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Biographic Information

Name: 'ABD-AL-HAFIZ, WISAM

Other Attribute : MILITARY RANK : STAFF MAJOR GENERAL
Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : FEDAYEEN SADDAM
Photograph Available
Sex : Male

Name: 'ABD-AL-JABBAR, 'ABD-AL-SATTAR

Other Attribute : MILITARY RANK : STAFF REAR ADMIRAL
Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : FEDAYEEN SADDAM
Photograph Available
Sex : Male

Name: 'ABD-AL-RAZZAQ, QAYS

Other Attribute : MILITARY RANK : STAFF LIEUTENANT GENERAL
Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : FEDAYEEN SADDAM
Photograph Available
Sex : Male

Name: 'ALI, NABIL AHMAD MUHAMMAD

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : HITTIN GENERAL ESTABLISHMENT
Photograph Available

Name: 'ALWAN, MUHYI SALMAN

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : HITTIN GENERAL ESTABLISHMENT
Photograph Available

Name: 'AZIZ, SABAH RAMADAN

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : FEDAYEEN SADDAM
Photograph Available
Sex : Male

Name: 'UBAYD, HASHIM NAHI

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : FEDAYEEN SADDAM
Photograph Available

Name: ABU-AL-LUL, MUHAMMAD

Other Attribute : MILITARY RANK : MAJOR
Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : FEDAYEEN SADDAM
Photograph Available

Name: AL-SHARIFI, AHMAD SA'ID 'ABDALLAH

Other Attribute : : OTHER/SOURCE
Photograph Available
Sex : Male

Name: AL-YASIRI, 'ABD-AL-RAZIQA YASIR MATHAR HASSUNI

City of Birth : Dhi Qar
Country of Birth : IRQ
Date of Birth : 19680000
Photograph Available
Sex : Male

Name: AMIN, KAMAL MUSTAFA

Other Attribute : MILITARY RANK : STAFF LIEUTENANT GENERAL
Photograph Available
Sex : Male

Name: ANTRANEC, SURIN YANSHAN

Other Attribute : : FEDAYEEN SADDAM
Photograph Available
Sex : Male

Name: ANTRANIK, SURAYN YANSHAN

Name: BATAH, AHMAD SADAK

Other Attribute : MILITARY RANK : STAFF BRIGADIER GENERAL
Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : FEDAYEEN SADDAM
Photograph Available
Sex : Male

Name: FARIS, KAZIM MUHAMMAD

Other Attribute : MILITARY RANK : STAFF MAJOR GENERAL
Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : KAZIMAT FEDAYEEN SADDAM
Photograph Available
Sex : Male

Name: HAMMU, QUTAYBAH SA'ID

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : FEDAYEEN SADDAM
Photograph Available
Sex : Male

Name: HAMMUDAT, MAKKI

Other Attribute : MILITARY RANK : STAFF MAJOR GENERAL
Photograph Available
Sex : Male

Name: HAMMUDI, 'ALI 'ABD-AL-'AZIZ

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : FEDAYEEN SADDAM
Photograph Available
Sex : Male

Name: HASAN, FADIL ZAHIR

Photograph Available
Sex : Male

Name: HASAN, MUHAMMAD SABRI

Name: IBRAHIM, AHMAD 'ABD-AL-MAJID

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : FEDAYEEN SADDAM
Photograph Available
Sex : Male

Name: JABIR, 'ABD NI'MAH

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : FEDAYEEN SADDAM
Photograph Available

Name: JAMIL, 'IMAD 'AWNI

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : FEDAYEEN SADDAM
Photograph Available
Sex : Male

Name: JUDAH, 'ALI HUSAYN

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : FADAYEEN SADDAM
Photograph Available

Name: KARAM, MUHAMMAD HADI

Other Attribute : MILITARY RANK : CAPTAIN
Photograph Available
Sex : Male

Name: KAZIM, MAKKI JAWAD

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : FEDAYEEN SADDAM
Photograph Available
Sex : Male

Name: KHALAF, 'ALI KHAYRALLAH

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : FEDAYEEN SADDAM
Photograph Available

Name: KHALAF, QASIM KARIM

Name: MATAR, MUHAMMAD KARIM

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : FEDAYEEN SADDAM
Photograph Available
Sex : Male

Name: MUHSIN, FADIL TAHIR

Name: SAHR, FALIH KAHT

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : FEDAYEEN SADDAM
Photograph Available
Sex : Male

Name: SALIH, AYYUB MAHDI

Other Attribute : MILITARY RANK : STAFF MAJOR GENERAL
Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : FEDAYEEN SADDAM
Photograph Available
Sex : Male

Name: SALIH, MUHAMMAD FAHAD
Other Attribute : MILITARY RANK : STAFF COLONEL Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : FEDAYEEN SADDAM Photograph Available Sex : Male
Name: SALMAN, KARIM RAHIM 'ABD
Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : FEDAYEEN SADDAM Photograph Available Sex : Male
Name: SHALISH, KAMIL HAMMAD 'ALIJ
Other Attribute : MILITARY RANK : SECOND LIEUTENANT Photograph Available Sex : Male
Name: SHINDI, HASHIM MUHAMMAD
Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : FEDAYEEN SADDAM Photograph Available Sex : Male
Name: SULTAN, 'ABD-AL-RIDA MIJALI
Name: WRYUR, 'ADIL KAZIM
Name: ZABBAR, 'ABD-AL-KARIM KAZIM
Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : FEDAYEEN SADDAM Photograph Available Sex : Male
Name: ZAHIR, SALMAN HAMID
Other Attribute : MILITARY RANK : STAFF BRIGADIER GENERAL Photograph Available Sex : Male

Document Remarks

██████████ This 145-page file contains correspondence and security reports within the Secretariat of Fedayeen Saddam, dated in 2001. Pages 2-11 contain a report dated 5 May 2001 on an agent named 'Abd-al-Razzaq Yasir Muthir Hassuni Al-Yasiri. His code name is Al-Sayyad Hamzah Al-Musawi. The report was about his affiliation to Badr Corps and his activities of dispatching saboteurs to carry out terrorist operations such as murders, explosions and looting. Pages 12-26, 31-50, 52-57, 60, 81-88 and 103-119 contain correspondence, handwritten memorandums, information reports, minutes of meetings and handwritten charts within the Secretariat of Fedayeen Saddam on the project study named "Tha'r Al-Basrah". This study tends to hit the American and British marine exists near Al-Bakr port using modified motorboats. This project is recommended be archived and adjourned to the Armed Forces for any future marine targets, dated in 2001. Pages 27-30 are handwritten reports prepared by the General Secretary of Fedayeen Saddam Staff Major General Ayub Mahdi Salih on descriptions of the American warships in the Arabic Gulf. Page 51 is an items' request form related to Hittin Establishment and includes handwritten substances such as

white cloth, carton surfaces and needles of sewing machines. Pages 58-59 and 61-64 are pages extracted from the CNN website that are written in English and their handwritten translation to Arabic pertaining to the allied military assets in the Persian Gulf region, dated 31 December. Pages 65-78 and 89-102 contain duplicate of handwritten report entitled "Situation Assessment of the Naval Operation Theatre" pertaining to confront the Iranian and Kuwaiti violations in the Gulf region dated 29 December 2000. Pages 79-80 contain a letter dated 4 January 2001 from the General Relationship Commission to the Fedayeen Saddam Chief of Staff related to assigning 19 Fedayee for unspecified duties. Pages 120-145 include the translation for two articles taken from two websites named "Gulf Info" and "Xinventions.com" that are written in English and titled "Projecting Air Power during the Crisis" of the Gulf war, dated 31 December 2000.

Batch Information	
Batch Number: 3119-4	Boxes in Batch: 300
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Transmittal Information Transporting Unit:COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BN 10 Date/Time of Arrival:291300LAPR03 Transmittal Number:UNK Point of Contact: [REDACTED]	
Comments	[REDACTED] NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
[REDACTED]	

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[Page 2:]

The agent Hamza al-Musawi.

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[Page 3:]

Information from Basra's director of security about the agent (Hamza al-Musawi) until 3/17/2001:

1. He was withdrawn from his station, located in Ahwaz city, at the end of 2000 and currently resides in Qum with his Iranian wife.
2. According to intelligence, the Iranian Intelligence provides high level protection for him out of fear over him because he represents an important element for them.

The above meeting took place on 3/17/2001 in the presence of staff colonel Muhammad Fahad and staff general Kazim Muhammad Faris, Kazima's force commander.

Signature: Ahmad Sadak Batah. 3/25/2001.

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[Page 4:]

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

To the commander of al-Rasafa's Saddam Fedayeen
Subject / Information

I wish to share with you some of the information available to me about the defendant Barzan 'Araj Kubaidi, among the group of the agent Sayid Hamza al-Musawi and the agent Mihyal Diyab. This agent participated in al-Yubash operation in the province of Diqar which resulted in the killing of the commander of the 47th brigade in 1999 and the injury of the secretary general of the Party branch. He began receiving the salaries of his deceased brothers, Ghaylan 'Araj Kubaidi and Shakir 'Araj Kubaidi who were killed during the revolt of treachery and deceit, and the other at the hands of the Iranian services, and the third who currently resides at the Badr base on the island between 'Imara and Diqar, and is receiving salaries from his brother Khalil 'Araj Kubaidi who is currently residing at the base of al-'Amala corps 9 Badr. Many thanks, sir.

The citizen, Shakir Muhsin al-'Amiri –Diqar, al-Ma'mud, 3/23/2001.

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[Page 5:]

This report was prepared regarding the agent (Hamza al-Musawi) until 5/5/2001

The officer charged with follow-up: Staff brigadier general Ahmad Sadak Batah.

1. The true name of the agent: 'Abd-al-Razzak Yasir Mutahhar Hassuni al-Yasiri
2. The dynamic name for the agent: Sayid Hamza al-Musawi.
3. Date of birth: 1968.
4. Place of birth: Diqar province, Suq al-Shiukh district, al-'Akika neighborhood.
5. Social status: Married to two women, the first an Iraqi, the second an Iranian.
6. Party affiliation: Affiliated with the al-'Amala corps 9 Badr, allied with Hezbollah. He is responsible for a large number of groups with destructive agendas.
7. His activities: Charged with dispatching destructive groups to carry out terrorist operations (murder, bombing, looting.)
8. Locations he frequents inside Iran:
 - a. Intelligence headquarters for al-'Amala corps 9 Badr in area (Si Rah,) that is the area of the three roads south of the city of Ahwaz.
 - b. The area of Shat 'Ali in Ahwaz city.
 - c. Uramin area in Tehran.
 - d. Presently he lives in the city of Qum with his wife of Iranian origin under heavy protection from the Iranian Intelligence.
9. His description:
 - a. Medium height.
 - b. Medium build.
 - c. His beard is not long, peppered with gray hair.
10. Mode of transportation: He used to travel using a khaki Nissan Petrol that belonged to the al-'Amala corps 9 Badr; presently he travels using a vehicle that belongs to the Iranian Intelligence.

(1-2)

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[Page 6:]

There was coordination with the Basra security directorate on 3/17/2001. All the information showed that he is currently living with his Iranian wife in the city of Qum.

11. There was coordination with the intelligence directorate of the southern area on 4/2/2001, where the director of intelligence confirmed the information referred to by Basra's security director and he promised us that there is continuous work regarding this agent, and very soon it will bear fruit.
12. One of the sources, Ahmad Sa'id 'Abdullah al-Sharifi, confirmed to us that the agent (Hamza al-Musawi) is now working under intense fear after he received information that the Iraqi authority is searching for him to kill him. He is moving around under heavy protection and is accompanied by a protective vehicle designated especially for him.
13. During a 4/2/2001 meeting with the director of the southern area, attended by Kazma's commander, the director asked us to work quietly since the above mentioned agent works with extreme caution, and it will require time until he feels assured and goes back to his normal mode of work. We are awaiting results. In case the intelligence services are unable to eliminate him, we will work using all means available to us to eliminate him.
14. Finally, sir, we pledge to you, as men of probity would, that we will be truthful with God and with ourselves in relaying the facts as they are to you, praying to God that he guides us to best serve our dear Iraq. We will hold to the covenant as honest soldiers worthy of the trust of the beloved leader, the President, God preserve him. May God keep you as a valuable aid to us. May God guide us.

Staff brigadier general Ahmad Sadak Batah
Board of Public Relations
5/5/2001

[Translator Note: An arrow leading from point 14 and at the end of the arrow the following is handwritten:] **there is no harm that we work parallel, or does time not matter much to you, Ahmad!!**

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[Page 7:]

[Duplicate of page 5]

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[Page 8:]

Information provided by the southern area intelligence director on 3/17/2001 in the presence of Kazma's leader and staff colonel Muhammad Fahad:

1. The intelligence director confirmed all the information that was stated by Basra's security director regarding his being present in the Iranian city of Qum.
 2. He did not reveal further information about him, only that work is afoot regarding him, and that the coming few days will give the glad tiding of his being dispatched.
- Signature: Brigadier general Ahmad Sadak. 3/25/2001.

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[Page 9:]

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

The decision

The director

Greetings and salutations, sir:

The subject: Suggestion to change the weapon.

Sir, this is regarding your order that five boats would be assigned for the mission of (the Revenge of Basra.) Sir, we would like to clarify to you the following:

1. Four boats were completed; they are: (One boat carrying Malotka missiles, [one with] a 106 millimeter caliber cannon, [one with] RPG7 grenades launcher, and a rubber booby trapped boat.)
2. The fifth boat, and as per your decision, sir, was to carry a guided aircraft. Until now the aircraft is not available. Even the boat is not ready because its engines are smashed, and it will require huge sums of money, roughly 30 million Dinars to repair.
3. The opinion: We suggest the following, provided it meets your approval:
 - a. change the weapon that will be used on the fifth boat from a guided aircraft to a Sterla antiaircraft shoulder carried missile launcher since we gleaned information that there are helicopters aboard those frigates. In case these helicopters interfered with our mission, we will need this kind of weapon. This is one hand; on the other, the fact that we have four boats, all equipped to strike the very ship, will fulfill the goal.
 - b. sell the fifth boat by convening a committee for this purpose and buy a small prepared boat to best manage time and money.

Awaiting your orders, sir. With all due deference,

Staff Colonel Muhammad Fahad Salih, public relations board, 3/17/2001.

Staff brigadier general Ahmad Sadak Batah, public relations board, 3/17/2001.

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[Page 10:]

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

Republic of Iraq

Office of the President

The Secretary

Secret

Number: k/5301

Date: 5/27/1420 Hegira, 9/7/1999

The director general for Saddam's Fedayeen

Subject / Information

The President, God preserve him, has commanded the following regarding what was conveyed in your letter, number 1/b/1490 on 8/31/1999:

((Preserve the subject, but it's to be ignored and left to the armed forces to deal with it. They can handle any future naval enemy target according to their mandates.))

Please review. With due appreciation,

[TN: handwritten on the lower left margin:] give it to Ayub for the safekeeping of the subject.

Signature: Lieutenant general, Dr. 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Khattab, Secretary to the President of the Republic.

September 6, 1999.

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[Page 11:]

To the leader of the Kazma Saddam's fedayeen via the commander of Basra force of Saddam's fedayeen.

Subject / Information

I am the fedayee Qasim Karim Khalaf. I departed on 6/12/1999 to the territorial waters using a fishing boat type (Tornado) accompanied by a group of fishermen numbering seven along with the owner of the boat. On this trip I monitored the approach of a helicopter that belonged to the Coalition forces that have positioned themselves in the Arabian Gulf, and which was conducting reconnaissance flights near our territorial waters and carrying out maneuvers to antagonize the boatmen in their fishing boats, but without firing any rounds at them. These flights were conducted throughout three successive days during the night and during the day. Following that, I saw on 6/15/1999 at around four in the afternoon an aircraft that belonged to the same forces taking off. It was conducting a maneuver near al-Bakr port that lasted for half an hour. This aircraft was guided, without a pilot, flying via a remote device under the control of the same forces. A day later a ship was spotted navigating toward the 'Abdullah inlet. While it moved past al-Bakr port, a swift Iranian boat came from the direction of the Iranian waters. Fifteen minutes after it reached the ship, it fired a number of rounds from a light caliber gun at the ship. The captain of the ship continued toward the 'Abdullah inlet without stopping, following which, the Iranian boat returned to its territorial waters after it encroached across our territorial waters to fire at the ship. For your information, there are Iraqi boats that rendezvous with Kuwaiti boats for the purpose of smuggling contraband like alcoholic beverages and the like. Also, there was an Iraqi boat that assaulted a Kuwaiti boat carrying people of Egyptian nationalities. They beat up these people and robbed them of their Kuwaiti money and other nautical necessities like a battery, depth sweeping device, fishing nets, even the fish that they caught. [Cont'd on Page 12.]

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[Page 12:]

There were Iraqis on those boats who were carrying weapons, which were not licensed from any pertinent departments in al-Faw jurisdiction. They were carrying these weapons solely for piracy. The authorities captured one of these people. He was carrying three weapons of the type Kalashnikov, half snubbed assault rifles. Investigation with them is in progress. There are people who fish in the Shat al-'Arab using small, wooden boats who also smuggle alcoholic beverages to Iranian boats. I obtained this information from an Iranian boat that approached the boat that was carrying me near al-Bakr port. They asked us to bring the beverages to them, but we refused. They then said that the small, wooden boats bring them all they want from beverages, prayer soil patties [Shiite custom], rosaries, and anything they wanted in return for the dollar.

This is all I have, sir; I await your orders.

Signature: The fedayee Qasim Karim Khalaf, the second squadron, eighth round.

[A reviewer wrote:] To the leader – please review and form a decision. Know that this fedayee was directed to continue to gather the most available amount of information, 6/18.

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[Page 13:]

In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
Be ye fair and drawn swords against tyranny while remaining truthful men
God. Country. The leader. Those who give pledge to you they are giving pledge to Allah
[Holy Quran: 48-10.]
The Republic of Iraq
Office of the President
Saddam's fedayeen
General secretariat

To the Saddam's fedayeen's supervisor
Greetings and salutations
Subject / the project of Basra's revenge

In reference to your marginal note regarding the side review attached that includes: "It is imperative to assign one or more of the fedayeen, and I prefer two at least to one of the boats under the cover of fishermen and covertly—and if we have originally fishermen that would be from God's grace. I do want to assure myself that the citizen did spot the frigate." We wish to clarify for you the following, sir:

1. To carry out your orders, the two fedayeen (Qasim Khalaf and Fadil Tahir Muhsin, members of the Basra force,) who are fishermen by trade, were charged with one of the boats in our territorial waters where the citizen with the Basra revenge project claims he saw the American frigate patrolling.

2. Attached is the information offered by the aforementioned fedayeen regarding what they saw during their fishing outings that they made (clipping 'a'.)
Please review and coordinate, sir. With sincere thanks,
Lieutenant general Ayub Mahdi Salih, secretary general
8/5/1999.

[TN: Above is handwritten:] discussion with Ayub.

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[Page 14:]

In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
Be ye fair and drawn swords against tyranny while remaining truthful men
God. Country. The leader. Those who give pledge to you they are giving pledge to Allah
[Holy Quran: 48-10.]
The Republic of Iraq
Office of the President
Saddam's fedayeen
General secretariat
[TN: Handwritten in bold type:] The decision, discussion with Ayub.

To the Saddam fedayeen's supervisor
Greetings and salutations, sir:
Subject / the Basra revenge project

In reference to your marginal notes on my attached review regarding the Basra revenge project, we wish to elucidate the following to you:

1. After confirming the addresses of the two fedayeen, members of the Basra force, we found out that one of the fedayeen lives in Faw city and works as a fisherman aboard one of the fishing boats. He was called and was briefed about the nature of the duty and the details to be observed during the fishing trip. Bear in mind that the fedayee under discussion has gone out on a fishing trip since 6/5/1999.
2. In order to decide on the potential of using other types of missiles different from the ones that were suggested by the citizen Muhsin Ibrahim Jiad in his project (Revenge of Basra,) naval staff commodore 'Abd-al-Sattar 'Abd-al-Jabbar (the most senior staff officer in the naval force command) was called in and was questioned indirectly about the technical specifications of the French-made missile (Exoset) [continued on Page 15.]

(1-3)

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[Page 15:]

In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
Be ye fair and drawn swords against tyranny while remaining truthful men
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[Holy Quran: 48-10.]
The Republic of Iraq
Office of the President
Saddam's fedayeen
General secretariat

AM 39) and the Chinese-made missile (Silkworm-H72). He stated the specifications for both missiles and the obstacles in using each one, as follows:

A. The Exocet missile (AM 39) and the obstacles in using it:

First: The Exocet missile is one of the radar-guided missiles. Therefore, we cannot – rather it is impossible- to modify it into a system where we can install it on any type of boat or cruiser.

Second: Despite its being impossible to modify the missile, in case we do modify it, we will need a boat with a displacement capacity of 200 tons, keeping in mind that fishing boats' displacement capacity ranges between 5 – 10 tons.

Third: The missile will require a scan and launch systems.

B. The Silkworm (HY2) missile and the obstacles in using it:

First: The silkworm missile is one of the radar-guided missiles. Therefore, we cannot – rather it is impossible- to modify it into a system where we can install it on any type of boat or cruiser.

Second: This system, one of the more complicated coastal systems, is composed of
[cont'd on Page 16]

(2-3)

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[Page 16:]

In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
Be ye fair and drawn swords against tyranny while remaining truthful men
God. Country. The leader. Those who give pledge to you they are giving pledge to Allah
[Holy Quran: 48-10.]
The Republic of Iraq
Office of the President
Saddam's fedayeen
General secretariat

1. Guiding radar wheel.
2. Specialized missile launcher.
3. Energy wheel.
4. System-ready diagnosis wheel.
5. Special cables to connect the circuit branches of the above system.

Please review and we are awaiting your orders, sir.
With all appreciation,

Staff general Ayub Mahdi Salih – general secretary. 6/8/1999.

[TN: A reviewer handwrote:] there was a discussion. The director ordered that a report be forwarded to the President in case the mission is unable to be carried out after the return of the fedayee from the open sea.

Signature: 713. QS, 6/8.

(3/3)

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[Page 17:]

In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
Be ye fair and drawn swords against tyranny while remaining truthful men
God. Country. The leader. Those who give pledge to you they are giving pledge to Allah
[Holy Quran: 48-10.]
The Republic of Iraq
Office of the President
Saddam's fedayeen
General secretariat

To the secretary general
Greetings and salutations:

Subject / the Basra revenge projects

In reference to the marginal note penned by the director of Saddam's fedayeen regarding the Basra revenge project including (placing one of the fedayeen or more then one, preferably no less then two, on one of the boats under the cover of fishermen and in total secrecy. If we have actual fishermen to start with, then this would be by grace of God. I do wish to verify the citizen's claim: that it is possible to spot the frigate) we wish to clarify the following:

1. In carrying out the director's order, a canvassing was conducted among the members of the Saddam fedayeen of the Basra force to find any who make a living as fishermen in our territorial waters where the citizen who originated the idea of the project claims he saw the frigate plying the water therein. We found the two fedayeen, (Qasim Karim Khalaf and Fadil Zahir Hasan,) which make a living as fishermen; they are from the people of the Faw city.
2. The two above mentioned fedayeen were briefed and directed to concentrate on anything they spot that resembles ships, boats, cruisers, liners, and naval force vessels, be they Kuwaiti, American, or Iranian in our territorial waters and the surrounding waters during their fishing trips.

(1-2)

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[Page 18:]

In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
Be ye fair and drawn swords against tyranny while remaining truthful men
God. Country. The leader. Those who give pledge to you they are giving pledge to Allah
[Holy Quran: 48-10.]
The Republic of Iraq
Office of the President
Saddam's fedayeen
General secretariat

3. After many fishing trips made by the two above mentioned fedayeen, they were called in to the general secretariat and were debriefed to hear what information they collected that they can remember. Based on what they stated, the following is now confirmed to us:

- a. The target (the frigate) did not entirely appear within our vision range since the start of 1999 and until the date of the last fishing trip that the two made on 7/5/1999.
- b. The first sighting of the target was at the start of September 1998, where the frigate was spotted noontime in our territorial waters in front of the 'Abdullah inlet. At the time it was at a range close enough to discern those who were standing on its deck – men and women. We estimate the range was no more than 100 to 150 meters.
- c. The second sighting of the target was on one of the nights of November 1998, where the frigate was sailing in our territorial waters across from Um Qasr port. It was accompanied by a helicopter hovering above it.

Please review and direct an order regarding presenting the above mentioned to the supervising director.

Signature: Staff colonel Qutaiba Sa'id Hammu, general secretariat, 8/5/1999.

(2-2)

ISGQ-2003-00003598

[Page 19:]

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

To the director of Saddam fedayeen
Greetings and salutations, Sir:

Subject: The specifications of the warships that are operating in the Arabian Gulf.

In reference to your order, that at 2330 hours on 1/30/2001 regarding offering the information available to us about specifications, weaponry, and readying the American warships that are operating in the Arabian Gulf and are numbered (37, 51, 56, and 992,) we wish to clarify the following to you, sir:

1. The warship Portland LSD-37

- | | |
|--|---|
| a. The general shape | As shown in appendix ()—pictures of the ship. |
| b. The manufacturing firm | Quincy Davidson company or General Dynamics. |
| c. Date of completion | 9/27/1967 |
| d. Date it was commissioned | 10/3/1970 |
| e. The source of financing | Ms. Emily Walton Ford |
| f. The length of the ship | 562 feet |
| g. Length of deck | 442 feet |
| h. Speed | 20 knots (approximately 65-70 kilometers per hour.) |
| i. The crew | 25 officers and 312 recruits. |
| j. Weaponry | 1) two 25 mm caliber mechanical cannons.
2) two 20 mm Phalanx cannons.
3) a system for close combat engagement.
4) seven, 50 mm caliber cannons. |
| k. The information available to us from our special sources indicate the presence of two helicopters on the rear deck of the ship. | |

(1)

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[Page 20:]

In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
Be ye fair and drawn swords against tyranny while remaining truthful men
God. Country. The leader. Those who give pledge to you they are giving pledge to Allah
[Holy Quran: 48-10.]
The Republic of Iraq
Office of the President
Saddam's fedayeen
General secretariat

[Marginal note:] A copy of the letter will be sent by us to comrade Qusai to see how his viewpoints will concur with those of his other comrades, then prepare an answer to present to the leader President Saddam Hussein, God keep and preserve him.

Greetings and salutations, sir:

As per your order, the committee charged with discussing the project (operation Basra revenge) under the leadership of staff major general Qais 'Abd-al-Razzaq, and with the membership of staff lieutenant general Aiub Mahdi Salih and staff general Wisam 'Adb-al-Hafiz. The committee wishes to clarify the following:

1. The purpose of the study: to destroy the American and British naval vessels that are stationed near the Bakr port by using cruisers and missile boats, after the modifications thereof have been implemented.
2. The resources to carry out the operation:
 - a. cruisers fitted with a 107 mm caliber grenade launcher at the boat's aft.
 - b. cruisers fitted with a 107 mm caliber grenade launcher at the boat's fore.
 - c. missile boats from the Iraqi naval forces command.
 - d. cruisers rigged with explosives and a timer.
3. Modus operandi to carry out the mission:

The modus operandi will be according to the following:

 - a. The first group (the one mentioned in 2-a) will strike the frigate's deck with a salvo of missiles to destroy all its instrumentation, equipment, weaponry and personnel on deck.
 - b. The second group (the one mentioned in 2-b) will strike the frigate's hull to cause large openings in the hull that will cause the ship to lose equilibrium and sink.

(1-3)

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[Page 21:]

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- c. The third group (the one mentioned in 2-c) will strike the ship with missiles to destroy what's left of her.
 - d. The rigged cruisers will be detonated one hour after the end of the operation via the timer. Following that, the operatives will clear the area as fast as possible using speedboats.
4. Field of operations:
The area where the frigate navigates (estimated at one nautical mile southeast the Bakr port and two nautical miles southwest the 'Amiq port).
5. Analysis and evaluation of the study:
After discussing the study by the committee, given the above information and all other factors (logistical and technical,) and after comparing it with the means available to the naval vessels, including the said frigate, of the hostile countries, we can determine a final decision in the following points:
- a. The grenade 107 mm caliber launcher was designed to be used for striking targets / target (area) such as infantry, not for point targets that are armored (thickness of the armored hull of the frigate.) Even if the naval target is large, the explosive head on the launcher's missile is soft because it's made of aluminum.
 - b. For the purpose of handling the naval targets with precision, the launching person will require modern means of capability for the purpose of firing the launcher. The projectile launcher will require a laser stabilizing device (stabilizer) that is currently not available, and cannot be installed on boats. Previously, the Iraqi landing ships were outfitted with such devices before they were sunk in the glorious mother of all battles.

(2-3)

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[Page 22:]

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- c. The search and destroy capabilities, including the helicopters that are available to the enemy countries are sufficient to keep any of these boats or cruisers from getting close to the influence zone.
 - d. The missile boat that belongs to the Iraqi naval command and was referred to in the study operate according to the theory of the (tracking beam,) which means the course that the missile takes to hit its target depends upon the emission emanating from the boat. This is old design. And any scrambling done to the radar (and this is a definite thing) will result in failure of the missile in reaching its target; it will either be dropped down or it will deviate from its course.
 - e. The helicopters that accompany the naval ships are constantly and totally sweeping the area, including Iraq's territorial waters (visually, by radar, or electronically) daily and round the clock. Therefore, any Iraqi armed boat that leaves in the direction of the Bakr port or the 'Amiq port, or tries to approach enemy naval targets will either instantly be sunk or captured.
6. In light of what was presented, the committee appreciates the initiative offered by the citizen Muhsin Ibrahim Jiad and his civic feelings, but overall the study is unable to be implemented from the logistic and technical aspects.

Please review and coordinate, sir. With all due appreciation

Signature: Wisam 'Abd-al-Hafiz, member.

Signature: Aiub Mahdi Salih, member.

Signature: Qais 'Abd-al-Razzak, head of the committee.

(3-3)

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[Page 23:]

In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
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The Republic of Iraq
Office of the President
Saddam's fedayeen
General secretariat

To the general secretary. Greetings and salutations
Subject: Operation Basra revenge

In executing the director's order that entails meeting the citizen Muhsin Ibrahim Jiad, the originator of operation Basra revenge, and to probe him for details to ascertain the nature of his true intentions and even more details regarding his project, we wish to state the following:

1. At 2000 hours on April 9, 1999, I met in utmost secrecy with the citizen Muhsin Ibrahim Jiad at one of the hotels in Basra province.
2. From the dialogue with the afore mentioned citizen, it turned out that he works as a hired hand on one of the fishing boats in Faw city. During one of the fishing trips he noticed one of the American Navy vessels –the one he called 'frigate'- navigating our territorial waters back and forth in constant motion. He also noticed one or more helicopters docked on the frigate's deck, but took flight and chased our naval command's boats and cruisers when they launched from their bases to perform patrol duties within the limits of our territorial waters, then returned to the frigate's deck.
3. In the area where the frigate navigates, there are hundreds of fishing boats jostling for space

(1-9)

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[Page 24:]

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[Continued] and at a distance the citizen estimated at half a nautical mile (or rough 826 meters,) or maybe the distance is less than that, for the citizen mentioned that while they were casting their nets they were able to, from a good distance, the naval personnel on its deck, and he was able to distinguish some of the letters on its side.

4. The fact that there are that many fishing boats near the frigate for such a long time without arousing its suspicion and doubts made the crew of the frigate complacent toward them.
5. From the tens of fishing trips that were made by the citizen Muhsin Ibrahim Jiad, and from his monitoring the movement of the frigate, he felt a civic duty to exact revenge upon Iraq's enemies. He started thinking of a way to destroy this frigate, namely using the 107 mm caliber missile launcher and the 122 mm caliber Grad missiles.
6. The citizen presented his idea to his son (N. D. 'Ala,) a member of the Iraqi naval forces, who supported it. The two began to join their ideas and illustrate them on paper, and that's where the Basra revenge project idea was conceived. He summarized it as follows:
 - A. Required resources for execution:
 1. Four fishing boats, examples of which were seen in the Dakir region – the region where fishing boats are built. The average length was 20-30 meters, and the maximum height is 5 meters.
 2. Two speedboats, assuming they are available in our naval forces formations.

(2-9)

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[Page 25:]

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3. One missile boat, assuming it is available in our naval forces formations.
4. Eight Grad missiles with launcher.
5. Two 107 mm caliber modified grenade launchers.

B. The suggested modus operandi to execute the mission:

The modus operandi entails the use of three groupings of boats and as follows:

First. The first group

(1) Arrangement:

- a. One boat with the 107 mm caliber modified launcher. (It will be installed on movable jacks that are raised to the boat's deck at the instant of striking, and as shown on the attached appendix (a).)
- b. A boat that could be modified by installing four 122 mm caliber Grad missiles, as shown in attached appendix (b).
- c. One speedboat.

(2) The mission:

- a. The boat that's mentioned in (a) above will unleash a barrage of missiles from the launcher installed on it, which carries 14 missiles, upon the frigate's deck, destroying all equipment, instrumentation, and munitions on deck in addition to inflicting casualties upon the sailors that are present on deck.
- b. The boat previously mentioned in (b) above will [cont'd., Page 26]

(3-9)

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[Page 26:]

In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
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Fire its Grad missiles at one of the sides of the ship in order to blow large holes near the ship's bottom, which will cause water to gush into its engine room, causing her to sustain damage and become immobile.
c. The speedboat referred to in (c) above will be used to evacuate the operatives from the mission boats and to transport them to shore as fast as possible.

Second. The second group

(1) Arrangement:

Same makeup as the first group.

(2) The mission:

[perform] The same duty as the first group, but from the other side of the frigate.

Third. The third group

(1) Arrangement:

A missile boat from our naval forces resources, armed with four missiles, with the warhead of each weighing 500 kilograms of TNT material.

(2) The mission:

This boat will launch its missiles toward the frigate to finish her off after its deck, with all its equipment and supplies, has been destroyed, and after the frigate becomes unable to maneuver and navigate after the malfunction of its engine from the seawater that entered its engine rooms through the blasted holes...[cont'd., Page 27]

(4-9)

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[Page 27:]

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That the Grad missiles assumed to have caused in both sides of the frigate.
7. In order to cover all traces of the mission, the boats will be rigged with charges of TNT connected to a timer clock or a remote control detonator, so that they can be blown up after the operatives have been whisked away from them.

8. Mission location:

The target has taken position at an area located one nautical mile (roughly 1652 meters) southeast the Bakr port and two nautical miles (roughly 3304 meters) southwest the 'Amiq port.

9. Operation assessment:

a. The technical aspect:

After reviewing the technical properties of the Grad missiles and the 107 mm caliber missile launcher that are supposed to be used in implementing the operation, and after reviewing the available information regarding the American frigate's capabilities, we reached the following:

First - It is not possible to use the Grad missiles to strike the frigate in the manner suggested by the citizen (and explained in appendix 2) because the missile is 287 centimeters long. Therefore, to carry out the citizen's idea, the missile will require a launcher that is 25 meters long – as long as the boat.

Second – The Grad missiles and the 107 mm caliber grenade launcher are designed to hit [cont'd., Page 28]

(5-9)

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[Page 28:]

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regional targets, not point targets. Even if we assume they can be used to hit this kind of target, this will require extra capabilities and a balancing device (Stabilizer).

Third – The Grad missiles can only be fired with an electric detonator that ignites the missile's capsule.

Fourth – The recoil from firing the Grad missiles or the 107 mm caliber grenades and the intense rear thrust exhaust gust generated from their launch will cause the boats to capsize, which will hinder the task of evacuating the operatives at the required speed.

b. The security aspect:

First – Radar and electronic detection methods used on the frigate's deck are able to reveal any hostile intentions toward it, as demonstrated when the on-deck helicopter takes off to chase away any of our naval force speedboats the minute they leave their bases.

Second – The frigate's on-deck helicopters perform a round-the-clock sweep of the sea surface.

10. Evaluating the citizen, the originator of the project:

From the conversation with the citizen Muhsin Ibrahim Jiad, we know the following:

a. That the citizen had more than one motive when he advanced operation Basra revenge. Among them is his civic duty, mixed with the attempt of appearing to be connected with the office of the President or even with the President himself (God keep him and give him long life). I inferred this when he mentioned to me... [cont'd., Page 29]

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[Page 29:]

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That he had exchanged correspondence with the office of the President from years ago, and he showed me some official business envelopes that he claimed he received letters in them from the office of the President.

b. The citizen enjoys a medium level income despite his asserting the opposite, for he told me, "the day I leave for work my family eats, and the day I do not leave for work my family does not eat." What he was hiding behind his affected honesty and dignity, which he tried earnestly to show during the conversation, was a naked desire for money.

c. No evil intentions were detected in the character of the citizen through his advancing the idea of operation Basra revenge.

11. The citizen hoped for help in treating his son whom he claimed was shot with a bullet, during the riots that lodged itself in his brain causing him a 60 % paralysis. Bear in mind that the citizen had previously asked for compensation from the committee for aiding the injured, in Basra, according to Basra's health department in its letter (copies attached,) but the previously mentioned committee declined the compensation, according to its letter number 5194 on 8/24/1999 (copy attached,) citing that injuries caused by riots and looting are exempt from compensation as reason.

Signature: Staff major Qutaiba Sa'id Hammu, 4/16/1999.

(7-9)

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[Page 30:]

Appendix (a)

[Starting from the top and after rotating counterclockwise 90 degrees, the lines read as follow:]

The grenade launcher 107 mm caliber on the boat's deck

The grenade launcher, concealed

A jack to raise the launcher

[The vertical dimension:] five meters

[To the left:] appendix (a) – Operation Basra revenge

(8-9)

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[Page 31:]

[Starting from the top and after rotating counterclockwise 90 degrees, the lines read as follow:]

The rear end of the Grad missile

The warhead of the Grad missile

Length of the boat 20-30 meters

[To the left:] appendix (b) – Operation Basra revenge.

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[Page 32:]

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate
Subject / minutes of meeting

On 4/30/2001 representatives from the Qa'qa' General company visited the Basra Saddam fedayeen command headquarters. The following took place during the visit:

1. The group charged with work on the boat was trained on the task of disassembling and mechanical and electrical connections on the boat's parts. The group learned the job expertly.
2. Disassemble the special parts of the boat, and set aside each parts group as spare parts.
3. It was discovered that the depot was not suitable to store explosive materials. In order for the depot to provide proper storage conditions for certain materials, the following conditions must be available in it:
 - a. The temperature must be ambient and not rise above 30 degrees Celsius.
 - b. Ample ventilation and appropriate humidity.
 - c. Electric circuitry and electric equipment must be explosive-resistant (connections insulated and reinforced,) and it should be grounded and should have a lightning rod.
 - d. Materials should not be stored mixed together, but separated, each material in its own space.
 - e. No rolling or striking the materials.
 - f. The depot should be looked after by a person who is knowledgeable with the material; who will prevent any smoking or sources of open flame; and who will bar entry to unauthorized personnel.
 - g. It is preferable that the depot is located at a remote place, away from population centers and places of gathering, and it should be surrounded with an earthen barrier.
 - h. In the case of long-term storage, lab analytical testing should be done on the explosive materials from time to time to ensure its potency every three months.
4. Minutes of meeting were agreed upon and signed by the representatives of the Qa'qa' General company and by the representatives of Basra command.
Signature: Hasan Hashim Radi – technical engineer.
Signature: 'Adnan Hasan Hussein – technical engineer.
Signature: Karim 'Azab Jabbar - technical engineer, 5/2/2001.

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[Page 33:]

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

The decision:

To be delivered to the facility and later recollected when needed or when a crisis happens that involves the enemy or before the occurrence of a crisis with the enemy.

Signature: Saddam's fedayeen director.

[In a marginal answer to the director:]

To the director, greetings and salutations.

Subject / report of testing an explosive substance.

1. The Qa'qa' General company informed us that the C4 substance that was used to modify one of the boats used in operation Basra revenge is an extremely explosive substance that requires periodic testing to ensure its potency and the conditions of its storage. After we have sent a professional group comprising three engineers from the facility named above on 4/30/2001, the committee tested the substance and provided us with the attached report. The report states the necessity of erecting a special depot that fulfills the requirements of air conditioning and other storage stipulations, as entailed in the report. This facility must be remote, far from population centers.

2. The opinion. After your approval, we recommend that we coordinate with the facility or any other engineering outfit for the purpose of providing us with a design blueprint for such a depot. A suitable area that's closest to a group of other depots within the Basra sector will have to be scoped out for such a depot. Please review, sir. With due regards,

Signature: Staff brigadier general Ahmad Sadak Batah – public relations board, 5/5/2001.

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[Page 34:]

Minutes of meeting

Referencing the letter from the military manufacturing board – top secret and confidential. Number 95 on 2/6/2001. The explosive PG7 has been manufactured at an amount sufficient for 20 missiles, as a first batch, and a field test was conducted on five missiles to assess performance, yielding the following results:

- depth of penetration = 60 millimeter.
- Diameter of penetration = more than 50 millimeter.
- 1. The Saddam fedayeen representative, captain Muhammad Hadi Karam, was provided with 15 missiles as per the above mentioned specifications.
- 2. It was agreed that the second batch will be provided at the end of this week with a total of 15 missiles as per the oral agreement with them.
- 3. The payment aspects will be resolved later.

Minutes of meeting were finalized on 2/19/2001.

Signature: chief physicist, Nabil Ahmad Muhammad 'Ali – Hittin General company.

Signature: captain Muhammad Hadi Karam, Saddam's fedayeen.

Signature: chief engineer Muhammad Salman 'Alwan – Hittin general company.

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[Page 35:]

Minutes of meeting

Referencing the letter from the military manufacturing board – top secret and confidential. Number 95 on 2/6/2001, and as an attachment to the minutes of meeting recorded on 2/19/2001.

Saddam's fedayeen's representative, captain Muhammad Hadi Karim, was provided with ten missiles as per the specifications listed in the previous minutes of meeting, bringing the total amount delivered to them to 25 specialized and modified PG7 missiles.

Minutes of meeting report was finalized on 3/1/2001.

Signature: chief physicist, Nabil Ahmad Muhammad 'Ali – Hittin General company, 3/1/2001.

Signature: captain Muhammad Hadi Karam, Saddam's fedayeen, 3/1/2001.

Signature: chief engineer Muhii Salman 'Alwan – Hittin general company, 3/1/2001.

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[Page 36:]

Hittin general company

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

Al-Rashid plant bill of lading for material leaving the plant. Such material will not be returned.

No	Name of substance	Unit	Amount		
			Number	Written	
11	Explosive – PG7 missile	Quantity	10	Ten only	To the fields for the purpose of Special testing
12	Propellant filler	Quantity	10	Ten only	For the fedayeen
13	Wooden box	Quantity	1	One only	

Three items only.

Signature: Muhammad Hadi Karim

Signature: department chief, 3/1/2001

Signature: depots, Muhammad [UI]

Signature: Ahmad Rashid 'Abdullah Muhammad

Identification number: 8530 / 31112000

Signature: company's security officer, 3/1

Signature: [UI], 3/1/2001

Confirmation by the operations room, entered into the computer under the file number 759.

Sectors, Signature: name: 'Aqil 'Abbas, date.

[stamped seal:] Hittin general company – material exit – number – date.

Signature: 'Aqil 'Abbas. Date:

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[Page 37:]

5203

Hittin general manufacturing	Material request	Date: 2/9/2001	No. 14..45
Requesting section: al- Rashid. Cost center: 55104	Operation name: production	The depot: al-Rashid	
No. Material name and description	Code No. unit	Quantity: No	Quantity: written
1 Adhesive tape	One roll	23	Twenty three
2 Black paint to paint the missile	Gallon	1	Only one
3 White fabric	Meter	7.5	Seven and a half
4 Carton layers	Kg	5	Only five
5 White paint to paint the boxes	Gallon	1	Only one
6 Sponge brushes	Quantity	5	Five only
7 Paint brushes, 3 inches	Quantity	2	Two only
8 Sewing machine needle	Quantity	1	Only one

[Under the heading of] notes: For the needs of the workshop to manufacture the PG7 material.

[there are numerous illegible signatures, names and other scribbled notes.]

ISGQ-2003-00003598

[Page 38:]

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate
I, the undersigned, received from Captain Muhammad Hadi Karim, a member of the
Saddam's fedayeen staff headquarters, the following materials:

1. Grenade missiles, 40 mm caliber, modified. Quantity = only ten.
 2. Filler for grenade missiles, 40 mm caliber, modified. Quantity = only ten.
 3. One wooden box.
- Only three items.

Signature: the deliverer, captain Muhammad Hadi Karim – Saddam's fedayeen, 2 March
2001.

Signature: the receiver, lieutenant Jamil Shamma' – Kazma's Saddam's fedayeen, 2 March
2001.

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[Page 39:]

Restricted. For the purpose of serving the concerns of the [Central] Intelligence, which plays a major role in framing its policy, namely the policy of the United States of America, making it able to scrutinize the issues that it handles or decides in the fields of the electronics industry and other industries, and to make future decisions based on calculated and precise planning and for extended periods of time for both the near and far future. We will see that the American Intelligence did not leave any areas unexploited to influence American policy. One of these methods is the use or the exploitation of parapsychology in its most secret work, for it is a weapon for both war and peace.

17. The American Central Intelligence Agency developed a program of transferring skills from the brains of some individuals to those of others, whether the latter are serving near or far in espionage missions. This experiment started on 6/25/1958. It involved telepathy, and it ended with a 70 percent rate of success. The American Intelligence also studied the possibility of sending special waves that can influence someone's brain at a distance of thousands of miles, and that the best place to use these studies is naval bases and submarines. In 1977, the Challenger, an American surveillance ship discovered a sunken Soviet submarine at the bottom of the Atlantic Ocean. Inside it, they found equipment and information that enabled the American Army to decode the secret code that was used by all the units of the Soviet fleet. This operation was the biggest and greatest military victory for the American Intelligence Agency for many years because it enabled the agency to uncover positions of the striking Soviet forces, causing the Soviets to reposition forces and to change the code as well as the plans in this regard. This operation did not succeed through conventional efforts and means, as through electronically equipped aircraft and ships and satellites that discovered the location of the sunken Soviet submarine at the depth of the Atlantic. Rather, a new kind of weapon was used in this operation, namely parapsychology – by using a specialized diver and telepathy.

(11-22)

Restricted

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[Page 40:]

In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
Be ye fair and drawn swords against tyranny while remaining truthful men
God. Country. The leader. Those who give pledge to you they are giving pledge to Allah
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The Republic of Iraq
Office of the President
Saddam's fedayeen
General secretariat

Number: 1/b/286

Date: 3/5/2001

The decision:
For the review of Ahmad Sadak
Saddam's fedayeen director, 3/18/2001

To the director of Saddam's fedayeen – greetings and salutations
Subject: Information

Attached, please find the letter number 2864, on 3/3/2001, from the office of the chief of staff and the letter number 1382, on 2/24/2001, from directorate of internal affairs, Basra Province, wherein you will find the President's order as to how to deal with the fishermen in the Gulf waters (clipping a). Please review and coordinate. With warm regards,
Signature: Staff lieutenant general 'Abdullah Kulaib 'Uwain – secretary general, 3/5/2001

[handwritten:] 663, circulate / 3/19/2001, to the office of the chiefs of staff (a.s.)
Staff brigadier general Ahmad Sadak Batah to review and take the necessary arrangements.

Signature: staff general – secretary general, 3/19/2001.

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[Page 41:]

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[Holy Quran: 48-10.]
The Republic of Iraq
Office of the President
Saddam's fedayeen
General secretariat

[handwritten:] A.R.E. 1035/4/3.
The Intelligence
Number 1/1/2864 / 3/3/2001
Date: 3 March 2001

To the general secretariat of Saddam's fedayeen
Subject: The fishermen

Referring to letter number 38, on 2/25/2001, from the Kazma command of Saddam's fedayeen, we herewith attach a copy of Basra Province internal affairs directorate letter number 1382, on 2/24/2001, that entails the Presidential order. Please review. Warm regards,

Attachments: (1) copy of a letter
Signature: staff major general 'Ali 'Abd Mahmud, head of chiefs of staff – Saddam's fedayeen

Copy to: Kazma Saddam's fedayeen command / regarding your above mentioned letter.
Please review. Warm regards,

[handwritten:] The office / shown before the eyes of the general secretary, 3/4, Signature:

Qasim //
T. W (A. B. J.)

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[Page 42:]

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

Republic of Iraq
Ministry of Interior
Basra Province
Directorate of internal affairs
Covert section
Number: 1382
Date: 2/24/2001

[center:] Republican emblem [upper right is a quote from Saddam Hussein, illegible:]

A.S 1/1 / 201 / 2/24

To the director in charge of Basra and Diqar provinces' coordination
Subject: The fishermen

We have been informed by the office of the ministry of the interior, office of the internal minister, in ministry of the interior's letter number 3905, on 2/14/2001, of the Presidential order, which was conveyed in Presidential office letter number B.Q/5099, on 2/12/2001, marked secret and urgent, that the fishermen in the Gulf are to be handled in the following manner:

1. They are to be allowed to carry weapons with them on their fishing trips in the Arabian Gulf.
2. There shall be no coercing the fishermen to carry weapons on their fishing trips in the Arabian Gulf and in our territorial waters.
3. In the event that one of the Iraqi fishermen is assaulted while in our territorial waters and he did not retaliate against the Kuwaiti or Iranian attackers, then this fisherman is to be doubly punished and have his fishing license revoked.
4. Encourage our fishermen, by the state and the party, to fish inside and outside our territorial waters in the Arabian Gulf.

Please review. Warmest regards

Signature: staff major general Ahmad Ibrahim Hammash, Basra's governor.

[handwritten:] please review and coordinate then brief the President as well as [UI].

XXXXXXXXXXXX

[distribution:]

Ministry of the interior / office of the minister / referencing your above mentioned letter, with thanks.

Party command center of al-Ablasa
Party command center of Um al-Ma'arik branch
Party command center of Basra branch
Party command center of al-Zubair bin al-'Awwam
Town hall of al-Faw jurisdiction
Town hall of al-Zubair jurisdiction
Town hall of Abu al-Khasib jurisdiction

[handwritten:]

1. Brief the President.

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2. Brief the head of chiefs of staff, along with a copy of the above letter.
3. Inform the Basra command force of its content after receiving the opinion of the head of the chiefs of staff.

Signature: 2/24

((continued))

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In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

Republic of Iraq
Ministry of Interior
Basra Province
Directorate of internal affairs
Covert section

Directorate of Um Qasr borough
Southern region secret police directorate
Law enforcement directorate of Basra province
Police directorate of Basra province
Southern region intelligence agency
Naval intelligence
Southern region customs directorate
Proceed to enact the necessary arrangements regarding the subject and inform all fishermen of it. Warm regards.

Kazim 21/2 preliminaries, Dia

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1. The first question: Is the area called "Jamila," which you informed staff major general 'Abdullah about, inside Iraqi or Iranian territorial waters?

Answer: According to our information it is a commercial exchange area, with maritime vessels from neighboring countries. It also has Iranian boats of various types ('Ashura force is Iranian and is located to the left, outside al-'Amiq port toward the Iranian side at a distance of 9 kilometers).

2. Second question: Why do you hesitate to sell fish in Jamila area, where you fish?

Answer: Because the area is located in the Iranian side and is under Iranian control, and because our boats are originally Iranian but were confiscated by the Iraqi naval force. Therefore, we fear that if we trespass into the Iranian side, the Iranians will reclaim the boats back.

Signature: first lieutenant Ziad Ahmad Hamadi, 6/1/2001.

Signature: lieutenant Hussein 'Ali Daih, 6/1/2001.

Signature: Ra'ad 'Awda 'Abd-al-Jalil.

Signature: 'Aziz Khairi Mazid, 6/1/2001.

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As a matter of fact, developing weapons that can penetrate deeply into the ground or concrete is one of the foremost priorities of American weapon manufacturers. Some targets may contain chemical and biological weapons. Unless these are annihilated to the highest degree, they can be detected from the air by some hazardous airborne substances. No matter how precise these weapons are, it is necessary for the attacking force to know exactly what its aim in the attack is: some targets are mobile, and Iraq has proven that it moved throughout the country very expansive equipment and data to evade United Nations' weapons inspection teams. Still, precision is essential and fundamental to the Americans if they want to strike vital targets while minimizing civilian losses simultaneously.

Signature: Sa'ad Najim 'Abdullah, translator, 1/4/2001.

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Training the light on the air force during crises.

Remainder of forces in the Gulf:

- The forces' record.
- Iraq.
- American forces in the Gulf.
- Remainder of forces in the Gulf.
- Weapons systems in the Gulf.
- The 1991 Gulf War.

Britain, January 18 – British forces (source: British defense department)

750 force units

18 Tornados and four Jaguar bombers

Two war ships

12 Tornado fighter jets for attack and surveillance and 500 soldiers at the Salim air force base in Kuwait and seven additional Tornados plus 210 from the Saudi forces in Kharj to patrol southern Iraq.

Two tanker aircraft and 50 recruits in Bahrain for in-air fueling and four Jaguar fighter jets for land assault and one 15-72 aircraft positioned at Incirlik, in Turkey, to patrol the no-fly zone.

Two war ships armed with Exocet weapons and one gunfire support ship to patrol the Gulf, and one frigate to head toward the area.

Australia

Special force

- There are no forces to date

Air force

- There are no forces to date

Aboard the carrier Invincible there are 1200 sailors. It participated in the Falklands war in 1982, and is presently positioned in the Gulf.

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Tabulated comparison for the weapon RPG

T Type	Weight	Range	Penetration depth	Usage	Caliber	Length	Notes
RPG-7/D1	6.3 kg for the launcher, 2.3 kg for the grenade.	300 m	320 mm	Armor	40 mm	950 mm in the firing position	20 launchers count.
RPG-7/V1	6.7 kg for the launcher, 2.3 kg for the grenade.	300 m		Armor	40 mm	950 mm in the firing position. 650 mm without grenade	20 launchers count.
RPG-7	6.7 kg for the launcher, 2.3 kg for the grenade.	400 m	300 mm	Armor	40 mm		
RPG-22	2.8 kg	200 m	1000 mm reinforced concrete; 1200 mm building	Reinforced concrete barriers; brick buildings	72.5 mm		One-time usage only; 20 launchers count.
RPG-18	2.6 kg	200 m	1000 mm reinforced concrete; 1200 mm building	Reinforced concrete barriers; brick buildings	64 mm		One-time usage only.

Note: the types highlighted in yellow are the ones required.

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Review of firepower

Allies airpower

The striking force for the United States in the Persian Gulf comprises more than 300 aircraft among them fighter jets, heavy bombers, and assault helicopters.

The airpower includes aircraft positioned in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Turkey; also, B-52s and tanker aircraft stationed on Diego Garcia Island.

Despite the fact that 100 aircraft, half of which are fighters, land in Saudi Arabia, it is possible that the United States will not release the fighters that failed in securing Saudi guarantee in gunfire support.

Coalition military power

American ships

Air carriers: The USS George Washington and the USS Independence, five destroyers plus frigates, submarines, amphibious vessels, and other ships.

American fighter jets and support aircraft.

American forces; British forces.

Iraqi forces.

Commands and control.

Republican guard.

Air force.

Military equipment.

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[English document]

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[Page 50:]

[English document]

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[English document]

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[11: 41] And he (Nûh (Noah) (peace be upon him)) said: "Embark therein: in the Name of Allâh will be its (moving) course and its (resting) anchorage. Surely, my Lord is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful." (Holy Quran - Tafsir At-Tabarî)

To the director of the Saddam's fedayeen, greetings and salutations, Sir:
Subject: An assessment of the naval field of operations

Referring to your orders to the task team that comprises staff lieutenant general Aiub Mahdi Salih, secretary general; special forces staff major general Muhammad Faris, commander-in-chief of Kazma's Saddam's fedayeen; staff brigadier general Ahmad Sadak Batah, from the public relations board; staff brigadier general Salman Hamid Zahir, commander of Basra force of Saddam's fedayeen; and staff colonel Muhammad Fahad of the public relations board at 2300 hours on 12/29/2000 regarding the assessment of the naval operations theatre in order to confront the Kuwaiti and Iranian transgressions in the Arabian Gulf area, we wish to clarify to you the following:

1. As soon as we received your order, a task team convened a meeting at 0900 hours on 12/31/2000 at the general secretariat of Saddam's fedayeen to formulate a movement and information-gathering plan and to ponder scenarios and consider opinions in order to carry out the mission with every precision and boldness and trust, given that it [plan] is one of the civic duties in the course of dealing with these transgressions to put a stop to them.
2. The task team moved to Basra sector to execute the movement plan in-field and to become familiar with the nature of the operations theatre and to establish contact with all our covert sources so as to identify the true nature of the situation and to formulate a number of alternatives that will result in the success of the operation, God willing.
3. The aim: prepare an evaluation of the operations theater, identify the violations, their [cont'd., Page 53]

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locations, and their nature, and formulate confrontation plans plus secure the requirements thereof.

4. Description of the naval operations theater: Appendix (a) is a chart of northern Arabian Gulf.

- a. The Iraqi coast is located north of the Arabian Gulf, bordered from the east by Iran, from the south by Kuwait, and it stretches for 60 kilometers from Ras al-Bisha until Um Qasr.
- b. The average depth in the Arabian Gulf is 70 meters, and it decreases as we move toward the north where the 20th depth line is located at a distance of 40 kilometers from the Iraqi coast.
- c. The presence of the de-militarized zone at 'Abdullah inlet will check the navigation of our naval vessels. There is a group of buoys that demarcate the imaginary maritime boundary line. The Kuwaiti coast is located five kilometers from the boundary line and ten kilometers from the Iraqi coast. This area is considered the territorial waters for that country.
- d. The Iraqi maritime coast has been demarcated after the ceasefire, and it has become smaller. Additionally, the Coalition forces are steadfast in further shrinking the coast to make it resemble an inland waterway.
- e. The al-Bakr and al-'Amiq ports are in the Arabian Gulf. The al-'Amiq port lies 50 kilometers from Um Qasr and contains an oil pipe.
- f. There is a demilitarized zone in the Shat al-'Arab area at one kilometer from both sides, the Iraqi and the Iranian; it is forbidden to position any heavy military equipment in it.
- g. In the Kuwaiti Gaid area, there are two observation boats in addition to a number of maritime observation posts that cover the Kuwaiti shoreline.
- h. There are Iraqi patrol boats that belong to the Iraqi navy that perform surveillance and observation up to al-'Amiq and al-Bakr ports.
- i. There are a number of Kuwaiti islands, such as Wuria, Bubian, Failaka, and Kuwait port as well as a group of islands that are close to the Iranian coast.

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5. Armament and naval readiness of the hostile countries (Kuwait, Iran, and the Coalition countries).

a. The Kuwaiti armament and naval readiness:

- 1) Two guided-missile boats, the Sunbuk, P-V-505, and the Istiqlal, P.5702, with a speed of 40 knots. Its firepower: four surface-to-surface, MM40 Exocet missiles with a range of 10 kilometers. Weight of the warhead is 165 kilograms. Lethal firing range is 5 kilometers. The boat is also armed with a 76 mm caliber Broler gun.
- 2) Four small patrol boats: Intisar 30, Aman 302, 303, and 304. Speed is 28 knots. Firepower is two, 12.7 mm caliber anti-aircraft machineguns.
- 3) Twelve small high-speed patrol boats, speed is 40 knots, each armed with a machinegun.
- 4) Seventeen small patrol boats equipped with a single-bore machinegun.
- 5) Eight patrol boats that were received from one of the French companies each armed with a 26 mm caliber gun plus two, 20 mm caliber guns.
- 6) A number of British-made small interdiction high speed boats, received in 1991. Speed is 43 knots. Powered by two Yamaha outboard motors, it is armed with a single-bore 12.7 mm caliber machinegun.
- 7) High speed Kuwaiti-made interdiction boats with a length of 13 meters powered by two Yamaha 100 HP motors. They were entered into service in 1998.

b. Iranian naval armament and readiness:

- 1) Three frigates.
- 2) Three destroyers.
- 3) Two guard ships.
- 4) Fifteen missile boats.
- 5) Five minesweepers.
- 6) Three submarines type Kilo [PH].
- 7) Twelve supply ships.

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- 8) Four landing ships.
 - 9) Seven patrol boats and a number of small boats.
 - 10) Fourteen helicopters.
- c. Armament and combat readiness of the Coalition in the Arabian Gulf:
- 1) American forces:
 1. One air carrier with 86 various aircraft aboard.
 2. Seven cruisers.
 3. Five destroyers.
 4. Four frigates.
 5. Three submarines.
 6. Command ship.
 7. Amphibious assault ship.
 8. Minesweeper.
 9. Four tank and personnel landing ship.
 10. One supply ship.
 - 2) Other forces:
 1. Six British naval vessels (three destroyers, two frigates, and one support ship).
 2. Three Canadian frigates.
 3. Three Dutch frigates.
 4. Four New Zealand frigates.
 5. Four French multi-purpose naval vessels.
 - 3) Surface ships (cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and submarines) carrying 166 Tomahawk cruise missiles for striking naval targets and 122 Harpoon anti-ship missiles.
 - 4) One amphibious assault ship (Blilu [PH]) carrying four Harrier aircraft and 19 helicopters of the types Sea Stallion, Super Stallion, Sea Cobra, and Sea Night.
 - 5) Two materiel and personnel landing ships with two infantry battalion plus two tank detachments landing capability via landing boats in a single lift. (4-14)

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6. Violations and transgressions, their locations, and their results in 2000:

<i>The Map</i>	<i>Vessel's name</i>	<i>Date and time</i>	<i>Type of violation / Aggression</i>	<i>Location</i>
1	Fath al-Rahman motorboat	5/7/2000 1200	Intercepted by a Kuwaiti patrol boat and was towed to Kuwait's ports.	Near Bubian island, on the Kuwaiti side.
4	22/Basra Al-Mamun	9/6/2000 0300	Intercepted by an Iranian patrol boat and was lead to port Bandar Khumaini.	Half a mile south of Jamila beacon M T (835972).
3	The transporter Mustafa	9/13/2000	Interception by American ships, was taken to Abu Dhabi port, then confiscated.	Baharkan area.
2	Fishing boat	10/7/2000 1735	A Kuwaiti boat approached the fishing boat and was then chased away by our boats.	Near buoy (12).
5	The transporter Muna	10/24/2000 2400	Intercepted by two Iranian military boats.	Southeast port al-Bakr, at a distance of 6.5 kilometers.
6	The mechanized barge Jalajil	11/24/2000	Intercepted by four Iranian armed boats and was lead to port Bandar Khumaini.	M T (835972).
7	The tugboat 'Ali Bantun	11/24/2000	Intercepted by Iranian boats then lead to port Bandar Khumaini.	The outer barrier of Shat al-'Arab.
8	The fishing ship Nur	11/24/2000	Intercepted by Iranian boats, then interdicted at the entrance of Musa Inlet.	M T (835972).
9	The ship Rishan	12/8/2000	Intercepted by a group of Iranian boats and interdicted on the Iraqi side of Shat al-'Arab.	Across from the Iranian command control

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7. The form of hostile violations:

From the information gathered from our secret sources, and after meeting a number of fishermen who work at various locations at sea (Um Qasr, al-Faw, Shat al-'Arab) or seamen who work in shipping freight, the following is now clear:

a. The Kuwaiti transgressions:

The Kuwaiti transgressions take place when Iraqi fishing boats trespass into Kuwaiti territorial waters searching for deepwater fish and during certain seasons. Two Kuwaiti boats would approach the fishing boat. An officer on one of the two boats would request that the sailors of the fishing boat should gather at its fore. Two crew members of the Kuwaiti boat then board the fishing boat to search it. If weapons or contraband were found, the boat is then taken to the Kuwaiti shores. If nothing is found, the boat is then expelled out of the Kuwaiti territorial waters.

b. The Iranian transgressions:

The Iranian transgressions happen when fishing boats venture into Iranian territorial waters searching for fish that abound in Iranian territorial waters and at certain seasons. Also, Iranian transgressions happen when oil tankers carrying smuggled oil try to evade paying Customs tariffs for using the Iranian territorial waters: An Iranian patrol boat will approach an Iraqi maritime vessel and stop it. If the boatman is a fisherman, he is then told to return to the Iraqi territorial waters. But if the maritime vessel is a ship, its cargo documentation is inspected. If it is found in violation of the governing laws, it is then taken to the Iranian coast.

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c. There was no proof that the Iranian and Kuwaiti patrols violated Iraqi maritime vessels inside the Iraqi territorial waters with one exception: the violation against the ship Rishan. This ship has itself committed two previous violations, and has a negative marker on it. The Iranian boat that approached it and fired into the air for the purpose of stopping her caused the sailors aboard it to fire back at the Iranian boat's crew, killing two of its members.

d. The patrols of the Iraqi naval force are constantly moving to cover the entire Iraqi territorial waters region between port Um Qasr and al-Faw, and between port al-'Amiq and port al-Bakr. During this unobstructed movement to carry out their duties there was never once any violation logged against them.

8. Options available to us to confront the aggressions:

From the study of the theatre of naval operations and the foreign violations that were committed against ships and commercial boats, we deduced that the ideal option to stop such operations is to perpetrate a high jacking or to destroy the hostile naval vessel committing this aggression, or kill its crews. This is best done by drawing the enemy into a calculated confrontation with one of the naval vessels that has been fitted and equipped with what ensures a quick and direct response. Considering most of the foreign aggressions (Kuwaiti – Iranian,) and based on what has been concluded from the available information that was gathered from sailing ships and boat captains, there is potential for finding locations of planting the following suggested ambushes.

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[TN: next page (8-14) is missing...see page 80]

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- (2) The negative aspects:
 - a. The potential of interference from the large or midsize naval vessels.
 - b. The potential for incurring losses.
- b. Locations for launching ambushes on the Iranian side:
 - First: Ambush No. One: to be launched near the Iranian command control (Attachment A.)
 - (1) The positive aspects:
 - a. Rapid withdrawal toward the Iraqi coast.
 - b. There must be no interference from other Iranian naval vessels.
 - c. It is possible to provide cover and concealment for the presence of many boats and ships.
 - (2) The negative aspects:
 - a. An Iranian reaction toward the sailing vessel.
 - b. Potential for interference from land forces that are positioned on the Iranian coast.
 - Second. Ambush No. Two: Can be launched at the mouth of Shat al-Arab (Attachment A.)
 - (1) The positive aspects:
 - a. The area is relatively far for the naval vessels to interfere.
 - b. The element of surprise is better achieved.
 - (2) The negative aspects:
 - a. Pulling out would be relatively far.
 - b. The potential for interference from land or sea.
 - Third. Ambush No. Three: To be launched near the Iranian coasts (Attachment A.)
 - (1) The positive aspects: Execution is in the direction of one boat.
 - (2) The negative aspects:
 - a. Potential for incurring losses.

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b. Potential for interference from other naval vessels.

c. Pull out is relatively far.

c. After analyzing the positive and negative aspects of the ambush launch locations, we reach the following:

First. The best place to launch the ambushes on the Kuwaiti side is Ambush No. One, which launches north of the Arab Gulf area (the entrance to 'Abdullah Inlet).

Second. The best place to launch ambushes on the Iranian side is Ambush No. One, which launches near the Iranian command control (in al-Faw).

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9. Special requirements to confront the aggressions (armament / preparedness / elements / command and control)

a. Supplies:

- 1 – Large motorboat with two speedboats powered by two, 235 HP motors each boat and the motorboat. This averages one motorboat and one speedboat for the Kuwait task and one speedboat for the Iran task.
- 2 – A communications wireless radio, type Rakal HF with an international channel for each speedboat and motorboat, and a similar device for central command.
- 3 – Three GPS devices for position location type Magellan.
- 4 – Three rubber boats with three motors.
- 5 – Three pneumatic generators.
- 6 – Thirty life vests.
- 7 – Ten diving suits plus their accouterments.

b. Armament:

- 1 – Three BKC machineguns plus the base.
- 2 – Three RPG7 for each speedboat and motorboat at an average of five anti-tank rockets for each launcher.
- 3 – Thirty half-butt Kalashnikov assault rifles with four magazines for each assault rifle.
- 4 – Thirty attack hand grenades.
- 5 – Ten highly explosive adhesion mines.
- 6 – Ten smoke grenades.

c. The elements:

- 1 – Three officers.
- 2 – Thirty fedayeen.
- 3 – Elements for the boats' command and guides to be recruited either from the naval force or from the cooperating civilians after the decision to implement in later stages.
- 4 – Admit the officers and fedayeen into a training course at the naval force command to train them on diving and swimming and the use of diving equipment and to learn to adapt and survive in the sea for 15 days.
- 5 – When the above requirements are fulfilled, the task team will need ten days to start execution of duty.

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d. Command and control:

- 1 – Secure the task area through Kazma's command by coordinating with the naval force command.
- 2 – Establishing a land command center by Kazma's command and securing the launch and pull-out area for the boats in Um Qasr and al-Faw according to the nature of the task and at subsequent stages for the purpose of securing the safety of the operation.
- 3 – Wireless connection between the command center and the task boat for the purpose of altering the plans and to safely withdraw when these exigencies are needed and through a commanding officer.

10. The confrontation approach:

a. Confronting the Kuwaiti aggression:

The conventional approach is for two Kuwaiti boats to approach. One of the boats stays at a far distance while the other begins the approach with the request that the Iraqi crew gather at the foredeck. The boat would then circle the vessel several times to confirm that all the crew is assembled at the foredeck. Only then would the Kuwaiti boat tether itself to the Iraqi vessel. Two to three armed personnel would then board the vessel to secure the situation. They then commence searching the boat and beating and insulting or escorting to the Kuwaiti ports and confiscating the naval vessel. In order to confront this practice and provide an armed response we shall do the following:

- 1 – The naval vessel (motorboat/speedboat) with all the required equipment will set sail for the purpose of fishing near the Kuwaiti coast, south of buoy No. (3) in the direction of Bubian Island and will maneuver in the area while executing a deception plan: Launching as large a number of boats to sea for the purpose of fishing. The Kuwaiti boats are then given the opportunity to observe this while being careful not to have any patrol boats present near the task naval vessel.

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2 – When the Kuwaiti boat requests that the crew gather at the foredeck, only part of the crew (5 – 6) will oblige, but the rest will hide inside.

3 – The Kuwaiti sailors are then allowed to board the naval vessel for the purpose of searching. Only then will the personnel hiding inside appear and open fire on them. Other personnel will start engaging the boats with medium weapons, including RPG7 to destroy them and kill anyone aboard them, or the adhesive mines or attack grenades can be used.

4 – Commence immediate withdrawal after execution of the task and do not linger in the area. Withdrawal shall be under the protection of Iraqi naval patrol in the direction of 'Abdullah Inlet.

b. Confronting the Iranian aggression:

For the purpose of carrying out an armed operation against the Iranian naval vessels near the command control in al-Faw [particularly] for the boat 'Ashur, we require the following:

1 – Prepare a small fishing boat with three to four personnel.

2 – The boat will remain anchored for two to three days for the purpose of fishing.

3 – When the boat 'Ashur approaches for material gain purposes or other purposes, it will be addressed using Persian or Arabian dialogue.

4 – The boat 'Ashur lacks any fighting capability, making its capture all the more easy.

5 – Conducting the operation at night requires that it stays longer than the time previously mentioned until the arrival of the target boat.

6 – Immediate withdrawal via 'Abdullah Inlet under the protection of the Iraqi naval patrol.

11. The deception plan:

a. Work under complete secrecy until the start of the execution of the task. The task team should conduct visits to the middle and north sector for the purpose of deception.

b. Coordinate with the member of the Iraqi command in launching the fishing boat at a suitable time to carry out a camouflage-and-hide operation for the boats tasked with duty.

c. Put in place a methodical, detailed deception plan during the preparation stage and secure the task requirements, such as buying or renting boats and modifying them, and establishing the logistical center and securing the launch and withdrawal base. All the details of this plan will be presented to you, Sir, for the safety of the operation.

d. Transportation for all the charged officers during all the operation stages will be via vehicles different from those used in the sacrificial work. The officers will wear civilian clothes similar to those worn in the Basra province environment.

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12. General conclusion: From the above, the task team reached the final and general conclusion that all the capabilities are available for the sacrificial work to execute the task with courage and precision for all the confrontation choices at once or based on priority of choices or in case your orders mandate the tackling of any naval target, Kuwaiti or Iranian, inside their territorial waters. The task team pledges to be worthy of your trust in carrying out this task or any upcoming task that you order us to do whether inside our territorial water or in the high seas. We await your orders, sir.

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate:

"And an Ayâh (sign) for them is that We bore their offspring in the laden ship. And We have created for them of the like thereunto, on which they ride. And if We will, We shall drown them, and there will be no shout (or helper) for them (to hear their cry for help) nor will they be saved." Chapter Yasin: 41-43 [Quran].

Staff colonel Muhammad Salih Fahad – public relations.

Staff brigadier general Ahmad Sadak Batah – public relations.

Staff brigadier general Salman Hamid Zahir – Basra force commanding officer.

Special forces staff major general Kazim Muhammad Faris – commander of Kazma command.

Staff major general Aiub Mahdi Salih – secretary general for Saddam's fedayeen.

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In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
 Be ye fair and drawn swords against tyranny while remaining truthful men
 God. Country. The leader. Those who give pledge to you they are giving pledge to Allah
 [Holy Quran: 48-10.]
 The Republic of Iraq
 Office of the President
 Saddam's fedayeen
 General secretariat
 Public relations board
 No /1/2014
 9 Shawwal 1241H
 1/4/2001

To the office of chiefs of staff – the administration
 Subject: Task delegation

The fedayeen whose names are listed below were assigned to their command posts. They number 19 fedayeen starting from 1/1/2001 until further notice to you from us. They are:

Sequence Number	Rank	Full name	Force
1.	Lieutenant Fedayee	Kamil Ahmad 'Alij Shlish	Al-Qari'a force
2.	Fedayee	Sabah Ramadan 'Aziz	Diala force
3.	Fedayee	'Abd-al-Rida Majli Sultan	Diala force
4.	Fedayee	Muhammad Sabri Hasan	Diala force
5.	Fedayee	'Adil Kazim Warrior	Diqar force
6.	Fedayee	Hashim Nahi 'Ubaid	Diqar force
7.	Fedayee	'Abd Ni'ma Jabir	Diqar force
8.	Fedayee	'Ali Khairallah Khalaf	Diqar force
9.	Fedayee	Hashim Muhammad Shindi	Basra force
10.	Fedayee	Muhammad Karim Mutar	Basra force
11.	Fedayee	Ahmad 'Abd-al-Majid Ibrahim	Basra force
12.	Fedayee	Falih Kahat Sahar	Basra force
13.	Fedayee	'Abd-al-Karim Kazim Zubar	Karkh force
14.	Fedayee	'Imad 'Awni Jamil	Karkh force
15.	Fedayee	'Ali 'Abd-al-'Aziz Hammudi	Karkh force

[Diala force cells are marked with the note:] Staff brigadier general Thair.

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[Diqar force cells are marked with the note:] Lieutenant colonel Raid + captain Samir.
[Karkh force cells are marked with the note:] Staff colonel Qusai.

(1-2)

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[Page 66:]

In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
Be ye fair and drawn swords against tyranny while remaining truthful men
God. Country. The leader. Those who give pledge to you they are giving pledge to Allah
[Holy Quran: 48-10.]
The Republic of Iraq
Office of the President
Saddam's fedayeen
General secretariat

Number	Rank	Full name	Force
16.	Fedayee	Surin Yinshan Antranik	Rasafa force
17.	Fedayee	Makki Jawad Kazim	Rasafa force
18.	Fedayee	Karim Rahim 'Abd Salman	Rasafa force
19.	Fedayee	'Ali Hussein Jawda	Karbala force

[Rasafa force cells are marked with the note:] Major Sulaiman.

Please review and advise, warm regards.

Signature: staff major general Aiub Mahdi Salih – Saddam fedayeen general secretary,
1/4/2001.

(2-2)

Hamad

1 4

Miqdam 3/1

T. W (A/B/J)

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In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

To my supervisor, greetings and regards:

Subject: Clarification

There was a misunderstanding during my meeting with you on 5/31/2001 regarding the subject of the information presented to you by the secretary general and staff major general Makki Hammudat. Therefore, I wish to explain to you the following:

1. The area named Jamila is a designated a commercial trading area lying nine miles east of al-'Amiya port. Basically it is an Iranian port that was previously proposed but work at it has stopped. The massive concrete pads that were built to serve as a foundation for the port are still there. It is considered a forward base where many boats from Iranian naval force 'Ashura command would dock. Many boats from various countries assemble in this area to engage in commercial exchange based on the goods carried by these boats. It is marked on the chart shown to us by you at the start of the task. Attached you will find attachment "a", which is a confession of the same person who informed the secretary general, plus the confessions of a number of people who were with him. When he was confronted by me, and because he knows that I know many details about this area, he then admitted that it is an Iranian, not an Iraqi area since it is called Jamila only by the Iraqi fishermen as a namesake for the produce market Jamila in Baghdad.

2. Regarding the reference that the task is disclosed. Here I meant to elucidate the matter of disclosure: If the intent was that the task was uncovered by the enemy, then I will be responsible about this before you. Rather, if its disclosure was from other Iraqi sources, then we have an indicator of that reasons that I will recount seriatim. The important thing is that it is of no importance nor does it have any influence upon the task, as follows:

a. There was coordination with the naval force through many segments, starting with the purchasing of the boats...

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- And the training that included 50 fedayeen and an officer from the Basra command and gathering preliminary intelligence about the American naval vessels that are operating in the Arabian Gulf and their contribution in facilitating the movement of our boats at sea and other matters that were requested from me by you regarding the Silkworm missile and the delineation of a safe zone within Zubair Inlet.
- b. Coordinating with the directorate of Iraqi ports regarding boat examination certificates and allowing our boats to dock at port of Um Qasr and using Hittin shipyard and the coordinating shipyard for repair purposes, noting that port of Um Qasr and its shipyards are not entered by shipping boats, but only the boats belonging to the naval intelligence and secret police.
 - c. Coordinate with the Basra branch of the leading party and with the fishermen association regarding the launching of a group that of more than 50 boats to provide cover for our boats' movements.
 - d. Coordinating with Basra province regarding completion of the fishermen's identity documents.
 - e. Coordinating with the ministry of defense regarding the securing of firepower, such as Malotka missiles and a 106 mm caliber cannon.
 - f. Coordinating with the military industrialization department regarding the modification of the weapons.
 - g. Coordinating with the Republican guard for the purpose of starting a workshop for 18 fedayeen from other forces and securing rubber boats.
 - h. Coordinating with several civilian entities regarding boat repair and regarding numerous occupations.
 - i. The task originally comprised a group that numbered more than 70 fedayeen and cooperative civilians; and certainly a number as big as this one must pose a risk on the covertness of the task.
 - j. The privacy that our boats enjoy, particularly when they sail from the port of Um Qasr, would attract the attention of other fishermen especially when noting that using the port of Um Qasr is a necessity that cannot be avoided particularly during the repair stage.
 - k. There exists another important element, namely that deferring to the commander and constantly confirming orders from Um Qasr has given another indicator to others that there about to be a specific at-sea mission for the fedayeen.

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3. Sir: As a result of having the abovementioned reasons warrant sufficient doubt in the task, I still feel very confident toward the task. All these matters were and still remain under consideration and are expected, but they don't mean much as far as the elemental course of the task execution simply because we basically were in agreement that it is a crucial task, and the level of sacrifice involved in it is initially calculated. Also, since the specification given by you was that we should work within our territorial waters, what harm would there be in having all Iraqis know that we are in our territorial waters, defending our country and that we harbor no aggression toward others?

4. Sir: As far as you know, this task comprised two parts. The first falls under the responsibility of staff major general Makki Hammoudat. This part deals with buying the boats, repairing them, and making them complete from all angles. The second part that concerns us relates to securing human resources, training them, readying them and equipping them with the firepower that they will be using. To be candid, sir, I would say to you that staff major general Makki Hammoudat has gone too far in mixing his sense of economization and scrimping with the significance of the task in that the boats -it is true- are cheap, but they are not suited for this kind of task despite the fact that more than (56,) fifty six million Dinars were spent on repairing them, though this repair procedure is not completely convincing. And I have told him oftentimes about this matter, particularly in relation to the boat that remained neglected at the port of Um Qasr for more than six months until it was destroyed when one of the supply ships crashed into it.

5. I do have additional suggestions that, if you wish to have them presented, I will be ready to bring them along and discuss them at length with you. May God guide us. Please review, sir. Warm regards.

Signature: Staff brigadier general Ahmad Sadak Batah – Public relations board, 6/4/2001.

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In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

The decision:

[in a broad tipped marker:] I agreed.

The director of Saddam fedayeen, 4/5/2001.

Mr. Director:

Greetings and salutations,

In reference to your oral command during my meeting with you on 3/18/2001 regarding briefing the naval force commander and chiefs of security departments, I wish to explain the following to you:

1. On 3/21/2001 staff brigadier general Ahmad Sadak Batah and staff colonel Muhammad Fahad Salih went to the province of Basra and stayed there for four days.

2. We visited the naval force commander and a discussion ensued thereafter regarding the Silkworm missile. It later became apparent that this missile is classified among the extra-heavy weapons and, as such, cannot be used on our boats. Its specifications are the following:

- a. Length of the missile: 7.36 meters.
- b. Diameter of the missile: 0.76 meters.
- c. Length of the wing: 2.4 meters.
- d. Total weight, including the warhead: 2.5 tons.
- e. Must be launched only from the coast, and it needs a seven-wheels [dials?] launching base, specialized for this purpose. They are:
 - i. Load wheel.
 - ii. Energy wheel.
 - iii. Launch wheel.
 - iv. Radar wheel.
 - v. Cable wheel.
 - vi. Base wheel.
 - vii. Direction wheel.

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In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

The decision:

[In broad felt tip – two points:]

1) I agree.

2) Everything must be ready immediately after the religious festival, God willing, even if with only three choices out of four, originally.

Signature: Saddam fedayeen director, 2/26/2001.

[Finer text:]

To the director of Saddam's Fedayeen: Greetings and salutations,

Subject: Operation Basra revenge.

Sir, we wish to advance for your review the stages that we have accomplished regarding operation Basra revenge. They are as follows:

1. The task force that numbers (19) nineteen fedayeen, who received training at the human frog wing of the Republican guard, were dispatched to Basra's Saddam's fedayeen command force on 2/17/2001. They were then divided into five groups according to the number of prepared boats and the type of weapon that has that decided should be used (RPG 7, 106 mm caliber, Malotka missiles, the bomb-rigged rubber boat, the guided airplane [broad felt tip remark:] **what happened after we commissioned Farnas club at the time? Contact should have been with general Makki through general 'Aladdin to give the reason for accomplishing.**

2. Three boats were completed and work is in progress to complete the other two. Staff major general Makki Hammoudat was informed of the exigency of speed in order to finish them during the few upcoming days, and he promised us that he will go the province of Basra solely for this purpose.

3. All the documentation for the other boats have been furnished (navigation cards, members' identifications, examination certificates, and so forth) through coordination with the province of Basra and with the directorate of ports and with the naval force.

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4. Our civilian sources that man these boats were briefed regarding the carrying of three fedayeen on each boat for the purpose of teaching them the trade of fishing and the ways and means of working at sea and navigation and boat operation. They will be replaced through rounds until everyone has been readied while noting that the first convoy has left at 1200 hours on 2/22/2001. [broad felt tip:] **Why couldn't you select fedayeen who are adept at fishing from the start?**

5. We made an agreement with the civilian sources that 50% of the fishing profits will be appropriated to them. [broad felt tip:] **What is the significance of the civilian sources for the task of the fedayeen?**

6. The modified launch base for firing the Malotka missiles has been readied by officers from the infantry directorate that are being used by us. It has been tested, lifted, and erected on the boat under our supervision.

7. The firepower of the RPG missile has been completely modified using the material HMX, manufactured at the Hittin facility. It was delivered to Basra force command.

8. The rubber boat modified using the material C4 will be operational on 3/1/2001, by the estimates of those working on the modification at the Qa'qa' facility.

9. All appropriate authorizations were secured to receive the 106 mm caliber cannon along with (15) fifteen shells. They will be received on 2/25/2001, upon which we will deliver it to Basra command.

10. There was an agreement with the naval command officer regarding the designation of a secure position in Zubair Inlet for the purpose of using it as a maintenance and deployment safe base for our boats.

11. As per your orders, sir, regarding the training workshop at the naval force command for members of the Basra force, similar to the workshop that was open for the Group 19, where 40 fedayeen graduated, we suggest -following your authorization- that we include them in the expenses that total (25,000) twenty five Dinars monthly and assign them at their command force posts following the example of Group 19.

12. Generally, the task, as we best estimate, will be ready in its entirety in the middle of the coming month of March. We ask God's guidance. Please review, sir. Warm regards,
Signature: Staff colonel Muhammad Fahad Salih – public relations board, 2/23/2001.

Signature: Staff brigadier general Ahmad Sadal Batah – public relations board,
2/23/2001.

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[Translator Note: The following pages have been reviewed, the comments and feedback were made with a broad tip marker:]

[11: 41] And he (Nûh (Noah) (peace be upon him)) said: "Embark therein: in the Name of Allâh will be its (moving) course and its (resting) anchorage. Surely, my Lord is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful." (Holy Quran - Tafsir At-Tabarî)

To the director of the Saddam's fedayeen, greetings and salutations, Sir:
Subject: An assessment of the naval field of operations

Referring to your orders to the task team that comprises staff lieutenant general Aiub Mahdi Salih, secretary general; staff Major general special forces Kazim Muhammad Faris, commander-in-chief of Kazma's Saddam's fedayeen; staff brigadier general Ahmad Sadak Batah, from the public relations board; staff brigadier general Salman Hamid Zahir, commander of Basra force of Saddam's fedayeen; and staff colonel Muhammad Fahad of the public relations board at 2300 hours on 12/29/2000 regarding the assessment of the naval operations theatre in order to confront the Kuwaiti and Iranian transgressions in the Arabian Gulf area, we wish to clarify to you the following:

1. As soon as we received your order, a task team convened a meeting at 0900 hours on 12/31/2000 at the general secretariat of Saddam's fedayeen to formulate a movement and information-gathering plan and to ponder scenarios and consider opinions in order to carry out the mission with every precision and boldness and trust, given that it [plan] is one of the civic duties in the course of dealing with these transgressions to put a stop to them.
2. The task team moved to Basra sector to execute the movement plan in-field and to become familiar with the nature of the operations theatre and to establish contact with all our covert sources so as to identify the true nature of the situation and to formulate a number of alternatives that will result in the success of the operation, God willing.
3. The aim: prepare an evaluation of the operations theater, identify the violations, their

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locations, and their nature, and formulate confrontation plans plus secure their requirements thereof.

4. Description of the naval operations theater: Appendix (a) is a chart of northern Arabian Gulf.

- a. The Iraqi coast is located north of the Arabian Gulf, bordered from the east by Iran, from the south by Kuwait, and it stretches for 60 kilometers from Ras al-Bisha until Um Qasr.
- b. The average depth in the Arabian Gulf is 70 meters, and it decreases as we move toward the north where the 20th depth line is located at a distance of 40 kilometers from the Iraqi coast.
- c. The presence of the de-militarized zone at 'Abdullah inlet will check the navigation of our naval vessels. There is a group of buoys that demarcate the imaginary maritime boundary line. The Kuwaiti coast is located five kilometers from the boundary line and ten kilometers from the Iraqi coast. This area is considered the territorial waters for that country.
- d. The Iraqi maritime coast has been demarcated after the ceasefire, and it has become more shrunken. Additionally, the Coalition forces are steadfast in further shrinking the Iraqi coast to make it resemble an inland waterway.
- e. The al-Bakr and al-'Amiq ports are in the Arabian Gulf. The al-'Amiq port lies 50 kilometers from Um Qasr and contains an oil pipe.
- f. There is a demilitarized zone in the Shat al-'Arab area at one kilometer from both sides, the Iraqi and the Iranian; it is forbidden to position any heavy military equipment in it.
- g. In the Kuwaiti Gaid area, there are two observation boats in addition to a number of maritime observation posts that cover the Kuwaiti shoreline.
- h. There are Iraqi patrol boats that belong to the Iraqi navy that perform surveillance and observation up to al-'Amiq and al-Bakr ports.
- i. There are a number of Kuwaiti islands, such as Wuria, Bubian, Failaka, and Kuwait port as well as a group of islands that are close to the Iranian coast.

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5. Armament and naval readiness of the hostile countries (Kuwait, Iran, and the Coalition countries).

a. The Kuwaiti armament and naval readiness:

- 1) Two guided-missile boats, the Sunbuk, P-V-505, and the Istiqlal, P.5702, with a speed of 40 knots. Its firepower: four surface-to-surface, MM40 Exocet missiles with a range of 10 kilometers. Weight of the warhead is 165 kilograms. Lethal firing range is 5 kilometers. The boat is also armed with a 76 mm caliber Broler gun.
- 2) Four small patrol boats: Intisar 30, Aman 302, 303, and 304. Speed is 28 knots. Firepower is two, 12.7 mm caliber anti-aircraft machineguns.
- 3) Twelve small high-speed patrol boats, speed is 40 knots, each armed with a machinegun.
- 4) Seventeen small patrol boats equipped with a single-bore machinegun.
- 5) Eight patrol boats that were received from one of the French companies each armed with a 26 mm caliber gun plus two, 20 mm caliber guns.
- 6) A number of British-made small interdiction high speed boats, received in 1991. Speed is 43 knots. Powered by two Yamaha outboard motors, it is armed with a single-bore 12.7 mm caliber machinegun.
- 7) High speed Kuwaiti-made interdiction boats with a length of 13 meters powered by two 100 HP Yamaha motors. They were entered into service in 1998.

b. Iranian naval armament and readiness:

- 1) Three frigates.
- 2) Three destroyers.
- 3) Two guard ships.
- 4) Fifteen missile boats.
- 5) Five minesweepers.
- 6) Three submarines type Kilo [PH].
- 7) Twelve supply ships.

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- 8) Four landing ships.
 - 9) Seven patrol boats and a number of small boats.
 - 10) Fourteen helicopters.
- c. Armament and combat readiness of the Coalition forces in the Arabian Gulf:
- 1) American forces:
 1. One air carrier with 86 various aircraft aboard.
 2. Seven cruisers.
 3. Five destroyers.
 4. Four frigates.
 5. Three submarines.
 6. Command ship.
 7. Amphibious assault ship. [TN: Underline matches the source document's reviewer's markings, and so forth thereafter.]
 8. Minesweeper.
 9. Four tank and personnel landing ship.
 10. One supply ship.
 - 2) Other forces:
 1. Six British naval vessels (three destroyers, two frigates, and one support ship).
 2. Three Canadian frigates.
 3. Three Dutch frigates.
 4. Four New Zealand frigates.
 5. Four French multi-purpose naval vessels.
 - 3) Surface ships (cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and submarines) carrying 166 Tomahawk cruise missiles for striking naval targets and 122 Harpoon anti-ship missiles.
 - 4) One amphibious assault ship (Blilu [PH]) carrying four Harrier aircraft and 19 helicopters of the types Sea Stallion, Super Stallion, Sea Cobra, and Sea Night.
 - 5) Two materiel and personnel landing ships with two infantry battalion plus two tank detachments landing capability via landing boats in a single lift.

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6. Violations and transgressions, their locations, and their results in 2000:

<i>The Map</i>	<i>Vessel's name</i>	<i>Date and time</i>	<i>Type of violation / Aggression</i>	<i>Location</i>
1	Fath al-Rahman motorboat	5/7/2000 1200	Intercepted by a Kuwaiti patrol boat and was towed to Kuwait's ports.	Near Bubian island, on the Kuwaiti side.
4	22/Basra Al-Mamun	9/6/2000 0300	Intercepted by an Iranian patrol boat and was lead to port Bandar Khumaini.	Half a mile south of Jamila beacon M T (835972).
3	The transporter Mustafa	9/13/2000	Interception by American ships, was taken to Abu Dhabi port, then confiscated.	Baharkan area.
2	Fishing boat	10/7/2000 1735	A Kuwaiti boat approached the fishing boat and was then chased away by our boats <u>and it ran away.</u>	Near buoy (12).
5	The transporter Muna	10/24/2000 2400	Intercepted by <u>two</u> Iranian military boats	Southeast port al-Bakr, a distance of 6.5 kilometers.
6	The mechanized barge Jalajil	11/24/2000	Intercepted by <u>four</u> Iranian armed boats and was lead to port Bandar Khumaini.	M T (835972).
7	The tugboat 'Ali Bantun	11/24/2000	Intercepted by Iranian boats then lead to port Bandar Khumaini.	The outer barrier of Shat al-'Arab.
8	The fishing ship Nur	11/24/2000	Intercepted by <u>Iranian</u> boats, then interdicted at the entrance of Musa Inlet.	M T (835972).
9	The ship Rishan	12/8/2000	Intercepted by a group of <u>Iranian</u> boats and interdicted on the Iraqi side of Shat al-'Arab.	Across from the Iranian command control

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7. The form of hostile violations:

From the information gathered from our secret sources, and after meeting a number of fishermen who work at various locations at sea (Um Qasr, al-Faw, Shat al-'Arab) or seamen who work in shipping freight, the following is now clear:

a. The Kuwaiti transgressions:

The Kuwaiti transgressions take place when Iraqi fishing boats trespass into Kuwaiti territorial waters searching for deepwater fish and during certain seasons. Two Kuwaiti boats would approach the fishing boat. An officer on one of the two boats would request that the sailors of the fishing boat should gather at its fore. Two crew members of the Kuwaiti boat then board the fishing boat to search it. If weapons or contraband were found, the boat is then taken to the Kuwaiti shores. If nothing is found, the boat is then expelled out of the Kuwaiti territorial waters.

b. The Iranian transgressions:

The Iranian transgressions happen when fishing boats venture into Iranian territorial waters searching for fish that abound in Iranian territorial waters and at certain seasons. Also, Iranian transgressions happen when oil tankers carrying smuggled oil try to evade paying Customs tariffs for using the Iranian territorial waters: An Iranian patrol boat will approach an Iraqi maritime vessel and stop it. If the boatman is a fisherman, he is then told to return to the Iraqi territorial waters. But if the maritime vessel is a ship, its cargo documentation is inspected. If it is found in violation of the governing laws, it is then taken to the Iranian coast.

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c. There was no proof that the Iranian and Kuwaiti patrols violated Iraqi maritime vessels inside the Iraqi territorial waters with one exception: the violation against the ship Rishan. This ship has itself committed two previous violations, and has a negative marker on it. The Iranian boat that approached it and fired into the air for the purpose of stopping her caused the sailors aboard it to fire back at the Iranian boat's crew, killing two of its members.

d. The patrols of the Iraqi naval force are constantly moving to cover all the Iraqi territorial waters area? between port Um Qasr and al-Faw, and between port al-'Amiq and port al-Bakr. During this unobstructed movement to carry out their duties there was never once any violation logged against the.

8. Options available to us to confront the aggressions:

From the study of the theatre of naval operations and the foreign violations that were committed against ships and commercial boats, we deduced that the ideal option to stop such operations is to conduct a high jacking or to destroy the hostile naval vessel that is committing this aggression or kill its crew. This is best done by drawing the enemy into a calculated confrontation with one of naval vessels that has been fitted and equipped with what ensures a quick and direct response. Considering most of the foreign aggressions (Kuwaiti – Iranian,) and based on what has been concluded from the available information that was gathered from sailing ships and boat captains, there is potential for finding locations of planting the following suggested ambushes.

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a. Locations of launching the ambushes on the Kuwaiti side:

First: Ambush No. 1: to be launched north of the Arabian Gulf area (entrance to 'Abdullah Inlet, see Attachment A).

(1) Positive aspects:

- a. Proximity to the Iraqi coasts.
- b. Ability to pull out under cover provided by Iraqi naval force boats.
- c. Kuwaiti interference is limited.

(2) The negative aspects:

- a. Potential for incurring losses.
- b. Potential for a confrontation from the Kuwaiti terrain.
- c. The Kuwaiti face-off will use two naval vessels.

Second: Ambush No. 2: to be set up north of Failaka Island (Attachment A).

(1) The positive aspects:

- a. Open sea area.
- b. The Kuwaiti opposition is conducted with one naval vessel.

(2) The negative aspects:

- a. Potential for incurring losses.
- b. The difficulty in pulling out the naval vessel.

Third: Ambush No.3: to be set up in the open sea in the direction of the Kuwaiti coasts (Attachment A).

(1) The positive aspects:

- a. Open sea area.
- b. Kuwaiti opposition is conducted with one naval vessel.

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- (2) The negative aspects:
 - a. The potential of interference from the large or midsize naval vessels.
 - b. The potential for incurring losses.
- b. Locations for launching ambushes on the Iranian side:
 - First. Ambush No. One: to be launched near the Iranian command control (Attachment A.)
 - (1) The positive aspects:
 - a. Rapid withdrawal toward the Iraqi coast.
 - b. There must be no interference from other Iranian naval vessels.
 - c. It is possible to provide cover and concealment for the presence of many boats and ships.
 - (2) The negative aspects:
 - a. An Iranian reaction toward the sailing vessel.
 - b. Potential for interference from land forces that are positioned on the Iranian coast.
 - Second. Ambush No. Two: Can be launched at the mouth of Shat al-Arab (Attachment A.)
 - (1) The positive aspects:
 - a. The area is relatively far for the naval vessels to interfere.
 - b. The element of surprise is better achieved.
 - (2) The negative aspects:
 - a. Pulling out would be relatively far.
 - b. The potential for interference from land or sea.
 - Third. Ambush No. Three: To be launched near the Iranian coasts (Attachment A.)
 - (1) The positive aspects: Execution is in the direction of one boat.
 - (2) The negative aspects:
 - a. Potential for incurring losses.

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b. Potential for interference from other naval vessels.

c. Pull out is relatively far.

c. After analyzing the positive and negative aspects of the ambush launch locations, we reach the following:

First. The best place to launch the ambushes on the Kuwaiti side is Ambush No. One, which launches north of the Arab Gulf area (the entrance to 'Abdullah Inlet).

Second. The best place to launch ambushes on the Iranian side is Ambush No. One, which launches near the Iranian command control (in al-Faw).

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9. Special requirements to confront the aggressions (armament / preparedness / elements / command and control)

a. Supplies:

- 1 – Large motorboat with two speedboats powered by two, 235 HP motors? each boat and the motorboat. This averages one motorboat and one speedboat for the Kuwait task and one speedboat for the Iran task.
- 2 – A communications wireless radio, type Rakal? [Broad tip, one word:] **naval** HF with an international channel for each speedboat and motorboat, and a similar device for central command.
- 3 – Three GPS devices for position location type Magellan.
- 4 – Three rubber boats with three motors.
- 5 – Three pneumatic generators.
- 6 – Thirty life vests.
- 7 – Ten diving suits plus their accouterments.

b. Armament:

- 1 – Three BKC machineguns plus the base.
- 2 – Three RPG7 for each speedboat and motorboat at an average of five anti-tank rockets for each launcher.
- 3 – Thirty half-butt Kalashnikov assault rifles with four magazines for each assault rifle.
- 4 – Thirty attack hand grenades.
- 5 – Ten highly explosive adhesion mines.
- 6 – Ten smoke grenades.

c. The elements:

- 1 – Three officers.
- 2 – Thirty fedayeen. ----->?
- 3 – Elements for the boats' command and guides to be recruited either from the navy [marker:] **trustworthy** or from the cooperating civilians **request information** after the decision to implement in later stages.
- 4 – Admit the officers and fedayeen into a training course at the naval force command to train them on diving and swimming and the use of diving equipment and to learn to adapt and survive in the sea for 15 days.
- 5 – When the above requirements are fulfilled, the task team will need ten days [boldface arrow connecting the 10 and 15 days] to start execution of duty.

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d. Command and control:

1 – Secure the task area through Kazma's command by coordinating with the naval force command.

2 – Establishing a land command center by Kazma's command and securing the launch and pull-out area for the boats in Um Qasr and al-Faw according to the nature of the task and at subsequent stages for the purpose of securing the safety of the operation. [boldface marker connecting 1- and 2- and the word:]

it will be revealed.

3 – Wireless connection between the command center and the task boat for the purpose of altering the plans to safely withdraw when needed and through a commanding officer.

10. The confrontation approach:

a. Confronting the Kuwaiti aggression:

The conventional approach is for two Kuwaiti boats to approach. One of the boats stays at a far distance [broad marker:] **launching** while the other begins the approach with the request that the Iraqi crew gather at the foredeck. The boat would then circle the vessel several times to confirm that all the crew is assembled at the foredeck [broad marker:] **the members**. Only then would the Kuwaiti boat tether itself to the Iraqi vessel. Two to three armed personnel would then board the vessel to secure the situation. They then commence searching the boat and beating and insulting or escorting to the Kuwaiti ports and confiscating the naval vessel. In order to confront this practice and provide an armed response we shall do the following:

1 – The naval vessel (motorboat/speedboat) with all the required equipment will set sail for the purpose of fishing near the Kuwaiti coast, south of buoy No. (3) in the direction of Bubian Island and will maneuver in the area while executing a deception plan: Launching as large a number of boats [broad marker:] **to be coordinated with [UI] and commander from artillery support** to sea for the purpose of fishing. The Kuwaiti boats are then given the opportunity to observe this while being careful not to have any patrol boats present near the task naval vessel.

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2 – When the Kuwaiti boat requests that the crew gather at the foredeck, only part of the crew (5 – 6) will oblige, but the rest will hide inside.

3 – The Kuwaiti sailors are then allowed to board the naval vessel for the purpose of searching. Only then would the personnel hiding inside appear and open fire on them [broad marker:] **swift**. Other personnel will start engaging the boats with medium firepower, including RPG7 to destroy them and kill anyone aboard them, or the adhesive mines or attack grenades can be used.

4 – Commence immediate withdrawal after execution of the task and do not linger in the area. Withdrawal shall be under the protection of Iraqi naval patrol in the direction of 'Abdullah Inlet.

b. Confronting the Iranian aggression:

For the purpose of carrying out an armed operation against the Iranian naval vessels near the command control in al-Faw [particularly] for the boat 'Ashur, we require the following:

1 – Prepare a small fishing boat with three to four personnel. ?

2 – The boat will remain anchored for two to three days for the purpose of fishing.

3 – When the boat 'Ashur approaches for material gain purposes or other purposes, it will be addressed using Persian or Arabian dialogue.

4 – The boat 'Ashur lacks any fighting capability, making its capture all the more easy.

5 – Conducting the operation at night requires that it stays longer than the time previously mentioned until the arrival of the target boat.

6 – Immediate withdrawal via 'Abdullah Inlet under the protection of the Iraqi naval patrol.

11. The deception plan:

a. Work under complete secrecy until the start of the execution of the task. The task team should conduct visits to the middle and north sector for the purpose of deception.

b. Coordinate with the member of the Iraqi command in launching the fishing boat at a suitable time to carry out a camouflage-and-hide operation for the boats tasked with duty.

c. Secure a methodical, detailed deception plan during the preparation stage and secure the task requirements, such as buying or renting boats and modifying them, and establishing the logistical center and securing the launch and withdrawal base. All the details of this plan will be presented to you, Sir, for the safety of the operation.

d. Transportation for all the charged officers during all the operation stages will be via civilian vehicles different from those used in the sacrificial work. The officers will wear civilian clothes similar to those worn in the Basra province environment.

(13-14)

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12. The general conclusion: From the above, the task team reached the final and general conclusion that all the capabilities are available for the sacrificial work to execute the task with courage and precision for all the confrontation choices at once or based on priority of choices or in case your orders mandate the tackling of any naval target, Kuwaiti or Iranian, inside their territorial waters without waiting for a violation to take place inside our territorial waters. The task team pledges to be worthy of your trust in carrying out this task or any upcoming task that you order us to do whether inside our territorial water or in the high seas. We await your orders, sir.

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate:

"And an Ayâh (sign) for them is that We bore their offspring in the laden ship. And We have created for them of the like thereunto, on which they ride. And if We will, We shall drown them, and there will be no shout (or helper) for them (to hear their cry for help) nor will they be saved." Chapter Yasin: 41-43 [Quran].

Staff colonel Muhammad Salih Fahad – public relations.

Staff brigadier general Ahmad Sadak Batah – public relations.

Staff brigadier general Salman Hamid Zahir – Basra force commanding officer.

Special forces staff major general Kazim Muhammad Faris – commander of Kazma command.

Staff major general Aiub Mahdi Salih – secretary general for Saddam's fedayeen.

(14-14)

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In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
Be ye fair and drawn swords against tyranny while remaining truthful men
God. Country. The leader. Those who give pledge to you they are giving pledge to Allah
[Holy Quran: 48-10.]
The Republic of Iraq
Office of the President
Saddam's fedayeen
General secretariat

Decision:

[Broad-tip marker, as a review comment on the original letter:] Discussion with staff general
Aiub.

Signature: Saddam fedayeen director.

Director of the Saddam's fedayeen, greetings and salutations, sir:

Subject: Operation Basra revenge:

This is in reference to your command that mandates the updating of information regarding the
American naval targets that are violating the sovereignty of our territorial waters in the
Arabian Gulf. We wish to clarify the following to you, sir:

1. Staff major general Kazim Muhammad Faris was notified of recalling the fedayeen
who were tasked with duty to inform them to start carrying out the mission without delay
and to task them with providing progress reports that include intelligence regarding the
positioning and the movement of the above mentioned targets.

2. On 8/23/2000, and after the return of fedayee Qasim Karim Khalaf (on of the fedayeen
previously referred to,) a report was submitted by him that contained information about
the targets under discussion.

(1-3)

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In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
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3. The author of the report, along with staff major general Kazim Muhammad Faris, was requested to report to the general secretariat. After discussion, he offered some opinions regarding the procuring of a fishing boat designed for this type of sacrificial work, as follows:
 - a. A fiberglass, out of commission boat was received from the naval force command and was subsequently refurbished and outfitted by us in a way that is appropriate with the nature of the duty. Bear in mind that the refurbishing and outfitting cost was estimated between (9-11) million Dinars.
 - b. received a good boat from the naval force command and put in place a few modifications to make the boat suitable for the nature of the mission; an estimated cost of the modifications is 5-7 million Dinars.
 - c. The purchase of a complete fishing boat from the citizens in al-Faw jurisdiction at a cost between 14 and 16 million Dinars.
4. Carrying out the mission in a boat specialized for fedayeen type of missions requires the approval of the governor of Basra and the providing of the fedayeen with fishermen licenses issued by the province.
5. Staff major general Kazim Muhammad Faris suggested including the fedayeen tasked with the mission...

(2-3)

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In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
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General secretariat

...in an accelerated training session at the naval force command regarding these topics:
identifying naval targets and reading and estimating nautical distances.

6. As per your command during 8/17/2000, the fedayeen charged with executing the mission were informed that there is another task that was added to the main task: confronting and controlling the Kuwaiti boats that practice acts of piracy against the Iraqi fishing boats in an effort to capture and confiscate them or, in case it became difficult to do that, to dispatch their crews.

Please review and provide orders to delegate, sir. Warm regards.
Staff lieutenant general Aiub Mahdi Salih, secretary general – 8/29/2000.

The meeting and discussion with the director took place on 9/1. He commanded the following:

1. Staff major general Makki will be charged with visiting the defense minister and request that we are provided with three out of commission boats from the navy.
 2. Form a committee to be chaired by major general Makki, colonel Kazim, and staff brigadier general 'Abbas for the purpose of dispensing funds pertinent to outfitting these boats.
 3. Agreed on points 4, 5, and 6 after review.
- Signature: 9/2.

(3-3)

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[Page 90:]

To the commander of Saddam's fedayeen, Basra force.
Subject: Security report

I am the fedayee Qasim Karim Khalaf, a member of Basra force of Saddam's fedayeen, second battalion, set out on a Tornado type fishing boat on 8/17/2000 when I saw the American frigate getting closer to the Iraqi territorial waters on 8/19/2000 accompanied by a helicopter type aircraft hovering near the frigate. The frigate approached al-Bakr port and was two kilometers away, then navigated toward the ships that were docked at the entrance of 'Abdullah Inlet, then headed toward the sea. On 8/20/2000 an Iranian patrol boat conducted a search of the Iraqi boats. On the night of 8/22-23/2000 a helicopter flew over the Iraqi territorial water where it patrolled until dawn. [Underline the next five words] There was another American aircraft that flew over the Iraqi territorial waters; it patrolled for the [underline the next five words] sole purpose of taking photographs. There were Iranian patrol boats, type Tanzin, [underline next two words] high-speed, that conducted [underline the next word] extensive patrolling and trespassed across the Iraqi territorial waters. Awaiting your orders, sir.

Signature: The fedayee Qasim Karim Khalaf, second battalion, 8/23/2000.

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In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
Be ye fair and drawn swords against tyranny while remaining truthful men
God. Country. The leader. Those who give pledge to you they are giving pledge to Allah
[Holy Quran: 48-10.]
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Office of the President
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General secretariat

3. In the event that you would agree upon receiving the above mentioned frames and completing them in a way that is suitable with the nature of the task, then the total cost for a single boat will be 10.5 million Dinars, and as follows:
- a. A 235 horsepower motor with attachments – five million Dinars.
 - b. Gear modification and altering the boat features and covering the boat – two million Dinars.
 - c. Fishing nets and their attachments – a million and a half Dinars.
 - d. Various items (anchor, compass, VHF device, ropes, gas stove, gas tanks, oven, other needs) – only two million Dinars.

Please review, sir, and delegate your command. Warm regards.

Signature: Staff m general Aiub Mahdi Salih. Secretary general – 9/23/2000.

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In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

To staff colonel Qutaiba Sa'id Hammu.

Subject: Boats.

After meeting the fedayee Qasim to learn the costs of preparing and equipping one boat after procuring the frame from the naval force command, please find below the required details and the funds needed to furnish them:

1. One 235 horsepower boat motor plus attachments costs 4.5 million Dinars.
2. Modifications and covering cost 2.0 million Dinars.

[Translator note: the rest of the writing is illegible until:]

Total cost: 9.975 million Dinars.

Please review. Warm regards,

Staff major general –special forces- Kazim Muhammad Faris – 9/22/2000.

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[Page 93:]

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.
To the secretary general of Saddam fedayeen.
Subject: Report

In reference to the oral command from you on 8/21/2000 regarding the probability of securing a good fishing boat or motorboat to be used by Saddam's fedayeen, we wish to clarify the following to you:

1. There was a meeting with the commander of the naval force regarding the potential of obtaining a fishing boat or a motorboat from the resources of the naval force. He responded by saying that fishing boats are not available to them, but they do have fiberglass boats that can be used for fishing after doing some repairs on them. He also mentioned that the naval force intelligence presently has a fishing boat that was purchased for 50 million Dinars two years ago. He showed a good degree of cooperation in providing whatever capabilities they had, and he will visit you when his annual vacation is due.
2. There was a meeting that took place with the fedayee Qasim Karim Khalaf, the source of the information, who is charged with monitoring the movement of the American vessels in the waters of the Arabian Gulf since he works as a fisherman on one of the fishing boats that belong to one of the citizens. He clarified the following:
 - a. the large size fiberglass boat is more suitable than the fishing boat for this mission, especially after repairing and finishing it.
 - b. in case it became difficult for the naval force command to procure the required boat, there are boats offered for sale by the citizens at an estimated value of fifteen million Dinars; they are fit and completely accoutered.
 - c. right now there are three fedayeen at the Basra command of Saddam's fedayeen who can carry out this mission.

(2-1)

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- d. the mission requires coordination with the province of Basra to issue fishing licenses for the fedayeen who are charged with this mission.
- e. it is a mission requirement that some of the fedayeen who will be chosen should attend a workshop at the naval force command (identifying naval targets, estimating nautical distances).
- f. the commander of the naval force mentioned that it is possible to make use of whatever boats that are available at the Iraqi ports. The fedayee had previously explained that these large boats that are designed for transporting workers are too large, making them not suitable for this mission.
- g. attached please find the report filed by the fedayee Qasim Karim Khalaf after returning from sea on 8/23/2000.

Please review and issue delegating orders. Warm regards,
Signature: Staff major general –special forces- Kazim Muhammad Faris, commander of
Kazma's command of Saddam fedayeen – 8/24/2000.

(2-2)

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[Page 95:]

To the commander of Saddam's fedayeen, Basra force.
Subject: Security report

This is the fedayee Qasim Karim Khalaf, of the Basra force of Saddam fedayeen, second brigade, set out on a Tornado type fishing boat on 8/17/2000 where I saw the American frigate approaching the Iraqi regional waters on 8/19/2000 under the cover of a helicopter hovering along the frigate. The frigate approached al-Bakr port to a distance of 2 km, then sailed in the direction of the vessels that dock at the entrance of 'Abdullah Inlet, then headed toward the sea. On 8/20/2000 an Iranian patrol boat conducted a search of the Iraqi boats. A hovercraft flew over the Iraqi territorial water. It patrolled until the dawn of the night of 22/23 of August 2000. There was another American aircraft that flew over the Iraqi territorial waters; it patrolled only to take photographs. There are high-speed Iranian Tanzin patrol boats in extensive presence that trespass across the Iraqi sovereign waters. Please review.
Signature: Fedayee Qasim Karim Khalaf, second brigade, 8/23/2000.

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In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
Be ye fair and drawn swords against tyranny while remaining truthful men
God. Country. The leader. Those who give pledge to you they are giving pledge to Allah
[Holy Quran: 48-10.]
The Republic of Iraq
Office of the President
Saddam's fedayeen
General secretariat

Decision: [This was provided by the author for the addressee, the director, who then wrote in broad felt tip:]

- 1) I agree.
- 2) Consultation with major general Aiub.
- 3) Consultation with major general Aiub regarding the minister of military manufacturing.

Signature: Director of Saddam fedayeen – 12/8/2000.

[The actual letter:]

To the director – greetings and salutations, sir.

Subject: special task.

This is in reference to your directive on 12/4/2000 at 2230 hours. Regarding tasking us with the duty of planning and preparing in an attempt to influence the naval vessels of the Coalition countries that operate in the Arabian Gulf area, we wish to explain the following:

1. A small task force was formed that comprises some of the officers who have expertise in using the weapons listed below to discuss how to fire them while the weapons are mounted on the fishing boats. The weapons are:

(1-4)

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- a. Mortar – 82 mm caliber.
- b. Grenade launcher – 107 mm caliber.
- c. Cannon – SBG9.
- d. Rocket – Twa.
- e. Rocket – Malotka [anti-tank].
- f. Grenade launcher – RPG7.

This is while noting that the above mentioned group was not given any information about the nature of the mission; rather, they were given cover to use these weapons while working in the marshes to reserve the secrecy of the mission.

2. On 12/5/2000 at 0900 hours a meeting convened with staff lieutenant general Kamal Mustafa, the secretary general for the Republican guard. The following were agreed upon:

- a. the lieutenant general showed complete responsiveness in that all the efforts of the Republican guards will be for the purpose of providing support for the fedayeen for this mission.
- b. we agreed on training 20 fedayeen as frogmen for the purpose of manning and navigating the rubber boats and precision firing with light weapons, particularly RPG7, for a period of 21 days.
- c. secure two rubber boats for the purpose of modifying them and booby-trapping them with explosives.

(2-4)

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3. On 12/5/2000 at 2000 hours there was a meeting with the minister of military manufacturing and with a number of experts from the ministry. We agreed upon the following:

- a. the potential for modifying the charge filler for the RPG7 grenade and fill it, instead, with the material (HMX). This material possesses high destructive capability. It can tear through stainless steel. The experts have already started the modification in one of the military manufacturing facilities; it will continue for 15 days.
- b. it became clear that the substance C4 is not suitable as a filler for ammunition since we found out that the substance (HMX) is more destructive. Nonetheless, C4 is very effective in booby trapping boats.
- c. the military manufacturing board showed its willingness to prepare for booby trapping two rubber boats with the explosive C4, which highly explodes both above and below the water and is not adversely affected by moisture and is extremely sensitive to detonation.
- d. the matter of detonating the booby trapped boat has become simple. They can detonate it via timer, touch, or collision.
- e. the minister of military manufacturing presented to us one of the research programs for the same purpose that is pertinent to the mission. He was in favor of my explaining to you the idea because it is highly secret and should be for a face-to-face meeting with you.

(3-4)

[Translator note: A photocopy of page 4 of 4 of the source document can be seen under the photocopy of page 3. It may have been overlooked while sorting out the pages.]

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Review of air power during crises

The Gulf information:

- Iraq.
- United States airpower in the Gulf.
- Other forces in the Gulf.
- Weapons system in the Gulf.
- The 1991 Gulf War.

Previous news from the Gulf, December 1998:

Washington, December 17: The second air carrier battle group along with six battle ships equipped with Tomahawk cruise missiles have reached the American forces theater in the Gulf area on Thursday.

The air carrier USS Carl Vinson will concentrate on increasing and intensifying the sorties against Iraq amidst attempts to conclude the air campaigns at the start of the month of Ramadan toward the end of this week, an official source added.

An official source in the navy stated that the air carrier USS Carl Vinson, accompanied by ten war ships, has entered the area of special operations under the American central command in charge of all American operations in the Gulf. The source added that this war battle group was stationed in the Indian Ocean east of Pakistan and was expected to reach the Gulf on Friday to join the American air carrier USS Enterprise on the third day of the air campaign against Iraq. This firepower consist of six war ships armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles plus eight other ships, armed with the same kind of missiles, currently involved with Iraq and has played a central role in the bombing campaign against Iraq. Like the air carrier USS Enterprise, the air carrier USS Vinson also has embarked air wings that comprise 36 F/A 18 Hornets, ten F-14 Tomcats, and four EA-6B fighter jets.

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The news, December 18:

'Ali al-Salim Air Base, Kuwait – December 17: Witnesses related that a number of Tornado GR1 missile armed fighter jets were being readied for takeoff on its second campaign to bomb Iraq on Thursday night from the air base in Kuwait. The British ministry of defense had announced earlier that the bomber fighter jets had completed their sorties on Thursday and had returned safely to their base in Kuwait, but refused to give additional information regarding the operation.

The Tornado bomber aircraft are not stationed at the 'Ali al-Salim Air Base in Kuwait, at a 35 mile (56 kilometers) distance from the Iraqi borders.

Washington: the air force B-52H bombers destroyed new military targets inside Iraq on Thursday after naval Tomahawk cruise missiles reduced the number of Saddam Hussein's spy stations and military barracks in Baghdad and turning them into rubble, Pentagon leaders stated.

Secretary of Defense William Cohen informed newspaper reporters, "there were no losses among the Americans, and we are providing good coverage for our targets." He also added: "Iraqi forces offered meager resistance. Not one Iraqi aircraft took off, and no Iraqi air defense radars targeted any attacking American or British fighter jets."

Head of the joint Chiefs of Staff, general Henry Shelton, stated that on the first day of the bombardment of operation Desert Fox, 2000 Tomahawk cruise missiles were readied to attack "more than 50 sensitive targets," but was not "quite successful" as their predecessors and did not provide an explanation for that. After admitting that, Shelton said that the American-British forces were targeting locations that the Iraqi President barred the United Nations' weapons inspectors from visiting, including locations suspected of having pertinence to weapons of mass destruction, locations that provide security for the centers such as Iraqi security forces and air defense sites and air sites and military communications locations and intelligence stations. Cohen added: "One thing needs to be clarified, and that is we are focusing on military targets; we are not attacking the people of Iraq," alluding to the claims that the operations are targeting Saddam and his family members personally.

Shelton then showed two reconnaissance photos showing explosions in Saddam's intelligence stations and military barracks in Abu Ghraib, Baghdad. "Nothing is left except the rubble," said Shelton, referring to a photo that showed the main building in a complex of Iraqi intelligence stations. Another photo showed a row of barracks with large holes in four buildings out of five. Some American officials stated that they were not sure whether there were members of the special guard inside their barracks when they were attacked by the cruise missiles between 1:00 and 4:00 o'clock in the morning, local time, or between 6:00 and 9:00 Wednesday evening. Shelton then said that perhaps because the sorties were expected and because of Iraqis sounding the alarm sirens in Baghdad the citizens moved away from the probable targets. But possibly some of the personnel were inside them. He was speaking even as a second round of strikes was airborne and he stated that "the data show that the first round was successful - in fact more than successful than what this photo shows."

Defense officials stated with some reservation that the targets included missile design and production facilities in Taji, some 19 miles northwest of Baghdad, and special security centers in charge of protecting Saddam, Makhul mountain near Samarra city - which is considered one of the locations of the Presidential palaces - that covers an area of ten square miles and consists of command posts and fortified underground bunkers.

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It is believed that the Presidential palaces are locations that are being used to hide biological and chemical materials programs and nuclear weapons, and that they are specialized to maintain control over communications centers that connect the various reaches of Saddam's military empire.

Secretary Cohen stated that the purpose of the strikes is to weaken the Iraqi force in threatening its neighbors with biological and chemical weapons, but not to end the crisis situation between Iraq and the United States, which has lasted almost an entire decade. He also added that there will be more strikes possibly at the end of this week.

"The absence of a military response could mean that Saddam has ordered his forces to 'absorb the shock,' thinking that the attacks will last a short time before he appears again to say that America still is unable to hurt him," an official source in the administration stated.

Shelton said that thousands of additional forces were given their orders to head toward the region, and that the American air carrier USS Carl Vinson will arrive at the operation theater on Thursday. Defense officials stated that B-52 aircraft carrying a payload estimated at between 2000 and 3000 pounds of cruise missiles will be crucial elements in the battle in directing its payload of missiles from outside the boundaries of Iraq. Also participating in the strikes will be navy and Marines' wings embarked on the air carrier USS Enterprise's deck, readied for the attack, as well as British Tornado bomber fighter jets. It is expected that the attack will commence this week at the start of the honored month of Ramadan. Cohen stated that the American presence in the Persian Gulf will continue indefinitely as long as Iraq continues to threaten.

The news: 12/18.

Subject: Operation Desert Fox.

Thursday, 12/17/1998.

Secretary of Defense William Cohen (also in attendance was head of the joint Chiefs of Staff, general Hugh Shelton).

Secretary Cohen: "Good evening.

"Whatever information we have about the military operations against Iraq revealed that our forces are performing exceedingly well since there were no casualties, and we are achieving complete coverage of our targets. As a result of that, we will continue with our aim of containing Saddam Hussein. We are diminishing his capabilities in attacking his neighbors whether he chooses to use conventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction. And as long as Iraq presently prevents the United Nations' inspectors from performing their duties, then it becomes incumbent upon us to continue to contain him. Our targets include the Iraqi air defense systems, command and control systems, airports, and the remaining military facilities. There is one thing that must be completely clear: we are focusing on military targets, we are not attacking the Iraqi people, nor do we harbor a desire to increase the suffering that Saddam caused to the Iraqi people.

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"But before general Shelton briefs you on the latest operations, I would like to emphasize that our forces are doing their duty at a very good level, and that every American should be proud of his forces that are participating in Desert Fox."

General Shelton: "Thank you Mr. Secretary. Good evening.

"I wanted a few minutes to present to you today a summary regarding our forces' latest military operations. But before anything else, I want to warn you that there will be no details provided whether on the targets or the damages incurred. I know it is something you wish to know, but simply put: these details are not yet available and in some instances they will disclose much about the continuing operations. All I can say is that yesterday's operations were carried out well and completely professionally, and we are grateful because our pilots and crews returned back safely. And as I said last night, we can be very proud of our men and women of our armed forces for doing their jobs all around the world, particularly those stationed in the Persian Gulf.

"Yesterday's operations were carried out by the Navy with participation from more than 70 brigades from the Navy and the Marines, backed by air and naval gunfire support from the air carrier USS Enterprise and by more than 200 Tomahawk cruise missiles that were launched from naval ships.

"And while I will not discuss any specific targets, I can say that yesterday night the American forces attacked more than 50 separate targets among which were those mentioned by Secretary Cohen, which included sites of weapons of mass destruction, security sites and security forces and Saddam's air defenses, airports, and centers that provide support to Saddam's forces and regime. I presently have two examples; the first is the military intelligence departments in Baghdad. The building here on the right is one in a series of structures that appear in this area that was targeted. At the bottom of the photo you will see only a pile of rubble that was this said building. We also will take a look at the barracks in Baghdad and the Abu Ghraib facilities that constitute a part of the special guards and the security apparatus. Here you see their barracks in this place. The first area before the strike shows the headquarters in this area, and you see here that this area is now completely destroyed. We have a sizable amount of data most of which is successful or more than successful than what it was, and some of it is not successful at all. But as you know, preparations are underway for more strikes. While it is not suitable at this time to discuss the progressing operations, particularly in details, I can inform you that today's strikes will include the aircraft taking off from their land bases. Among them were the British Tornados plus additional forces from the Navy and the Marines from the deck of the air carrier USS Enterprise. As regards the rapid response forces and their deployment and the air carrier USS Carl Vinson, they will arrive with the other battle groups to the region today. Some of the land and air forces present here in the United States will start arriving at the Gulf at the end of the week.

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"And I know that you are aware that the presence of our forces in the region will not be possible were it not for the backing and support of our partners in the Gulf. And we are grateful for their continuous help and their backing of our efforts in reducing the threat posed by Saddam Hussein to the security in this vital area of the world.

"I also wish to take this opportunity to mention the strong backing from the British forces in the region. They are not only steadfast, faithful allies, they are fierce fighters as well. Lastly I wish to emphasize one more point: It is inevitable during the struggle and conflict that the emphasis will be on our weapons and their effectiveness, but we must not lose sight of the fact that it is our people who make the difference and distinction. And as Secretary Cohen said, it is our strong troops, sailors, airmen, and Marines - they are the ones that made America the great power that it is. We owe a debt of gratitude to our men and women who are carrying out these operations. Secretary Cohen and I are now ready to take your questions."

Q: "General, in these two examples there were certain targets that were attacked, so what was inside those sites that were attacked? And is it possible that you can give us any statistics about any kind of casualties? After all, we can see five of those barracks, here, part of which was destroyed if not all."

General Shelton: "Jim, before anything else, speaking of the casualties, we have no data about that yet based on the results of the strikes. As regards the two targets, the first one is the area of the barracks that belong to the special Republican guards. These units, in fact, guard the weapons of mass destruction to help in their transport. This is part of the mechanism used by Saddam to control his facilities, the ones UNSCOM wanted to inspect. And when we take a look at the military intelligence, this is one of the locations that provide intelligence information to the force, where UNSCOM wanted to visit, for it became normal for it to mislead UNSCOM or provide them with information, or missing information that detract from UNSCOM's ability to perform their duty."

Q: "A follow-up question please..."

Q: "Mr. Secretary?"

Q: "Busy at that time?"

General Shelton: "We have no information in any shape or form whether or not these barracks were occupied at that time. We attacked the special barracks between the hours of 1:00 and 4:00 in the morning, Baghdad time, and maybe the troops evacuated them and maybe some were still inside them."

Q: "As regards the Iraqi air force, was there any movement of the Iraqi aircraft against our own?"

General Shelton: "In this regard we have not noticed any Iraqi aircraft movement."

Q: "Mr. Secretary, the Iraqi minister of the exterior stated today that the house of Saddam's sister was hit with missiles, which made me wonder whether the American air forces are targeting Saddam's personal palaces, and whether the attack on Saddam's sister's house was deliberate?"

Secretary Cohen: "I have confirmed previously that Saddam owns about 80 palaces, and I don't know which of them his home is and, frankly, I don't like to discuss the targets at this particular point. We are seeking military targets or anything that relates to the military."

Q: "The Republican guards generally and in addition..."

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Secretary Cohen: "We will strike these forces that deal with weapons of mass destruction and we will place him in a position not to threaten his neighbors."

Q: "Mr. Secretary, after you destroyed these facilities and many targets inside Iraq, and if Saddam will not comply, what will the United States do? Where will you go?"

Secretary Cohen: "We will go to him to contain him; we are moving headlong toward containment. He is unable to rebuild his army and weapons of mass destruction. He has been contained such that he cannot go north nor south; he's in a box. He is dealing with two subjects, the first is to get rid of the inspectors, and the second is to get rid of the sanctions. He now feels that all he can do is be frustrated, deny the charges, obstruct, and at all occasions prevent the inspectors from fulfilling their obligations plus mitigate their effectiveness either by altering their specialties or by changing their leadership. Secondly, he's seeking a 'complete review of the sanctions so they can be lifted,' so he can get rid of the sanctions that he faces. We are adamant on keeping the sanctions as they are and, at the same time, keeping our forces on red alert. And in case he tries to rebuild or threaten his neighbors, he will face once more the military deterrence, so we will continue with the containment process."

Q: "To what extent do you aim to...?"

Q: "The Coalition, Mr. Secretary, to a certain level he has succeeded with them because many of our friends are now criticizing what is happening."

Secretary Cohen: "And many of them support and stand behind what is happening."

Q: "Mr. Secretary, among the problems that are facing the Pentagon during the Gulf War is the Khamisiya. Do you have any indication or evidence that when sites of weapons of mass destruction were hit, any of the suspect chemical fallout was spread and could affect Iraq?"

Secretary Cohen: "The Short answer is 'no,' before anything else..."

Q: "And what if the answer is long and prolix?"

Secretary Cohen: "I will give you a longer answer. Before anything else, Saddam used to claim, and he did just that over the past eight years, that he does not possess any chemical weapons, that he does not possess its biological element. Only when he was confronted with the facts he backed up and admitted that he was lying. That is why we did not believe what he said about his not possessing any of them, because if we did believe that, we will have no interest in attacking any of the facilities out of fear that poisonous gases would spread. And we were very accurate in selecting the targets that relate to the facilities on the basis that may be they contained some kind of poisonous gas that could spread and threaten the lives of innocent citizens. That is why we scrutinized these targets to reduce the potential that such a thing would happen."

Q: "And a follow up on the subject?"

A: "We have no information about the spread of poisonous gases."

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Q: "Is it true that you avoided some targets because you believed that there are weapons present there? Or did you use weapons, a type of weapon capable of doing that...?"

A: "There are a number of facilities that could possibly have dual purposes. It is possible that on some floors there is civilian production and on others there is the otherwise. And we were very precise with our targets in an attempt to restrict them to the military type in an effort to reduce the probability of causing harm to innocent civilians."

Q: "Is this true?"

Q: "Military first..."

Q: "The farther targets?"

Q: "Many organizations that constitute a center for the program for the weapons of mass destruction are fundamental to the regime. So if you attack them in the manner you have outlined, you will in essence be the one who acted to destabilize the regime. Was that not the aim here?"

A: "The aim is not to destabilize the regime; the aim, as I stated, was to eliminate the threat to the neighbors and the use of weapons of mass destruction, in the hope that we are able to strike the facilities that aid him in doing so. We cannot imagine the difficulty in confirming whether it was biological or chemical weapons, we are concentrating on the military facets of his regime."

Q: "And what are they?"

Q: "You mentioned in yesterday's press conference that the last strike crews returned in November, and you later expected that there will be a new crisis in the middle of December. Can you tell us why you did not return the aircraft home, including the essential ones, like the F-117?"

A: "Well, we stated that we keep in reserve a sufficient force in the Gulf, capable of thwarting any possible aggression from Saddam. And just as we started to return home, as we are doing now with our aircraft, we have carried out our task. When we find out that there will be no additional operations, there will be no need for additional forces. We have made our decision, the President has made his decision that we are not going to attack. Based on that, instead of calling on more forces, we have brought some of them back and left the other part on duty; it proved that it has the readiness to strike within 24 hours. Then, of course, we have a follow-up force capable of deploying instantly to give general Zinni added flexibility in the region and be ready to respond to any assault from Saddam."

Q: "But the important crew for the F-117 aircraft which you keep to carry out control and air defense commands."

A: "This depends on the plans that we have; we keep appropriate and sufficient forces in the region that are capable of carrying out the attack that we envisage should the need call for it. But to answer the question, I would say that since November 15th we have been ready to respond even within 24 hours. We have around 72 hours to give an alert to make sure that all systems are in place and that any response

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we need can be delivered within 24 hours."

Secretary Cohen: "I wish to answer the part of the question regarding the F-117 aircraft and why it stayed here. Perhaps you will say that I respect the point of view of the general and his vision for the future, but I don't think that any of us can predict precisely in what month or on what day would Saddam poke his finger in the eyes of the UNSCOM's inspectors, or search for a metal bar to gouge their eyes with, as he did in the past. Still, we are interested in what is called 'readiness,' for we always persevered to strike a balance in what we do so long as the matter concerns our forces and the pressure and stress to which they are subjected as a result of deployment followed by being called back. And we have taken a decision that will enable us to mobilize these forces speedily should the need call for it. And should the President issue such an order, the question then becomes: 'How can we balance the formation of the forces?' The current situation makes us wonder how this balancing would allow us to act instantaneously and then include these aircraft that are undergoing stress. That is why..."

Q: "Did Iraq try to attack its neighbors? Did you notice any action toward Israel or Kuwait or anything of the sort?"

Secretary Cohen: "Not at this time."

Q: "What about..."

Q: "The two American pilots."

Q: "As far as the escalating threat from the terrorists, what are the precautions that you have set in place?"

Q: "As regards terrorism, it has been with us for a while now, and it is increasing because of Usama Bin Laden and his group who have been planning to attack American facilities. We are concerned about these plans and are following up very, very closely on them. We anticipate that it will happen as it did in the past, and we were very successful with this. In fact we have prevented many bombing attack attempts during this year from happening, after the one in east Africa. We understand the nature of the threat, and we can take every precaution; every one of us is under alert and we can deal any of them from a military viewpoint, and we anticipate that it would happen any time. What the American people need to know is that this has no relation with what is happening in Iraq. This is a plan that has been in preparation for years, and it is continuing on constant foundations, and we are dealing with it as best we could with all the means available to us."

Q: "Can I get a follow up on the Khamisia case? Are there locations that you know of where weapons are being stockpiled that you also know of, that if they are attacked it would cause problems for you and the like."

A: "UNSCOM has more information about it than I do as regards when they should search for certain records or any of the materials. I am not the right person when it comes to a location that might contain that."

Q: "The Pentagon said that there are 400 cruise missiles in the area and about 100 ALCM's. This means half the number of cruise missiles in the area that belong to the Navy. Are you going to mobilize more of these missiles to the area or do you have enough reserves?"

A: "Yes, we do have adequate reserve of them in the Gulf area. As for the rest, they could be deployed as fast as possible."

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Q: "When you are concerned with responding to Saddam Hussein, how much money is being spent on one large force to change the mind of one person? Have you looked for an alternative to the bombing that we have conducted many times? Every time he challenges us, his defiance costs us more billions of dollars? For example, why can't the United Nations send enough forces to cover the horizon to protect the inspectors? Have you looked for an alternative to this strategy that failed to change Churchill's mind and Ho Chi Minh's mind, and we are still headstrong in it? Are there other alternatives than this?"

A: "We have tried many options and are still trying other strategies than this one, but I believe that the truth of the matter is that we have Saddam Hussein who is defying UNSCOM and the international community and the United Nations and everyone, and he is continuing in developing programs for weapons of mass destruction. As regards the alternatives, there are a few of them under the current circumstances that we have been engaged in for eight years, and that is we want him clean and free of sanctions and for him to return to the international community, which without a doubt is better for the Iraqi people."

Q: "If you attack his special guard, general, you will then weaken him. I wonder whether there are any other plans you can tell us about as far as weakening and destabilizing him. Was not our policy to get rid of Saddam Hussein? Was not that our goal for the long-term?"

General: "I will not discuss any details regarding the goals that were set by Secretary Cohen to mitigate his strength in threatening his neighbors and everything that could weaken his regime."

Q: "In the first round of strikes, did you hit what was recently named 'in what place is Saddam Hussein [sic]'?"

A: "We currently are not pursuing Saddam Hussein, and Saddam Hussein is not the target in this operation."

Q: "As regards the holy month of Ramadan that is approaching us, you are not sure of the continuation of the strikes during this month, or are they going to stop?"

A: "We have started with the operations and our goal is to continue with them without defining the military operations, but we are sensitive toward the month of Ramadan and that is all I could say."

Q: "Is UNSCOM dead? And if it is so, what is your strategy over the long range to control weapons of mass destruction that are in the hands of Saddam Hussein? Is it going to be the bombardment, then the waiting, then return to bombardment?"

A: "As far as Mr. Butler is concerned, Saddam Hussein has castrated UNSCOM. They are alive but without motion. My hope in the upcoming operations is to at last make Saddam see the wisdom of allowing UNSCOM to return to do their job. Contrary to that, we will continue in the containment operation. And if he threatened his neighbors or tried to revive the weapons of mass destruction program, we will be ready to undertake another action against him again."

Q: "And what if he gave a promise to allow UNSCOM to return to resume their duties, wouldn't that be another promise? He did back up on many of the promises he gave in the past, isn't that true?"

A: "We hope that after this operation that he and the others would be wise enough to comply, if not, then the containment will continue."

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"We have no desire to lift the sanctions until he completely complies."

Q: "As regards the holidays, the families of the people who are participating in these operations are worried about the safety of their kids. Can you list the risks that they might face? For example, did Iraq threaten the pilots in any way? What are the risks of mobile air defense? Could you list some of the dangers that..."

Secretary Cohen: "The head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will answer that, but allow me to make one observation: We have courageous men and women in all the sectors who are exposed to risks every day, whether in peace or in war. So when I was there during last September, the air temperature on the ships was 160 coupled with humidity but still they conducted 2000 launch operations during the month of August and in very adverse conditions. They were training and standing at the highest levels of readiness every day. We lost people every week. Therefore, as long as we remain the best fighting force in the world, their lives will always be exposed to dangers and risks. In addition to that, there are the pilots who fly over Baghdad, exposing themselves to the danger of being hit by surface-to-air [missiles] or being captured. Or take the people who are in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait or any other place, they are exposed to the danger of Scud missiles that could be launched or they could fall under attack of some sort. So these are the daily risks that may very well escalate. We have taken all the procedures including the defensive ones that as long as you have chosen to use force, then you must be ready for any probability."

General: "I wish to add one thin: We have in reserve 17,000 to 20,000 troops and sailors and pilots and Marines in the area daily. They are in fact exposed to the threat of Saddam's weapons of mass destruction as long as they are within these ranges that he's capable of reaching."

Q: "General, during these operations, was any of these pilots exposed to a direct threat? Were their aircraft painted with normal radar? Were any antiaircraft missiles fired at the aircraft?"

General: "I prefer not to discuss these details now or anything else that might help Saddam in these operations."

Q: "Do you believe the air carrier USS Vinson will participate in the battle when it arrives today or tomorrow and for the rest of the forces to participate in the assault?"

General: "This depends on the flow of operations."

Q: "How do you wish to comment on the statement by Senator Lott in his inability to support the military operations?"

Secretary Cohen: "We will visit Senator Lott and we will provide Congress with a report and there will be a chance for discussion, for Senator Lott is like any other Congressman: He must base his decisions on whatever information he has regarding the situation, but I think it is necessary to support our troops. After we have the discussions, we will come out with the conclusion that this mission is an honorable one and that it is the right thing at the right time and that the President has made the right decision."

Q: "Do you feel that the rapid deployment has given you the element of surprise and made the attack all the more effective?"

A: "All the reports that have reached us indicate that Saddam Hussein feels that he will not be able to face the reality: that he caused the failure, and obstructed the mission of UNSCOM's inspectors in performing their duties, and that he thought there is no chance that the United States would take action during Ramadan."

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Q: "General Shelton, did you...?"

Q: "Plan for this on Sunday...?"

Q: "Will continue to the present...?"

General Shelton: "I really don't like to get into the details now regarding the operations, including the type of participating aircraft."

Q: "You...British Tornados and mentioned the aircraft on land airfields."

General: "There will be land based aircraft and there will be Tornados and also sea-lifted aircraft and all types of aircraft on this day."

Q: "The military plans were put into action on Sunday?"

Cohen: "Our military plans started in November to prepare for the operations."

Q: "What about immediate preparedness? You said they will be ready for strike before submitting the UNSCOM report to the United Nations."

Cohen: "We are always ready during the month of December to take action and enact procedures. We will not undertake any procedure until the report is submitted. We know what the report will say and in fact the President called for the strike."

Q: "Place a notice that Desert Fox is imminent?"

Secretary Cohen: "We have no final word regarding the United Nations' report until Monday or Tuesday at the last minute."

Q: "Is Saddam still alive...?"

Q: "Mr. Secretary..."

Q: "Is he in contact with his forces?"

Q: "We know that you have placed your forces on a 72 hour alert."

General: "Yes, we have placed our forces under a 72 hour alert in the Gulf, ready to execute."

Q: "So there is an alert?"

General: "Effective from mid November and we are ready to respond within 24 hours, if it required us to do so."

Q: "Were there previous alerts?"

General: "Yes, a 24 hour alert, an alert to execute an operation where the first missile was launched at 1700 hours toward the target."

Q: "Is Saddam still alive, can he contact his forces?"

-The End-

The news: December 18:

American naval forces launched a strike against Iraq...ships and aircraft aboard the air carrier USS Enterprise along with other maritime vessels in the Arabian Gulf launched a strike with Tomahawk cruise missiles against military targets inside Iraq on December 16 as part of Operation Desert Fox.

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The participating units include various aircraft of all air wings to provide impressive support during operation Desert Fox. According to Pentagon officials the candidate targets were chosen based on their military significance to the Iraqi regime. Among them targets that contribute to the production, storage, procurement and usage of weapons of mass destruction, while taking under consideration minimizing harm to the American fighter. A general in the army stated that it is inevitable to focus on using weapons with the most effectiveness, and that our men are the ones that make victory...our brave fighters, sailors, pilots, and Marines are the ones that made America a great force, and for all of those we are indebted. Additionally, it is possible that air carrier USS Vinson would join the force on December 18.

Signature: The translator Sa'ad 'Abdullah, 1/2/2001.

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Ammonium Picrate	Yellow to orange to red	Armor piercing and bomb projectile	22,500 feet per second	Sensitive to touch and friction
Astrolite	White	For destruction and demolition	2,600 to 26,500 feet per second	Inactive and ineffective until it is mixed. Must not be used with tetryl
C-4	White to light tan.	Plastic demolition and explosion	26,400 feet per second	Sensitive to pressure and friction
Cyclotol	Green to tan	Used as thrusting charge for fragmentation bombs	25,900 to 26,400 feet per second	Excellent for explosive effects
Flex-x	Any color, mostly olive or red	For cutting	23,300 feet per second	Flexible and soft, waterproof and sensitive to friction and shocks
Torpex HBX	Ashen	Underwater explosives and torpedoes	22,700 to 23,700 feet per second	Excellent for explosive effects
HMX	White	A mixture of TNT for highly explosive warheads	29,900 feet per second	RDX production
Kinepak	The powder is white, the liquid pink	For blasting	14,100 feet per second	Inactive and ineffective until mixed
Nitrocellulose	White	Blasting, smokeless powder	21,900 feet per second	Used in non-incandescent powder
Nitroglycerin	Amber red, clear, foam means "warning"	For blasting, TNT components	4,900 to 25,400 feet per second	Capable of being absorbed through the skin, causing headache
Nitroguanidine	White to yellow	Propellant and igniter	25,100 feet per second	One of the military's sensitive explosives
Nitrostraj	White	Mortar shells	16,00 feet per second	One more of the many forms of nitrocellulose
Pentalite	White to yellow to ashen	Propellant and igniter	24,500 feet per second	Highly compressed and highly sensitive
Octol	Yellow orange	Propellant	27,500 feet per second	Excellent in blast effects
PETN	White unless painted	For blasting	27,500 feet per second	Highly sensitive densifier
Picratol	Yellow to	Armor piercing	22,900 feet per	Sensitive

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	tan	bomb projector	second	
Picric acid	Yellow to red	Alternative filler	19,00 feet per second	Dangerous when it spoils

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