that some of what is mentioned in the committee's recommendations blames our directorate for the failures we did not take part in like the battery malfunction or the electrical detonator. I don't accept these accusations.

(1-3)



Page 55

Answer 3:

After some charges failed, we conducted a series of actions to determine the cause of failure. Some of the charges delivered by us to the party who wanted to use them stored the charges for a long period of time under bad conditions, which was contrary to the instructions given to them. This caused the basic components of the detonators to become unusable. That is why the explosive charge did not blow up.

We proved this by testing some explosive charges we delivered to Directorate 5/7. The experiment was videotaped and the detonators worked perfectly. We coordinated our efforts with Al-Qa'qa' General Establishment and managed to overcome a case of electrical detonator malfunctioning. Not one case was recorded. Batteries, on the other hand, remain a problem because good quality batteries are not available due to current circumstances. The technical consultant managed to secure a limited number of batteries used in missions. Some of these batteries have a zero current.

The batteries are subjected to visual tests only. We don't subject the batteries to tests with special devices. It is known that the electrical detonators were tested with Ivometer, which is a standard test. We cannot find an alternate in the army, security or intelligence.

Answer number 4: We don't have any answers because our work procedures are correct, even though we are understaffed. The bigger responsibility falls on the people who used these explosives. They did not cooperate with us. These charges should be used as quickly as possible. Also, when we prepare such charges, they are kept with us under lame excuses. For example; the source is not available to collect the charges or it's not the right time to carry out the mission. Also, we are not informed when our charges have served their purpose. We are only blamed if they don't work. As of now, no party has answered our inquiries and we have a signed copy by the party who received the charges, acknowledging being informed ..

-2-



Page 56

...to reply based on the recommendations and directives of the committee

Answer 5: A detailed report has been submitted to the Investigation Committee Chairman about what we think might contribute to developing our work.

This is my statement and accordingly I sign it.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Khalil Ibrahim Fayyad', written over a horizontal line.

Khalil Ibrahim Fayyad
Director, Directorate 16/2
5 April 1994

(3-3)

Page 57

Replies given by Engineer Mahfuz 'Abd-al-Wahab, Director of Timers Division
M16/2

1. Was the committee's recommendations mentioned in letter number M1\2\1\414, dated 1 Feb 1994, forwarded?
2. What did the Director of Directorate 16 order you to do in light of the committee's recommendations, which are referred to above? What were his orders in this regard?
3. What did you do to stop sources and collaborators from being unable to use explosive charges correctly?
4. Were there any reasons that prevented adopting a method or suitable steps to stop failures in using charges, and avoid charges exploding in the face of sources and collaborators?
5. Do you have other issues you want to address that will help the committee's mission, explained in administrative order number 725, dated 7 Mar 1992, which may help the committee find out the real reasons why certain special missions that depend on explosive charges manufactured by your department have failed.

Answer 1: I did not read the recommendations. The section director briefed me about some of its paragraphs verbally

Answer 2: I was not given any specific instructions. I was only ordered to notify the party who used the charges about the specifications of the charges, and how to use it. This was thru the section director. I followed the instructions of the Section Head.

Answer 3: We stressed to the parties who wanted to use the charges to follow the correct procedures, in transporting, and planting, and the operation.

Answer 4: We had no knowledge of the sources and collaborators mission, or the conditions they are using it in. We can't know what might have been the reasons of failure because we delivered the charges functional.

Answer 5: It was detailed in an attached report.



Senior Engineer Mahfuz 'Abd-al-Wahab 'Abd-al-'Aziz
Explosives Electronic Preparation Division, Director
M16/2
Al-Ghafiqi project

Page 58

Presidency of the Republic
Intelligence Service

Directorate:
Section:

To the Chairman of the Investigation Board
Subject: Conducting an Experiment

Please be advised, that we have conducted a field experiment. We tested six timers, just like the ones given to the Kurdish Democratic Party. These timers tested were selected by Mister As'ad Maki randomly. We set the timers to go off at different timings.

1. We used Iraqi-made detonators in the field test, the same type used by Iraqi Intelligence. We set them up to blow up at different timings. The experiment was a success, which meant that the timers work perfectly and are not defective.
2. We don't have the proper conditions (set up) to carry out a full scale test (a live explosion), because there are citizens living in the area used.
3. In spite of the instructions that recommend not testing the timers more than 3 times, we have tested the timers more than 10 times, greatly exceeding the allowed limits. This is a cause for failure of some or all of the devices, which does not reflect the real efficiency of the timers. In spite of this, the timers have worked in a normal manner.
4. It is a known fact that if the timers work correctly the electrical detonator will explode and cause the explosives to blow up regardless of its type, which is proof that our explosives works perfectly.

1-2
Secret and Confidential

Page 59

5. We request forming a committee made of technical specialists, capable of giving a technical opinion in this regard, if this work is not accepted. It is only fair to ask, what are the motives for destroying the timers during the experiment, especially if the timers were not the cause of damage that took place? We are going through difficult times because of the sanctions. We badly need any electronic board that can be part of a weapon to use to fight our enemies with.
6. The explosion that killed one of the Kurdish Democratic Party members when he tried to use our explosives, cannot be used as example of our work' quality because the timers passed many tests. That proved they are functional and accurate.
7. We have concrete evidence that the individuals who carried out the mission caused the bomb to explode before the scheduled time, as explained in our attached letter, which was issued by one of our specialist officers who met Source (Ghandur) during training. He said, "The battery broke down because Ghandur reversed the battery's current, which caused the premature explosion".

Please read. Regards,

A copy to:
The technical consultant

Attachments:
A report from Chemist Khalid Ibrahim



Khalil Ibrahim Fayyad
Director
Directorate 16/2
4 April 1994

(TC: Pages 60 and 61 are scanned in reverse order)

Page 61

Information Form/
11

Presidency of the Republic
The Intelligence Service

Directorate
Section

Director of the Technical Workshop
Subject: Report

We present a detailed report dated 3 April 1994 on my meeting with the source "Ghafur", who is affiliated with the Iranian-Kurdistani Democratic Party, that timers were examined after they were connected to detonators. After talking to him for an hour, we discussed several incidents that occurred while connecting the previous munitions and the reasons which led to some of the munitions failing. Of the issues which were emphasized was how to store and transfer the bombs to a certain spot for detonation. Were protection and punctuality taken into consideration?

Of the issues which "Ghafur" spoke of was that he examined the timers after connecting the battery's poles with the circuit's poles while using a small lamp to check the process. After using a "9" volt battery, he noticed that the lamp blazed. He conducted the same experiment on the rest of the timers. He himself regularly connected the lamps into the circuit and placed the battery in a non-reciprocal position. The result was a continuous blaze. Placing the battery poles reciprocally, in accordance with my opinion, with the circuit's poles would directly damage or burn the timers, leading the lamp to blaze and as a result it would be useless or unsafe and this would lead to failure when performing missions.

In addition, there is another problem. This is the circuit's poles are bigger in size than that of the battery. That is why these poles impose pressure several times on the battery leading to two cases: Either cutting one of the poles' wires or creating a (short) circuit within the timer. He was instructed not to use this case and it would be preferred to impose pressure all at once. If it was big, we could use adhesive tape to fix it.

Also, his attention was drawn to certain technical issues which would prevent executing the mission like safety conditions and accuracy while performing the mission.

-Continued-

Page 60

Presidency of the Republic
Iraqi Intelligence Service

Directorate:

Section:

To: Technical Workshop Director
Subject: Report

We cautioned him about the possibilities of malfunction if he did not place the charges accurately before completing the wiring of the electrical circuit and to be precise in connecting the detonators and the wires.

He told me that after he completed a test with a light that he told his comrades to execute only after making sure it worked.

One of many other important things he repeatedly asked was what type of material was used in sealing the timer, if it could be opened, what was inside the timer (components of the timer), and if it could be opened. We wanted to have the material and its components, and if it is available on the local market. We did not answer any of his questions.

He also wanted to know the chemical material used to stick the RDX powder. He mixed benzene with cork and got a gluey mixture and used this to stick the RDX. It took a long time to dry, and affected the power of blast. He insisted on knowing what was that material and if it available in the market, or if we had a large amount of this material could we give him some of it. We did not give him a reply.

For your attention
Regards



Khalid Ibrahim 'Ismail
4 April 1994

Page 62

Information Form/
11

Presidency of the Republic
The Intelligence Service

Directorate
Section

Director of the Oppositional Section
Subject: Examining Timers

On 3 April 1994, six timers were tested in cooperation with Directorate 16th and in presence of Ghafur Mahdi Zawah the Deputy of Special Operations Official of the Kurdistan Democratic Party. The examining results were as the following:

- A two-hour timer exploded four minutes early.
- A four-hour timer exploded ten minutes early.
- A four-hour timer exploded ten minutes early.
- A five-hour timer exploded fifteen minutes early.
- A seven-hour timer exploded after 22 minutes.
- An eight-hour timer exploded on time.

Please review... With respect

(Signature)
Diya' 'Abdallah Mahmud
Post Officer- Special Work Team
4 April 1994

Respectable Chief of the Council:

Please review the results of examining six timers during different times...
With respect

(Signature)
Farhan Hamid 'Ubayd
4th Directorate 2nd Department/ 2
4 April 1994

Page 63

Top Secret and Confidential

Information Form/
11

Presidency of the Republic
The Intelligence Service

Directorate
Section

Respectable Chief of the Investigational Committee
Subject: Report

The technical work of producing explosive munitions started in 1980, or even earlier in the Special Operations Directorate. Back then, supplying the Technical Equipment with explosives, whether this equipment were timers or wireless transmission devices, depended on what was manufactured in the Technical Research Center, or the wireless explosive devices which were imported from foreign establishments.

Since then and up to 1986, work was organized and flowing in a good pattern with no obstacles or failures. Mr. Farhan Hamid knows that because he was one of the officers who cooperated with us in this domain.

When the Technical Section was cancelled in the Special Operations Directorate and the cadre was transferred to the 16th Directorate, they cooperated with the Palestine Cadre, which worked for the benefit of the Palestinian Liberation Organization. The question which would be raised was; is it right for a person who works outside the Intelligence Community or those who travel abroad with no restrictions or control be exposed to Intelligence duties whether that enveloped researches or executive work? If the answer was no, then how did it happen? Who knows the reasons behind this cooperation? This incident took place without considering what has been exposed of present and future Intelligence plans. Recently, the Command of the 16th Directorate approved research plans; seasonally and annually, concerning this issue.

Certain researches satisfied the work requirements but the majority of the researches might not benefit the work because the consumed time goes in vain.

It is known by us that the sources, who are affiliated with the Intelligence System, do not have technical abilities which allow them to establish executive researches for different duties, yet most of the sources depend on the easy and classic pattern of work.

(1-9)

Top Secret and Confidential

Page 64

Top Secret and Confidential

Information Form/
11

Presidency of the Republic
The Intelligence Service

Directorate
Section

Mr.: -----

Subject: -----

To include our work within a pattern that serves the work of our Department in a way that meets the requirements of the Intelligence Command, we hereby present what we went through in the past to the present in order to be able to solve the problems, serving our work and overcoming anything that might cause failure in our work in the future.

1. Specialized Cadre:

Work in preparing explosive munitions was never conducted on a professional level by a specialized cadre in the Service. It was only done by a few sources which we are on top of it. At the outbreak of the crisis with Iran in 1979, or earlier, even in the General Security Directorate, the cadre was simple and depended on us in most cases. After time, a better cadre to control sabotage actions was found. As for the Service, more experience was available in the defense and attack fields while work carried on depending on the original cadre. It is known that work in this field is required but one has to have the motive and the passion for work. Yet, who wants to live expecting his death at any moment? There are rare cases. When we look at the history of the sources who are working now, we find that only a few of them are interested in such work. Most of them were transferred to the project because their formations wanted to get rid of them, those who were recently nominated by the Service with no experience or practice, extra individuals in the directorates and those who were transferred for other reasons. What is happening will not lead to developing sabotage missions.

Page 65

Information Form/
11

Presidency of the Republic
The Intelligence Service

Directorate
Section

Mr.: -----
Subject: -----

Work requirements:

As we previously mentioned, we have been depending for a long time on what has been provided by the Technical Research Center concerning the timers and some electronic equipment. This equipment was kept under bad conditions, especially during the testing period. We found out that some devices were completely damaged because of the storage conditions and we also believe that the validity of certain materials and electronic equipment were negatively affected by the conditions and by the long period of manufacture. In additions, the other part of the issue includes consuming most of the basic components of the special timers.

In order for the missions to not stop, attention has been stirred in the local market and it is known that the local market has items of various manufacture origins which have less efficiency than the original ones in terms of their accuracy and their resistance to certain conditions. We believe that such a thing will affect the accuracy of the planned missions directly or indirectly.

Duties performed by the Project:

The project conducts many duties such as:

- A. Completely plan seasonal and annual work plans.
- B. Complete work for munitions in all forms.
- C. Complete electronic and mechanic protection means.
- D. Track planning duties; train officers and sources.
- E. Unveil and defuse explosives.

If we were to examine these duties, we would find that these duties do not form the duties of a section, but in fact exceed the duties of a directorate.

Page 66

Information Form/
11

Presidency of the Republic
The Intelligence Service

Directorate
Section

Mr.: -----

Subject: -----

Project Site:

The project was functioning at Al-Rashad area in one of Baghdad far suburbs. It had been forced to move to another location, which is Abu-Ghurayb, due to the flood at that time. It is a location outside Baghdad. The condition of this location does not suit the nature and the importance of the project. It also was not given enough attention, despite the instructions of the Intelligence Leaders who are concerned with this work. When a source is assigned by the department whether from a technical or administrative aspect, he would do whatever was possible to reject the order because he knows the work's nature, the center's distance and the responsible individual of the project. It has been referred to as Project "Exile".

Because the project's locations are scattered within the areas of Al-Rashad, Al-Waziriyah, Al-Kazimiyyah and Abu-Ghurayb, efforts are also scattered and time is lost because of transportation. Adding to that, the presence of the International Inspection teams which led us to evacuate equipment and devices outside Baghdad are going through bad storage conditions. In addition to the administrative difficulties that we are going through because we are a formation within the section, our duties are expanding and the administrative duties are assigned to us in accordance with this formation.

Dealing with other Formations:

We are suffering greatly dealing with the beneficiary formations because of the misunderstanding of the technical aspect of this work and because there is no clear image for the officials responsible of these formations in terms of work or even ignoring this work. We have heard from some of them that...

Page 67

Information Form/
11

Presidency of the Republic
The Intelligence Service

Directorate
Section

Mr.: -----

Subject: -----

... what we do is just fill items and such thing would come out of individuals who do not understand the nature of the work assigned to us. They believe that their formations are essential. Truth be told, their role is nothing but an average role and that the technical aspect is essential.

How can an individual be innovative when the benefit goes for the one who is playing a minor role? The essential individual who is the technical specialist is not mentioned? Is this not unfair?

Another example is that most of the formations dealing with us do not reply when we ask them, in accordance with a central order issued by the Intelligence Director to inform us of the successful exploding devices, which we provide them with and the reason is clear. When there are failed cases or what they claim to be failed cases, we would be dragged into investigational committees accusing us of murdering so many.

Authorities:

In accordance with the valid order which requires sending explosive devices and train sources on how to use these devices in the field, such an order requires our sources travel to governorates and because of the high living standards requires staying in hotels. That would impose high expenses on the sources. This would be a reasonable claim for the sources not to perform the duties assigned to them while on the other hand we see that the allocations are reasonable for most of the other formations. This case negatively affects the workflow and the accomplishment of the duty.

Page 68

Information Form/
11

Presidency of the Republic
The Intelligence Service

Directorate
Section

Mr.: -----

Subject: -----

Specialties:

According to what we believe, we might not be right from the viewpoint of the department. We have been treated like the other formations. We believe that what is urgently required is to gain support in all aspects, whether that was ordering materials by local or foreign currency in order to satisfy the public interest, or direct purchase.

When there are many efforts made to make a certain duty successful, a controversial issue might take place. For example, a battery causes an electronic device to fail. We greatly suffer because of this and no one to solve it. We might be asked if we brought the issue to the attention of the Intelligence director. We would answer saying, "Direct officials have an idea of the problem and we continuously complained to them".

A technical and scientific fact implies that we should always prepare our product to perform under actual mission requirements. We test the electronic timer function with a "9" volt battery. It functions with a "9" volt battery. By testing it with a "9" volt battery we would create an improper condition for the actual mission. We would do such a thing urgently because the required battery is not available due to financial circumstances. The truth be told, this should not exist at all because we lose a lot for the sake of a few.

Suggestions:

In order for the work to progress in accordance with the requirements of the Intelligence Command, we list certain suggestions:

Page 69

Information Form
11

Presidency of the Republic
The Intelligence Service

Directorate
Section

Mr.: -----

Subject: -----

1. The formation of the project would be at a similar level with that of the directorate, which consists of the following Sections and the Divisions:

A. The Electronic Section, which consists of three divisions:

First: The Development Division.

Second: The Production Division.

Third: The Executive Department.

B. The Chemical Section, which consists of the following divisions:

First: The Development Division.

Second: The Production Division.

Third: The Executive Department.

C. The Mechanical Section, which consists of the following divisions:

First: Detection Division.

Second: Processing Division.

Third: Maintenance Division.

-7-

Page 70

Information Form/
11

Presidency of the Republic
The Intelligence Service

Directorate
Section

Mr.: -----

Subject: -----

2. Increase the number of the specialized cadres working on the project in order to satisfy the actual requirement using sources who participated in different aspects such as the electronic, chemical and mechanical aspects.
3. Give us the chance to get the important electronic items and materials from original countries of manufacture in order to benefit from better standards. To completely coordinate with Al-Salam Factory and with specialists working there to benefit from their experience and developed technical capabilities in the field of manufacturing timers and to use their important sources so as to benefit from their experience, especially, those who manufactured the timers currently used by us.
4. To give special attention to those who work in the project so as to uplift their morale by improving transportation and grant those who have vehicles, under their responsibility, similar services granted to their colleagues working in the intelligence formations, considering those who work in the project as field workers, in that they manufacture and send explosives which also need vehicles of high efficiency.
5. Because the buildings of the project are scattered in different locations such as Abu-Ghurayb and Al-Kazimiyyah, it would be difficult to control all that is related to work which might lead to administrative or technical imbalances. A good and secured location would guarantee overcoming several negatives that might occur in the future, especially for such a duty that differs from other duties because of its importance and secrecy.

Page 71

Information Form/
11

Presidency of the Republic
The Intelligence Service

Directorate
Section

Mr.: -----

Subject: -----

6. Give priority to the administrative services of the work because these services are either few or absent.
7. We suggest that such special duty would be tied to the decision maker (the Intelligence Service Director) or his respectable Deputy or the General Director of the Secretariat because such work is so confidential and its duties are tied with Higher Command decisions which are related to the country's security.
8. Revise the presence of the technical sources in the project and choose the best ones who represent the core for the future of the work.

Please review... With respect

(Signature)
Mahfuz 'Abd-al-Wahab 'Abd-al-'Aziz
Senior Engineer
Chief of the Electronic Preparation Department
4 April 1994

(Signature)
Khalil Ibrahim Fayad
Deputy Chief of the Chemists
Director of the 16th Directorate/ 2
14 April 1994