

PART I (1 hour: 33 minutes)

[Izzat Ibrahim, in progress] ...We cannot surmise on the basic points of this program although, as I said, we implemented some matters at the right time. As to whether our implementation was right or wrong, I consider it within its right circumstances, no matter how much loss it represented to us.

But, we have long agreed on the constants. God willing, we will fight and struggle to stand by them to the end; namely, preserving the sovereignty and preventing any interference in our internal affairs, and for the future, with all its prospects, to remain open before Iraq.

I now believe, compared to the day on which we decided to hold this dialogue, that the vision is clearer today, and that the hope is greater to achieve it with the least losses expected.

I personally expected that there will be big difficulties and sacrifices in defense of these principles. But, I now see that there are better circumstances for the fulfillment of these objectives, compared to the circumstances we experienced at the time. We made this decision more than six months ago.

We said that there can be flexibility in the areas that have nothing to do with the preservation of sovereignty, noninterference in internal affairs, and blocking of the future.

Sir, the implementation of the program under these objectives, is as I revealed before. As to the principle, it is firm and established and backed by our party and people. We must accustom ourselves to it.

[Saddam] Comrade Mizban.

[Mizban Khadr Hadi, member of the Iraqi Revolution Command Council] Sir, comrade Tariq's visit to Morocco and his meeting with King

Hassan, was useful, I believe. Compared to the other rulers we know, King Hassan seems to me to be more poised and a man of great vision. This was shown by his positive answer to comrade Tariq and Iraq.

I believe that there are a number of factors behind the stand taken by King Hassan. I believe that he was able to read the circumstances, but these people also fear for themselves.

There are big examples. When the Shah was expelled, they saw how the Americans and the West could not protect him.

Establishing ties with a strong regime represented by your Excellency is desirable.

Mr. President, in order to contain the conspiratorial atmosphere against Iraq and to lift the economic embargo, it is useful, in my opinion, to communicate our viewpoint. Finding a solution to the plotting against Iraq calls for moves; not only with King Hassan, but even with the Sudanese, Tunisians, Yemenis, Algerians, and European circles to convey our viewpoint to the so-called hostile trio, so that when they speak to them about Iraq, they can say that they implemented such and such decisions, but what have you done to them and what are they asking for. I believe, Mr. President, it is useful to make our move and convey our viewpoint.

[Saddam] Let us go back to comrade Tariq's message. Tariq, the comments they made are good. But, let us wait for implementation. Fine, the implementation [indistinct words] you destroyed all that I told you and you announced that you destroyed them.

[Mizban Khadr Hadi] Mr. President, this is possible when we speak with our friends and even others. I believe that we should limit things, and thus behave according to what we believe is very correct; I mean, this move is useful. They are now directing their media against us and our move is not at the level required outside. Our media are also unable to reach the outside world. But communicating the Iraqi viewpoint when you receive delegations will be very useful, I believe, not only concerning the regimes. When comrade Tariq left, he also influenced the people.

It is possible for us also to move via another channel. I believe that it will be very useful, in order to communicate this viewpoint, to move in the direction of the Asian states, Africa, and even some European and Latin American states. I believe that we can gain many voices in these circles and the wider popular circle.

Concerning the support by our people, we can also speak to convey our viewpoint according to your Excellency's analyses. We can also refer to this tripartite plotting against Iraq and how these people want to bloc the future before us. We are capable in this aspect. But we need moves on this side and also action among our people.

I believe that it is useful and very necessary to convey our viewpoint to the outside world. I thank you, Sir.

[Saddam] Do the comrades have any observations?

[Unidentified speaker] Actually, Sir, we have a different viewpoint from the one you made. Our justifications and implementation of all decisions are meant to deprive the Security Council of any excuse. The new diplomatic move is to entrust the king with a task, which is to secure a second meeting for Tariq with the Security Council so as to explain what has remained, other than the last paragraph on control.

It will remain as the last solution, if they responded. They are supposed to give things in return, because the siege was based on these conditions.

Their claim is Iraq's failure to implement some of the clauses, and before that all the clauses. This is the diplomatic move, from which we hope something good would come out.

As to entrusting other states with the same task, it is incorrect, especially since we explained to them and told them what we did. As to non-implementation of the lifting of the embargo by the Security Council, this is something else. All our friends, all permanent member states of the Security Council, friends, and states are supposed to know that we are implementing all the decisions. We support this blessed step and wish well, God willing.

[Unidentified speaker] Sir, the comrades emphasized two points; the foreign moves and the moves toward our people. Regarding foreign moves, this is natural. We must move within our capabilities. But the results are not in their hands. It will depend on how we manage to reach the parties concerned.

As we all know, Sir, the siege is aimed at our people's link to the leadership so as to maintain the atmosphere for plotting, as they planned for it.

I would like to emphasize the point that we must further explain to our people the resolutions, which we have carried out and the Security Council's stand on this subject.

We have previously told our people that the siege was scheduled to be imposed even before 2 August. But, the people did not understand this presentation as we did, except for the most aware among them. Now, however, they understand it after we have destroyed weapons that are dear to us, and carried out resolutions, which, as you said, were imposed on us.

Still, for the sake of our people's future, we accepted such unfairness.

As to how our people can understand this fact more, I believe that it is not just that the people must increase their readiness, but they must also understand this fact. In their siege, they are wagering on our relationship with the people. Once they have understood that the people understand this fact very well, it would become clear to them that their wager was not guaranteed and that they cannot always wager on the relationship between the people and the leadership.

Therefore, I suggest that our media should tackle this subject according to a mechanism to be presented to your Excellency in advance and in a gradual manner. This is because the Jordanian papers, which I do not always read, deal with the subject of the siege and the subject of the border with Kuwait more than our media.

Our media dealt with the subject of the siege for a certain period and then stopped dealing with it in the desired manner.

Therefore, the subject of the borders, since it was also dealt with by the Kuwaiti papers, and the subject of the siege should be linked as two subjects according to a certain escalation as demanded by the presentation of our situation.

[Saddam] Have you felt any extremism on the subject of the borders, ... Hasan?

[Unidentified speaker] [Indistinct words]

[Saddam] Pardon?

[Unidentified speaker] As your Excellency knows, the people are very sensitive to two subjects: The subject of the borders and the

subject of the weapons. The people were agonizing over the subject of the weapons. But they also realize that the approval to destroy the weapons was for the purpose of avoiding any excuses by the enemies to fabricate another aggression.

This is the subject that I wanted to emphasize, Sir, in addition to what the comrades said. Thank you, Sir.

[Saddam] Please?

[Unidentified speaker] Thank your, Sir; actually our inclination is logically correct and our steps were right from the beginning and our dealing with the Security Council's coarseness was objective and logical, as dictated by our national interests and the interests of our people.

But, I have a query, if you may: Regarding the visit of comrade Abu-Ziyad [Tariq Aziz], I saw King Husayn rather pessimistic and doubtful that the comrade's mission would be useful. In fact, he asked comrade Tariq to brief him on the situation after his return.

And, after his return, the same thing happened. He [king Husayn] reaffirmed what he said in the first meeting and asked Comrade Tariq jokingly... [Sentence interrupted]

[Saddam] He was surprised when he told him certain things.

[Unidentified person] He said jokingly, matters must be clear and the answer must be clear. Your Excellency can evaluate this talk. After his return, he [King Husayn] was surprised that King Hassan responded to the comrade or to our cause.

Could you explain this subject? Thank you, Mr. President.

[Tariq Aziz] Sir, the relations between Hasan and Husayn are not good. [laughter] We know this from our acquaintanceship with them. There isn't any mutual trust between King Husayn and King Hassan. There is no cordiality either. There is respect, as a formality, a king respects the other, but there are no relations... [Sentence interrupted]

[Saddam] Does King Husayn respect King Hassan as a formality more than vice versa?

[Tariq Aziz] Yes. They maintain these formalities. You know, your Excellency, these traditional regimes and monarchies preserve many formalities.

[Saddam] [Indistinct words]

[Unidentified speaker] [Indistinct words]

[Saddam] Let me tell you that King Husayn preserves these formalities more. I have information that when Zayd al-Rifa'i went to visit him, they played squash. The king struck the ball and Zayd al-Rifa'i chased him. All this was part of the king's message.

[Tariq Aziz] The other thing about their relations, King Husayn fears King Hassan II's interventions in the Palestine question. From time to time, King Hassan II intervenes on the Palestine question, say by receiving Shim'on Peres, and arranging his role in the subject of Camp David and meetings between the Egyptians and the Israelis, and the hints that he gives to Abu-Ammar [Yasir Arafat], and the latter pins hopes on them and some things reached by the Jordanians and Palestinians are disrupted. This is the background of the relationship. We can sum it up by saying that there is no mutual trust between them and no cordiality.

The other thing is, we know, and you said that when we go to him we must take something in writing, because King Hassan--and this applies to Moroccans in general--they speak Arabic very well, but they do not understand our dialect,. Our talk is not very clear to them, and their talk is not very clear to us. So matters must be clear and written, especially when they are delicate.

In his relations with us, with Iraq, of course, all this time--I remember this since your attendance of the 1974 Rabat Conference, I was with you in the delegation--until now the king has not behaved toward Iraq in any way that annoyed us, except for his personal opinions. Sometimes, he is very daring to the point of saying things that might not be proper to say in a meeting. But he always dealt respectfully and seriously with Iraq, and with your Excellency. He considers us serious people. He considers us serious people and therefore does not play with us. He knows that we are not the type who play games.

King Husayn did not tell him all these issues and all our concerns about Morocco and how we are careful about them. We also did not tell him how the Moroccan king respected Iraq. There was no chance to talk about that. It is possible that he questioned his credibility. This is why he [King Husayn] Made this remark. He told me: How do you find King Hassan? Matters must be clear. I told him: They are clear, your majesty. Our stands are clear. Our stands are written on paper. He said: Hopefully, it would be fine, he said. He

was pessimistic. Throughout the past period King Husayn was pessimistic. I met with him several times. Comrade Taha also met with King Husayn. He was pessimistic and he was right to be so due to his situation. He has become a sandwich squeezed by all sides.

On my way back, when I told him that King Hassan responded enthusiastically, he was surprised and said: Why? He said King Hassan is only concerned with Morocco, only with his affairs. Is it because that these conditions could affect his situation? The man, King Hassan, did not hide that. I did not speak to King Husayn about all the details of the meeting. He [King Hassan] did not hide anything. He said that the situation--the continued existence of Iraq in this manner--is not good for all us. He said that there is a humanitarian and brotherly aspect, which is part of our responsibility as an Arab people toward the Iraqi people. But there is an Arab interest and there is a threat to Arab national security. There are dangers.

He knows that if these dangers affected the Arab people in the Arab East, they would also affect him.

There is also the question of Islam. You know, your Excellency, that Moroccan king rules Morocco as king and caliph, in one way or another. His authority on his people is religious and worldly. When there is a threat in the Islamic World [sentence incomplete as heard]. For example, he adopted a tough stand on the Iranian Revolution because it threatened his authority inside his country. They officially call him Amir of the faithful; Mawlana Amir al-Mu'minin King Hassan II. He is like the queen in Britain. The queen is head of the church. He has that authority. Had he acquired a church in Morocco, he would have been its head. [Laughing] He is very sensitive on this subject.

I did not write many details. But he spoke about Iran and the Soviet Republics. He said these are not Muslims but non-Arabs or ajam. In other words, they could cause us problems and threaten the Arabs and Muslims.

King Husayn didn't understand this very well. And I told him: Your majesty, this is a positive manifestation. Let us communicate with it. Why communicate with it?, he commented.

Where did King Husayn's pessimism come from? It is not due to our situation. The pessimism is not due to Iraq. It is due to his situation: The economic crisis that does not allow Jordan to have future prospects without Iraq. There are also the settlement [peace] talks. On the settlement talks, when we visited him last

year, we did not comment. But his group, Adnan Abu-Awdah and Tahir al-Masri spoke about big hopes. He also said: The Americans could be serious now and want peace and stability. He wagered on that and made official speeches in this direction; in other words, he expected that something might happen on the path of peace and prosperity even with concessions.

Now it is becoming clear day after day that only the concessions are demanded; all the concessions that cannot be covered. This is the general feeling that I saw in Jordan. There was silence on the settlement subject, simply to keep matters going. They are being subjected to harm up to now.

He had hopes that if he offered some concessions, eased, and appeased, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf countries, and Egypt would deal with him. They didn't deal with him. He now feels that his fate is linked to ours. As to how strong this feeling is; 100 percent or 60 percent, this is a reality. Any sensible person in Jordan feels that this is the fate.

Thus, Sir, even on the personal level and media level, he received me on the way out and on the way in. But, they did not report on the meeting. But on the level of personal dealing, I observed in my last two visits a greater interest in the Iraqis. Colonel Arshad is there, and they are showing big interest in him. There are other comrades that he knows. Of course, this has some meaning that is not difficult to explain. It shows that the feeling among Jordanians is that their fate is linked to Iraq. This feeling exists in the ruling leadership in Jordan; it is stronger now than it was several months ago when they had some illusions, and I won't say dreams, that they could resume their relations with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and others.

[Unidentified speaker] [Indistinct words]

[Tariq Aziz] Tahir, Tahir; not from Tahir personally. Tahir is a weak person and does not have farsighted assessments. He thinks that he can produce results. All these things are under the direction of the king, and the fruit of his attempts. The king has a group of persons, whom he sends in different directions to put out feelers and see if they produce results. If they do not produce results in any direction, he stops action in that direction. This has been his policy over the past 40 or 37 years while in power in Jordan.

But, the comrades should not be disturbed about King Husayn's pessimism. You will recall, Your Excellency, perhaps through

relations of 10 years, let me say; the last 10 years since the beginning of the Iraq-Iran War, King Husayn had never come to us optimistic. He comes pessimistic. You charge him, Your Excellency, and he stays for three months preserving his charge; and as soon as he hears a report about a battle, or the papers speak that something happened in Iraq or something might take place on the Iraqi front, he comes. In fact, sometimes he surprised you with a visit in order to reassure himself. This is the nature of King Husayn.

[Saddam] Comrade Abd-al-Rahman.

[Abd-al-Rahman] Thank you, Sir. Actually I want to begin with your Excellency's saying on 16 March 1991: Thank God for everything. I do not hide from you that the subject of Balat al-Shuhada [Facility] that I heard about today weighs heavily on my heart, despite all the absolute faith in our will and power.

The decision; I mean the last step was a blessed one, God willing, by its timing, the choice of King Hassan, and the depth you reached in the Mother of Battles and afterward and up to this day, as well as the present timing for the last step, God willing, with the numerous remarks made by the comrades on the issue of al-Jawharah [the jewel] that you referred, and we are all convinced of it, God be praised.

But, let me refer to a remark made by the comrade vice president to the effect that the question of methodology actually calls for a special meeting. Perhaps, every one of us has observations on the methodology that we will follow for one month from now on until the reply comes, whether it would be positive or negative, within the confines of the assessments made on the question of choice, or as regards the conviction of King Hassan basically and what comrade Tariq said now in reply to the query by comrade Khadr on King Husayn and his stands.

Sir, actually, after the Mother of Battles, we have regained our breath, God be praised. The president's positive situation is splendid; it is not only we who are enjoying high morale, but also our masses as well. We see the morale as very high.

I would like to speak about some of the remarks that comrade Muhammad [not further identified] mentioned regarding dealing with our people and our relationship with them. We can hold a conference in which I can speak and hold people accountable by name. We must hold such a conference. Each state institution will act in accordance with the powers given to it. What we want to say is that

we do not want to continue with the flattery that used to be practiced and which we used to abhor; and this is one of the lessons we learned from the great Mother of Battles. But we did not benefit from this and every one of us is responsible for this. I should be held responsible, for when I see that a remark has been made about this or that branch, I must take action against it and not continue to placate it. I believe that we and several members discussed issues that are related to faults in the current domestic state of affairs. Yes, there are faults and we cannot deny them. We cannot blame the Israeli Mosad [indistinct words] for all the political means that the United States, Britain, or France use. In spite of all their actions against us, we, God willing, will reach a stage of strength, faith, and willpower through which we will have King Hassan, and not only him, adopt specific convictions. With respect to the remarks Comrade Tariq [Aziz] made about King Husayn and the pessimism he has expressed, yes, there is pessimism because God does not change people until they themselves change what is in their heart. It is not easy for King Husayn to change--with all the remarks that your Excellency has made about him and the remark made by comrade Tariq--he will study the situation, but he will ultimately reach the conclusion that under Saddam Husayn, no matter what happens in Iraq, Iraq will rise once again loftier than before and more quickly than he expects. This is a firm conviction, Sir, in which I firmly believe, thanks to God.

We will work and struggle for this purpose. As for the methodology and the timing, when we speak about the political aspect, we must discuss it in a logical and reasonable manner in spite of all the intricacies of politics. With what we heard today, we told the world that Iraq has implemented all its commitments, in spite of the manner in which they were imposed on it, and that after doing this, Iraq will get its rights; and it knows how to get them. Your Excellency, may God protect you, there are many ways to get our rights within a political methodology. Political methodology means we need to expand our relations and improve our methods. Thanks to God, Iraq's relations under your Excellency over the past 24 years are great relations. Political timing in addition to our strong stand, thanks be to God, will [word indistinct] between threats and enticements. We tell our Arab countries how stronger Iraq will be after all this. You will see all this regardless of how the UN Security Council will accept this. I admired this point and I will let others explain what we will do. We will say what we will do though they will work against this before we carry it out. But as your Excellency mentioned, we will not let them know what methodology we will adopt. We will let them wonder about this. The reasonable and logical approach by many European countries is to use their relations with us on the basis of their own interests.

They act in accordance with interests. We will tell them: Let us discuss relations on the basis of interests. The comrades might have various viewpoints on the methodology, whether on the level of political relations or on the level of the domestic situation. Each of us might have more accurate remarks to submit at other meetings about the practical process of implementation in the not distant future, God willing. Your Excellency might give us more time to listen to anyone who wants to discuss the methodology, whether on the level of international political relations, the international state of affairs, and the way we deal with it. Thank you, your Excellency.

[Saddam] [Words indistinct]

[Unidentified speaker] Thank you, Mr President. The step concerning our move will be successful and positive, God willing. We will explain our state of affairs through an Arab or a friend. This is one point. We can hold discussions and see the results of this step. In light of the results of this step, we are prepared to act on the domestic, Arab, or international level. Your Excellency, allow me to make some remarks about the international situation. As the United States presented the new world order with which it terrorized the world [words indistinct] His Excellency President Saddam Husayn submitted the 12 August [1990] statement, or the 12 August initiative. There are many political issues to be discussed, such as using double standards and other things [words indistinct] the 12 August initiative proceeds in sequence, comprises the UN Security Council resolutions, and stipulates that rights should return to those who have a claim to them. This is a new initiative that defines a new world order for the world. However, one discusses it shyly through the news and newspapers. They discuss parts of it, but not explicitly. Both [the initiative and the world order the United States proposed] are considered as a world order. One is compulsory and the other has right to its side.

Your Excellency, the other point I would like to clarify has to do with the West or the three countries that comrade Ali [not further identified] has mentioned. We must name these countries and say that these are Britain, the United States, and France whose treatment is different from the others. We have the right to say that this is a positive element. Does the West or the world, or specifically the Western countries that are familiar with the issue believe that Iraq implemented the UN Security Council resolutions out of fear--the world knows that we reject these resolutions to some extent? Do they also believe that Iraq, out of fear, had destroyed all weapons and implemented the resolutions expeditiously? Or was it the West that was afraid of Iraq? Your

Excellency, this has two aspects: The first aspect is that I believe that the West is afraid of Iraq. Why? Because the West, specifically the United States, have seen the stage the Iraqis reached in dealing with nuclear energy and industrialization and kept in mind your directives concerning reconstruction and the new industrialization process. Will continued pressure on Iraq turn Iraq into a new and unique manifestation in light of the facts that are clear nowadays? This is what the West might be afraid of. Does the West believe that so long as it has people who think and has iron and raw materials, Iraq can produce everything and terrorize the West once again? They say that Iraq destroyed missiles without any regret because it knows that it can produce better missiles. The West takes all these elements into consideration. In light of this, and under your leadership, God willing, we can achieve all this. It is true that what we are discussing is a new world order, but this order revolves around the 12 August initiative. The events that followed took place in a broader context, and this is what we noticed with respect to the Arabs at the Libya conference. Comrade Abd-al-Ghani [not further identified] explained to us matters other than those that were raised at the conference. Many personal matters were raised. But Iraq has become the decisive factor with respect to the Arab nation and the world.

Your Excellency, if you allow me to make a remark about King Husayn's stand in light of the message and the meeting he held with comrade Tariq. King Husayn and Jordan are experiencing a deteriorating economic situation. Jordan has \$8 billion in debts to the world. As a result of borrowing from Western countries, or from the IMF, conditions are imposed on it. It is banned from encouraging development and carrying out new construction endeavors so that it might repay its debts. Observers and Iraqis wonder whether Jordan has benefited from Iraq as a result of the embargo, imports, and other matters. Certain people in Jordan benefited from Iraq. These people have relations with a certain ministry or a minister, and these relations only involve people at certain levels of responsibility. The people in Jordan did not benefit in a manner that is commensurate with their support. The Jordanians started to harass Iraqis over some matters, and this reached the point of stealing from many Iraqi businessmen. The Jordanians are financially disturbed by this, and they added to this by speaking about the situation of the Palestinians in Jordan. King Husayn adopted a cool stand toward the Palestinians, and they withdrew their deposits and left him without any deposits. He depended on Iraq for assistance, but Iraq was in a difficult situation. Thank you, Your Excellency.

[Unidentified speaker] Your Excellency, I do not want to repeat what the comrades have already said. I support the letter, but I believe that the letter came a bit late. We were supposed to send the letter earlier, and to act in this way. Your Excellency, what is more important than the letter is the decisions that will follow the letter that your Excellency has discussed. We must adopt the same resolute revolutionary measures on the domestic front as those adopted abroad. We must adopt the same revolutionary measures with our people and party first. Have we mobilized our party in a manner that will allow it to accept all this? I believe that we did not do this. A large number of our comrades still speak as those who have been starved by the embargo do. A large number of our party comrades are not speaking in a principled manner. As for the people, I would like to give you a small example. We went to Al-Uzayr with comrade Abu-Harith and comrade Ghalib [not further identified]. They welcomed us with placards. At the end, an 80-year-old woman followed me and told me [words indistinct] Your Excellency, we need something concrete so long as we will discuss the statements Your Excellency have made. We will tell the UN Security Council: You did not give us enough, so we will not give you anything. We must first mobilize our party in a clear and positive manner and subsequently mobilize our people. As a second step, we must ask the question: Can we continue to ensure the delivery of the ration supplies that we now give to our people after we adopt the measure that your Excellency mentioned? Therefore, we must stockpile ration supplies and ensure that we can provide our people with these supplies for a certain number of years until, as Your Excellency said, the embargo is eroded. These two points are basic and important; and since we adopt revolutionary steps abroad, we must go back to our party and people and inform them and mobilize them militarily so that we may be able to reply to any action and have the full support of the people and party. All those seated here have made an oath of defiance, and all the party made the same oath. But I am responsible for what I say, and I would like to say that not more than 20 percent of Ba'thists honored this oath of defiance. This is a simple example, your Excellency. Thank you very much.

[Saddam] Who initiated this oath of defiance?

[Unidentified speaker] It was initiated...

[Saddam, interrupting] The youths were the initiators, and it came from your sector. If 20 percent have honored the oath [words indistinct]

[Unidentified speaker] The entire party took the oath.

[Saddam] All that takes place in an improvised manner is never implemented. You were the first to take the oath, meaning that you were the first to make this initiative [words indistinct] I am happy with your characterization of the situation if this characterization reflects the reality. I have assessed that the larger percentage of people will not honor this oath, even before hearing what you have just said, especially since the oath-taking started to spread on a broad scale. I expect that the larger part of people will not honor it [words indistinct] Comrade, who should follow up on these matters? You are command members. Let us take your own sector, what are the studies that you have made to determine that only 20 percent, no less and no more, have honored the oath? The youths have taken the oath. Should we not know how many honored it? We cannot do this. I cannot say that 20 percent, less or more, have honored it. But I can deduce on the basis of past experience that most of them most probably did not honor it. This is just a deduction. You might ask me how I reached this conclusion. I would tell you that I have no proof, because I do not have a sector for which I am directly responsible. I am not directly responsible for a specific sector so that I can carry out a detailed statistical study and analyze the signs and so forth. This is so because I am busy with other matters. Even if you tell me: Can you give me four hours of your time daily? I might tell you that I can give you four hours, but my mind will remain busy with other things and busy in another direction [words indistinct] because I am thinking of something else. I am thinking about the general state of affairs, and about how to produce great results by carrying out major work. But when you ask me about the youths, I am the one who should ask you about them, for you are a command member. You sit with me and hold discussions with me, for you are the official in charge of the youth sector. Have you held any discussions about how many have honored the oath? Do you have an idea about the percentage so that we may measure how many have honored it, for they are the initiators and the pioneers. If the percentage of honoring the oath by pioneers is 20 percent, we have the right to deduce that the percentage of honoring the oath by non-pioneers might stand at 10 percent. Is this not so?

[Unidentified speaker] Your Excellency, we did not carry out such a study. But I am saying that the 20 percent are within the party ranks, and not within my sector, for we have not as yet carried out such a study in this sector [words indistinct].

[Saddam] You are just making a deduction as I did. Then, you are like me. I do not permit that you carry out general deductions as I do. It is impermissible for a minister to come and tell me: Bribery

is widespread in the state agencies. I will tell them: Fine, but what is your role? Is my job to run after the bribe-takers? I can do so, but to do so, I need to focus on the issue and stop thinking of all the other fronts. If I do so, I can achieve quick results.

For instance, we cannot discuss minor issues in the Regional Command in a general context. The Regional Command's secretary should not discuss matters that are related to members of the Command. This means that I should know if the plate that is given to the soldier is in accordance with the same standards that are in the book concerning food given to soldiers but Comrade Ali does not know. Likewise, I myself should be on the same standards of knowledge about this. Brother Ali is the Defense minister and he is supposed to know details better than I know them. The chief of the Army staff should still know more and the commander of the army corps should still know better, and the commander of the division should know much more. We do the same thing.

I said this so that henceforth ... [pauses, changes thought] In the previous meeting, which was important, I wanted to see what progress we had made. I heard what you said and it was in general terms. We wanted to postpone it but then, comrades, we must make specific arguments. If we speak in general terms then who will make specific remarks? This is the prerogative of the members of the Command, each in accordance with his special duties. Henceforth, in matters of diplomacy, Comrade Tariq should not speak in general terms, like me, like Comrade Ali, Comrade Muhammad, and others. Therefore, I will make a note that the diplomatic moves will be left to the committee that is chaired by Comrade Taha. They will move before they tell us about the moves. We will hear this from the media, from the secretary, or the director of the office. They would say that they have dispatched a delegation to this place, and so on. They will inform us about any exceptions just for our information. If you have a point to raise, then you can point it out. If there is no time left to implement this point then it will be all right. Probably that day they might present the documents and I might not agree. This does not mean anything; it means that I was thinking of another issue. My comrades have the ability and they know about all these things. They might ask if we can leave out this country or that. Well, let them leave it out and if I have a viewpoint I will give it to them later on. We should not involve ourselves in technical details. We must leave them to play their role.

Now how should we move, and how to move on the people's level in terms of guidance and formulas, and as to the side that should make the first announcement? Should this be carried out in a sudden

manner or in other ways; namely, by programming and other methods? I propose a committee in which comrade Tariq can take part because Comrade Tariq might be asked to begin the first seminar for instance, and so on.

What about the Party? How can we move on the Party level? Can we hold a cadre meeting? Should this be done now or later on? On diplomacy, should we wait for initial information from King Hassan or should we move on a larger scale? Do the moves at this stage and on this large-scale mean that we should tell them: The last time round they destroyed the ether and what is its name? Is this the credibility that they want? Where is the Security Council? It has not adopted any resolutions. Statements issued here and there, and their forces are still in the north and they are still interfering in our internal affairs and we have not received any bread.

Therefore the Security Council has no credibility. That is how we move diplomatically. Do we accept the two resolutions or lifting the sanctions? They are doing this. Are these the same points that were sent to Hassan or are they in a different context? When and to whom? The people?

Therefore in order not to fall into an error, either when we deal with specific issues -- because this is infidelity -- or when we generalize -- because it would be wrong -- we should not display the positive side, meaning that these are our people and this our party, and hide the negative side. Who will solve it? We have to solve it. However, when we display the positive side ... [pauses, changes thought] I need to dwell on the negative side and I can tell you the negative side. When you tell me how to tell the people, I will tell you. [Word indistinct] I would like to see you as comrade members of the command. Can you understand the basic point in a human being in a way that we can say he is steadily good, or good at a certain stage, or good on a certain occasion, and how?

When Abd-al-Salam Arif died, may his soul rest in peace, many Baghdadis followed his funeral. But did they really love him? No. But of course, when there is a funeral, drums and funeral music, people are influenced. This is awe-inspiring.

What are our standards for good things? I should not only ask you about our standards on bad things. I also should ask you about our standards. This is extremely important. However, all this is based on my trust in you. We are able to generalize the good and restrict the bad. This is trust. In order to cooperate with each other, each one must bring figures and analyses based on correct substantive

and specific diagnosis. Thus we will be able to change the bad and entrench the good. Comrade Mizhir,

[Mizhir] Thank you, Sir. What you said at the beginning of the meeting should have been followed at this stage. I do not believe that the United States, Britain, and France, and Saudi Arabia behind them will leave us alone. Your Excellency, two or three days ago you spoke about the conditions of the Iraqis and mentioned certain things, and the Saudis were startled and they said that this is a threat to Saudi Arabia. The Iraqis cannot tolerate injustice.

[Saddam] Did they issue a statement to this effect?

[Mizhir, continuing] I think so.

[Unidentified speaker] [words indistinct]

[Mizhir] I was told by some individuals, Sir.

[Saddam] Who are the individuals that you rely on? Today, I heard an Iraqi from the family say: I heard they said this and that. Sometimes the people say things; what do you expect? They say something. But a woman tells her aunt these things and I heard but did not make any comment. Yet I learned a lesson. Sometimes I ask them: What radio said this? [laughing] They hear someone who had been told by someone else and they give you information. They are very interested in these things. What time was this said? [words indistinct]. Some are not accurate. For instance, if a command member hears something he should ask the information department if such a statement is issued. That is way I just asked you. I have not read the news. I do not know. The media and reports by Comrade Abd-al-Jabbar Muhsin arrive but I do not read all of them.

Sometime ago I told my escorts bring me the official statement. Do not tell me that somebody said this. One cannot hear insults from the beginning to the end.

[Unidentified speaker] The press is something else.

[Saddam] Analysis. I sent you one today. I read and read. Comrade Abd-al-Jabbar sent them to me [words indistinct]. He gives me a brief report but if there is an important subject, I do not need the summary. I read the summary and go back to the original. It took more than one hour. It was just how they look for Saddam Husayn's money. That is the summary.

[Unidentified speaker] What is there? [words indistinct]

[Saddam] Yes. A company formed by Kuwait whose task will be to search. They are composed of former intelligence men from Britain, America, and such states. Awanis [not further identified] said [words indistinct] and he did not find any (words indistinct)). That was the last article I read and I sent it to you. Awanis said this and it is possible that the president used to purchase from Awanis. [The article says] we searched and we did not find anything but we might find something. This means more search, and so on and so forth.

I mean to say that when someone hears some new reports, the members of the command must ask what radio, what time and what hour?

[Unidentified speaker] And to correct him.

[Saddam] Correct him because they live among us and if they continue to tell us stories, [changes thought]. Sometimes I heard stories from the comrades and I always tell them that I must see the original and see how it was written and expressed. We did not insult them. We simply said that the first responsible person was Husni. We also said that Fahd was the second responsible one. And Bush was the third.

[Unidentified speaker] The first was Fahd, the first responsible was Fahd.

[Saddam] Not Husni, Husni played a big role. First, he was the tool behind the bungling of any Arab solution. He was also the first instrument to give official Arab support before the world; that is, the Arab Summit Council made the decision. That was everything. There were also the dirty intelligence games and curtailed information. Westerners know that these are lies, but they depend on them. They say: President Mubarak said such and such a thing, and Fahd said such and such a thing. It was important to use Egypt's moral power. Egypt pursued a deviate path.

Why did Fahd follow this path, because he had the excuse of fear.

[Izzat Ibrahim] Husni was an old plotter?

[Saddam] Husni sat with us to the end. We spoke about the evils and the circumstances and the plotting against us. We were annoyed. He came without any justification. On the other hand, Fahd was next to Kuwait. He said whoever who attacks Kuwait will attack us. There is

logic in what he said. But, why did Husni volunteer without any bases?

[Unidentified speaker] [Indistinct words]

[Saddam] The main thing is it was Mubarak and Fahd among the Arabs who brought these foreigners to attack us.

[Unidentified speaker] [words indistinct]

[Saddam] These people [words indistinct]. True, they antagonized us. But is it easy to antagonize us? Are we so simple in this country that one can antagonize us and stay next to us, and continue to kill our children. Is it so easy?

[Unidentified speaker] [words indistinct]

[Saddam] In this period, after we gave the Arabs all this opportunity to retreat, they still continued with their evil. One must strike the evil ones, Husni and Fahd, and leave all the others; especially Husni and Fahd and leave the others, even the Saudi family; Husni and Fahd because they don't seem to have given up their evil. They have not given up their evil. Yes?

[Unidentified speaker] Excuse me, Sir. That is why the sense of guilt will remain and they will continue to feel it. They will always worry about everything in Iraq. Comrade Tariq's visit to Morocco was successful and good but I think that the visit must diplomatically be followed by a visit to the United Nations. Probably if he is there and explain the contents of the letter.

Another point, we should follow these issues with the Arab states that are either friendly or that are at least neutral. It is important for us to move on the Arab level, in addition to what the comrades said, in terms of the friendly and neutral countries. Thank you, Sir.

[Saddam] Therefore, by the grace of God we will proceed and if anything new crops up we will revise our stands. Concerning the other point on the international borders committee, which has not been approved by the UN Security Council - am I right? We have also seen these things. Is it logical to behave and express ourselves in the same way - even though we were not easy to deal with, even on the subject of the borderer, our memorandums have been essentially the same in terms of the contents. But after all this time and after the issue became [words indistinct], are we not required to present another paper for history? What is required is to present

another paper for history, because it has been proven that papers and history continue to work. No one can get rid of them, especially on the subject of land and sovereignty, and history; I mean historical documents that speak. It is clear that the strongest card is that we went, ruled, and sat. But the matter might become confused between our approvals of decision number so and so, which was made under pressure, so that none of the Iraqis can use them as an excuse in the future. The weak always try to find an excuse. We want to set documents for the strong; that is support for them, whether in the ranks of the people or the authority.

An endeavor was made in the limited committee to set a document so as to again explain the old historical background, how that throughout history, Kuwait has been such and such. Despite all this, you now come to make such a decision, when they themselves admit that there were Kuwaitis there. Even in the case of the oil wells; in the Saudi talks they said that their money is not so much; that is about \$2 billion and plus. Even the Kuwaiti rulers agreed to that. They wanted more than that and to take new oil wells.

This is injustice that completely conflicts with every historical and equitable situation. We must establish them. Some say, we will fight you until you say that Kuwait is ... no, it is over. It doesn't help. They are annoyed and I do not know what. Let them get annoyed. But we must establish it as a document. There will come a day.

Even the Western newspapers are not satisfied with this decision. I later read articles after I received the memorandum. Almost on the same day I received new articles other than the ones they cited. They cited these articles in a clever manner by referring to an article from here and there and referring to a statement from there. What are they doing? This means that they give a justification for the Iraqis to keep this subject going on.

[Unidentified speaker] They are strengthening their justification.

[Saddam Husayn] The judgment reached to this point. If the comrades have something for discussing the idea, the discussion is open, and if they have something to discuss the drafting, the discussion is also open. Is it not this the essence of the subject, comrade Tariq? Comrades Tariq and Izzat were [words indistinct] Yes comrade Muhammad.

[Muhammad, not further identified] If you allow me Sir, in line with what your excellency said and the amendments, which is clear what your excellency mean by them. In page 40, a paragraph says: After sometime, Sa'd al-Abdallah visited Iraq. In my opinion, it should be he visited Baghdad, from a historical point of view.

[Saddam Husayn] Visited Baghdad, yes. Wherever Iraq is mentioned based on the meanings which we changed, it should be replaced by Baghdad. You note that in some forms I used to give the name of Kuwait, but in other forms on our part and how we speak [words indistinct] These remain as a framework, but the essence has another way of expression.

[Unidentified speaker] Kuwait is an area, [word indistinct] a name of a state. You say Kuwait [word indistinct] but we do not say the State of Kuwait. Kuwait is an area.

[Saddam Husayn] Comrade Abd-al-Ghani [not further identified] says that a book has been published under the title of "The Gulf War; Who is Responsible?" The author is Dr Awdah Butrus Awdah. In this book, there are clarifications about the positions of Husni [Mubarak] and [Saudi King] Fahd and their conspiring even before 2 August.

[Izzat Ibrahim] Send us copies of the book.

[Unidentified speaker] You are welcome.

[Saddam Husayn] What?

[Izzat Ibrahim] We want copies for all of us.

[Saddam Husayn] The comrades should read it [words indistinct]

[Izzat Ibrahim] [words indistinct] Valuable book. Sir, let us assign

[Saddam interrupting] Yes, but I have not read it. Abd-al-Muhsin [not further identified] [words indistinct] somebody expresses thanks to you, etcetera. OK, but I have not read it.

[Izzat Ibrahim] Let us ask the Foreign Ministry...

[Tariq Aziz] The book is good and it has a very good pan-Arab tendency.

[Unidentified speaker] Dr Awdah was a Ba'thist.

[Another unidentified speaker] In one of the documents, Jabir [al-Ahmad; the former amir of Kuwait] says to Sa'd [al-Abdallah] [words indistinct] with our friends in Egypt [words indistinct].

[Another unidentified speaker] But, he used the word invasion. I told him if you can change it, and use another word [words indistinct].

[Saddam Husayn] [word indistinct] the documents he is having, but from the political point of view, we have not invaded them, but we take [word indistinct] back.

[Izzat Ibrahim] [words indistinct] Several books have been published and not only this one --Arab and international books, including the book [word indistinct] Why do you not ask someone to bring them to us?

[Unidentified speaker] [indistinct words]

[Saddam] I wrote to the information minister and told him: Comrade Hamid Hammadi, we have become one state with Kuwait. We have managed Kuwait and its documents have been moved [to Iraq]. It is assumed that many documents about their intelligence and Foreign Ministry have been moved. What else you have to do with these documents other than to see them and find out what is beneficial to you, and reveal them to the public opinion and the people [words indistinct].

[Izzat Ibrahim] Some of them may benefit politics and others may benefit the Foreign Ministry.

[Tariq Aziz] [words indistinct]

[Izzat Ibrahim] Some benefit security.

[Tariq Aziz] Concerning the issue of documents, we asked them at that time to give us the Foreign Ministry's documents. They said no, we have taken [words indistinct]

[Izzat Ibrahim] What do they want them for [words indistinct].

[Tariq Aziz] [words indistinct] Have they not been distributing the documents according to the sectors?

[Saddam Husayn] The concerned sector.

[Tariq Aziz] We told them that these are our documents; give them to us. They said: No leave them with us and we will take care of them.

[Saddam] You do not ask them? You ask for the [words indistinct]

[Tariq Aziz] The Kuwaiti Foreign Ministry has a computer that I saw -- a computer system in which they saved all information, even copies of the documents [words indistinct]

[Unidentified speaker] [indistinct question]

[Tariq Aziz] I do not know how they used them [words indistinct]

[Saddam] Look [word indistinct]

[Izzat Ibrahim] Sir, there are some books about the war by strategic, military, and political writers. The majority of these writers [words indistinct] but all the books -- according to those who go abroad and read them -- proved the failure of the allies -- all the allies, in the realizing the objective of destroying the Iraqi Army. They explained in detail how the battle took place [word indistinct] how the Iraqi Army was mobilized. We can ask for these books to take what is beneficial in them for the political and economic management of the war. The majority of these books discuss -- though they do not give Iraq its right -- how the international circumstances or those concerned in the region, including those who intervened from abroad, gave the chance for Iraq to take Kuwait. They forced Iraq to take Kuwait.

[Saddam] We benefit from them, each in his field.

[Izzat Ibrahim] Let us benefit from them. It is beneficial to take from them.

[Saddam] We will ask the Information Ministry to be active in following up the books and present reviews of these books to the leadership. I mean comprehensive reviews and not just summaries.

[Unidentified speaker] Among the main books, which have been translated into Arabic in the press [words indistinct].

[Tariq Aziz] [words indistinct] this was translated. [words indistinct]

[Izzat Ibrahim] [word indistinct] the US defense secretary?

[Tariq Aziz] The defense secretary has not written a book. This is Woodward who wrote the book on [word indistinct]

[Saddam] In French, also [words indistinct]

[Unidentified speaker] Sir, we have not published a book thus far.

[Saddam] Let other books [Sentence incomplete]

[Unidentified speaker] Muhammad Hsanayn Haykal has published a book.

[Saddam] We have certain people. Unless they collect documents, write, and publish, our issue will be cut down. Let us just nod our heads and the others write to make right or wrong conclusions. But if we produce a book, we would be defining the situation.

[Izzat Ibrahim] We would be narrowing the scale.

[Saddam] A book commensurate with the magnitude of the Mother of Battles, covering all its angles is only possible by the leadership, and we are busy. Let him as he is and anyone willing to write let him write. We will not say it is wrong or right, but we will only nod our heads.

[Izzat Ibrahim] [Indistinct words]

[Saddam] What?

[Izzat Ibrahim] [Indistinct words] [Saddam] Let it be. No book can cover The Mother of Battles. No one can cover the Mother of Battles, even when we write.

[Saddam] Who are the ones who write for comrade Tariq Aziz? Who is the best writer in this field? But, which part of the Mother of Battles could he cover and where can he start? The drama continues and has not finished. It is not confined to stating that we attacked them on [indistinct word] then they surrounded and then attacked us on 17 and 18 and the battle ended on 28 February. This is not the case. It is ongoing. If there is a proposal or time in the future to write about the battle by someone who would do the battle justice, then he could give glimpses of the Mother of Battles in a specific field so that other fields would be open [to further writings] or things that could be talked about in a [word indistinct] and to leave other things that cannot be talked about to the imagination to continue to induce writing. The Arab imagination about the Mother of Battles is now broader than the

Iraqi imagination. The reason is that an Arab man views the Mother of Battles according to principles and by matching with other cases from the Arab reality. But, if you prevent an Iraqi from this romantic view [by depriving him] from water, food, and milk not to mention the fact that this man is a martyr and she is a martyr and our neighbor is a martyr and another is handicapped incomplete sentence]. These daily facts diminish the romanticism of an Iraqi in perceiving the Mother of Battles. But, see what Arabs do. Iyad Sa'id Thabit is an Iraqi writer. I have read some of his writings. He draws an imaginary scenario of some things which are not realistic, but the case implies that it happened the way he depicts it. The case makes him believe that his depiction matches what really happened. So, if this would be the case, then proceed with God's blessings.

One Arab nation with an eternal message.

[Unidentified speaker] I don't know what is the mechanism [indistinct words]. Some warned. Let me review this and submit it to your excellency once again. There are some terms which you said [incomplete sentence]. [indistinct dialogue which precludes any meaningful processing]

[Unidentified speaker] We have a Lebanese friend; namely, Karim Baqraduni. He is coming not on an official visit. He asked to visit Iraq [indistinct words].

[Saddam] Good night.