

Summary Translation of File ISGQ-2003-M0003978

(Tr. Note: joined in progress)

S: he suggested a percentage 1:1

“People talking unclear”

S: Artillery resources, some army segment must maneuver with and the artillery must stay somewhere else, no we will start our work

“People talking unclear”

S: this ring had just rung..

“People talking unclear”

S: later..

Saddam Hussien: First point I want to talk about is explaining the subjects we were talking about a little while ago because I see some of you lost regarding this matter in fact we meant it, ,ha, as an educational state.

not related to certain individual but all the all the talking we did but in specific it was meant to certain commander and not all the commanders, I heard some things about him and I will follow what I heard and I will tell him straight up, I am always when I talk I will not got my thoughts from writings that I read but I will get from the Live social conditions, for example if my son does some mistake he needs to be notified so I used to this style of educational style,

Even my self when I Make mistakes I need some body to notify me from my colleagues in the leadership.

Everyone of us needs that so no one can think that he reached to his final condition ,never, every thing, in our work schedule

In our work schedule we have a lot unnecessary things so we need to get the most critical things are of it, in the attendance of the leadership but I think the most important things in it are item 6 and item 11, the other items comes in importance in levels, for example, if a Corp commander who is responsible and the chief of staff and his assistant for the military operations can solve this matter....etc

And as far as the rest of the items I will leave you the freedom to discuss them according to your levels Is that right comrade Ibraheem?

So this meeting from the time of our previous meeting we saw that the battles are taking place every three months or so, we can engage and exchange analyses with each other in regard the way we need to treat the enemy, so from now all our meetings will take place within this frame work and than we will be able to apply it from one Corp to another in a good manner and at the same time we will be able To fill the gaps and to fix any mistakes so I am suggesting that we Discuss those two items and also I like to add three more items, the subject of planning, with its different levels and the subject of fastness and slowness in planning also in putting the military plans For the case of offence and defense, the subject of maneuvering in front of the enemy and the way we will able to predict the next behavior of the enemy and the way we will deal with it, also the observations of the military commanders and the positive things that they could use as good lessons for the other corps because each commander has its lessons , and the holes and the gaps that he discovered that are related to the fighter character or in the technical and mobilization fields and what measures he used to fix them , we could generalize them

In the other corps or we can make them more efficient through discussions and then we will generalize them so in our army we will not have corps with different measures and characteristics.

It is obvious that each commander has its own touch so if the conditions are similar to each other we can apply these measure but if the terrain are different than applying these factors will Have a deadly affect, so we can not apply these factors, so each Corp has its own characteristics and similar characteristics with other corps, let me start with this point first which is the subject of making plans, as you all know making plans consists of different stages that you know before it gets to its final version in defense or offense from the point of the resources availability and the point of the nature of the terrain and the morals of the enemy, in a situation like ours and by now we are able to recognize our borders including our ability to adopt to the terrain factor now for a long period of time also we adopted to the enemy's habits, our resources and our strength are most likely known to us, so it is suppose to put the necessary plan in shorter time than usual it is supposed to be that way , when we ask the commander of division to wage an attack on enemy position and it takes him almost a month to put the required plan so how can I understand him and how can I understand his Psychology and plus the available opportunity In front of you to take , you as a hunter because the enemy will not stay frozen waiting for you, one of the most things we know is to put the enemy in a state of confusion and use the element of surprise to put his estimation in the wrong position, but if it take us one month to put a plan during this time the enemy could surprise and wage an attack , let say within 15 days.

Because, my brothers in general we need to consult with our selves and with the commanders if we were asked to put a plan on How can we invent and create the Inventions necessary to confront the enemy either in defense or offense to fasten the execution of the plan, this argument it not going to help us in this battle because this battle could end in one year, but the opportunity is available to the corp commander to wage an attack but if he is waiting for two months and the enemy is in front of him for two months to attack so some times to have to put the plan necessary to on the level of a Corp , in the size of a Corp within 72 hours ,so how can you do that if you are not trained to put an urgent plans right now if we keep using the Usual frame work we will transfer many diseases to our army, deadly diseases but if in reality we confronting an enemy in the current situation with its composition, with its standing, We should not forget on how we are able to prepare our mentality to confront an enemy different in composition and with different opportunities in a regular army that fight us in a different way than this so how can we deal with That ? so one of the subjects that I recall is the one we discussed even in the general leadership and asked several commanders on the best ways to understand the methods to puts a precise plans.

How can we prepare ourselves to put quick plans to confront the enemy not within a month but in case of dynamic war so we will tell our enemy please wait because it will take us 2 months or 1 month to put the required plan, so my brothers the usual military methods we are using with this enemy which were born by the experiments , we thought we could use the same military methods to confront another enemy with different characteristics than this one , we are dealing with these irregulars now but at the same time we have to prepare ourselves on how can we confront a modern regular army and

with good armament so we have to prepare for both situations so this is not only a theory but this is can be obtained by practice , making plans is one of the practices that we need to prepare our selves for it in a situation different than the present one, based on that and with regard to this subject, I recall the subject of dependence or one side of it which also was created by the circumstances , the commander of a division now when he wants to put a certain plan on the level of his division he will wait for the commander of the Corp to get his approval if the circumstances allowed him so the Corp commander will call upon the division commander to come and they will meet for 6 or 7 hour to discuss all the matters related to this issue and than he will tell him O.K. I approve your plan but in the execution phase the Corp commander will attend the headquarter of the division commander these military methods are accurate for the current situation but we need to remember to use different military methods for different situations , how many times the divisions commanders met with the corps commanders in the days between the day 22 and the day 28 of September of 1980, we need to remember that situation and how many times the divisions commanders met with brigades commanders in their relaxed headquarters not the dynamic ones and discussed with them certain mobilization issues, this the real approach we adopted to confront this regime , the elements of weakness in it, its composition used by them as elements of strength, he used ignorance to push people to their death with out any Concern, he used his lack of responsibility towards his people by paying no concerns to the size of his losses , he used the lack of education Which could reach to %70 in Iran to pass the their lies by using the religious fanaticism which also used to put the irregular people in the battle front in the way we know now, so is this the measure for our confrontation of our army?

.. No..but this is one of richest lessons for our army because it has its unique plans and manners and visions ..etc. which is in reality if we stayed in our regular approach towards this enemy we were defeated but if we build our army based on this experience because we will be considering this experience as the ultimate framework, we will be definitely be defeated , so based on that we need to lessen the degree of dependence, because even in the general leadership we can effort going back in forth between the leadership and the headquarter of

a certain Corp for three or four times in order to put a certain plan so in the future confrontation, who said that we will be offered this opportunity in a war of masses, so you will be communicating with the corps commanders through electronic devices and you can not leave you positions , you can not leave your positions, the Corp commander can not leave his headquarter, the divisions commander will lead the their divisions our of their dynamic headquarters so this is the future state that we need to be familiar with in order not to forget them so we need to practice them at least in the plans making, we will practice it in a way just a little away from the higher headquarters unless certain necessary event erupted , the corp commander will practice his role , the the division commander will practice his role , in another ward we need to practice our role in connecting them in the fields of consultation and the field of setting a specific visions, we meet them and we will deal with certain lessons but if the enemy waged an attack against one of our battalions we need to have the ability to take decisions on the battle field without going back to the corp commanders because every thing is available to us in order for the officer to have the confidence to make decisions on the battle field

otherwise he will be in a certain psychological state that he needs at all times somebody telling him what to do, this point my brothers I like you to give more attention to , on the relationship between you and the higher ranks.for example, after the end of the battles of the first corp I was in the plane with general 'Hisham' with us were Lt.General 'Jebbar Shenshal'. Lt.General 'Jewad Shekouri ' and General.Meisser we were debating that in order

To prevent the enemy from maneuvering we need to attack him in a military regions select and in a certain circumstances and also using the right military strength , also we choose , so we asked General.Hisham to study this matter , General.Hisham went and did some studies with the consultation with the general leadership is it that right?

Then the battles of the first region took place, we were busy with them but we were still thinking about this study in one way or another,

So when the battles ended in the first region we decided to get back to this subject so almost a month now we are working back and forth and

We are coming back and forth from the first corp so the enemy will keep waiting for us , he will keep staring on us while we are preparing our plan ..No ..he will attack us in a different sector , so this is a very critical and essential point that we need to study and to be put in front of the corps commanders in case that we have an objection against it , it is o.k. to have your point of view heard with regard to this matter towards this direction not as a decision to start an attack , from July, 1982 when we faced the enemy attack against our territories ..is that right? We did not wage in a very serious manner any attack to regain our lost territories in all the sectors of operations except one case in the sector of "Kerdemend" and we were able to get it back but normally if the enemy were able to take over territories , normally he will be able keep it after the battle settles other wise during the battle we need to keep trying to attack and regain control , also from the psychological aspect I am insisting on this subject , and as you see some times we are determined in some battles and giving casualties

Like what happened in the fourth corp sector in the area of brigade '51' and the area of brigade '108' these decisions are only made by the corp commander but they were the general leadership decisions that the enemy should get not even one inch from out territories because every inch we lose and the battle settles down the motivations of the army personnel will cool down both soldiers and commanders and I repeat commanders and soldiers also general leadership and others off course it has its situations and its causes both on the technical and psychological aspects of it but nothing its impossible that we can not treat also an event took place we were debating the issue of where can draw our line of defense so that we can be in a strong position , we were told right here but if the enemy was able to take over this position we will tell our selves this position is worthless and this other position is much better so why we picked our previous position as our strongest defense line then? So unless we got killed than we strengthen our defenses so this psychological situation is the one predominated since the battles of eastern Basrah until this minute, because the enemy is watching us and learned the way we will behave so he reached a conclusion that these guys will not attack to regain their territories or either want our territories because they were there before and left them so you the military commanders, the enemy is thinking this certain way, their political leaders, their military personnel has their own

military structures from they become a lieutenant to the point they become a general or Brigadier so its difficult to be ignored and thrown out , they will say the enemy is positioned in front of us by this size of divisions so we can not wage an attack and create a sector of operation , so their politicians replied to the “what do you mean you can not wage an attack or create a military operation sector ? the Iraqis cannot fight so maneuver with all of your army because those Iraqis cannot attack “ you did not hear these statements ..we did when he becomes so shameless that he will announce through radio and T.V. that he will reconsider their plans so this is a very dangerous development and we are still sitting doing nothing..so what the enemy will do ? the enemy will maneuver with all the strength and possible will use ¼ from its strength to preoccupy on the front of three corps and concentrate on several axes of one specific corp area ..this is our impression that the enemy will preoccupy our army in three corps area as a secondary attack but will concentrate on one specific corp area and keep attacks it ..attack the first day ,,could not get anything.. Attack the second day.. the third day.. the fourth day but on the fifth day he will be able to penetrate our depth and on the sixth day he will surround us so he will choose certain army units and keep pounding them using the human waves technique so how can we face up this kind of approach during the confrontation so let us suppose that this event took place , how can we confront it? And before that the enemy start talking about a final and decisive battle indicating that a decisive battle will be waged against us and we decided to challenge him to produce this decisive battle and actually we want them to wage this decisive battle because we are not afraid of them ..we want them to come ..we want this decisive battle to take place, however, the enemy is using this rhetoric as an essential part of his propaganda war against us but I also think that the enemy as far as the planning aspect wishes to wage a decisive battle so if he wants to wage a decisive battle where he be able to wage it ? After he reviews the results of the previous battles and the nature of the terrain and the depth of the most critical targets ..which is Basrah ..why basrah is the most critical target ,well known and well recognized from all of the other targets that reside from 80 km in depth and under ? god knows except Baghdad if they reached the depth of 80 km ..this is different because they will put Baghdad under their artillery guns and than will have different situation but they know and we know and other people know ..Baghdad is far away so the only condition close to this rhetoric is applies to Basrah ..for us where is more suitable for us engage in the battle ..some say in Basrah but I say as a commander who needs to be concerned about the outcome with all of our confidence in our selves and our abilities ..I say the fourth corp sector ...they will not engage on the area of the first corp we said when the battle ended there ..our brothers in the leadership decided not to maneuver with these formations for the purpose of training and I told them that the enemy will not engage there by reviewing all the factors and other factors showed the correctness like what we said about the area of the fourth corp and after calculating all the factors we said the enemy will not attack here , so that left us with the area so after reviewing and calculating all the other factors so these factors point to the areas of the second corp and the first corp so attacked us on the area of the first corp it is very suitable for us to fight the enemy in the area of the fourth corp and it is suitable for to us to breakaway his strengths and disallow him from maneuvering as he likes and the opportunity to choose what sector he wants to use to wage his attack ,choose the timing

and choose the required military formations suitable for his attack.. that is suitable for us right ?

Why in the area of the fourth corp with exception of the area of brigade #51 and the area of brigade #108 inside and up the most difficult areas and with the exception of all these areas also he will not try to go north because its difficult terrain even as far as the region of the tenth division and the left wing of the first division if he tried to penetrate a deep penetration he will get to a paved land and we will butcher there but he could take over our fore defensive positions but can not apply his version of waging what so called the decisive battle ..there will be no decisiveness on his part , in the area of the fourth corp the enemy was crushed and we achieved a wonderful victory and could not gain even an inch and gave a lot of casualties , in the area of the first corp he will not return so there is a possibility that he forgot his previous wounds he suffered in the battles of eastern Basrah so let come here the morals are good, the defensive positions are good like we mentioned with regards to the terrain , so what we do let us maneuver our forces before he maneuvers his forces . the cheating and the deceiving if they are not connected with serious indications for an action has no usefulness in a long war..let us bring the whole army and keep the fourth corp for example and conduct maneuvers if you do not have a precise plan to wage an attack you cannot depend on it ..so we need to wage an attack but from where ..we will attack our lands to regained them back I mean we can not say that because the enemy could not occupy Iraq that means that these lands have no values we can not say these things not in the military dictionary or in the dictionary of carrier ”refers to a certain profession used to be practiced in old markets which means a person who lift stuff and carry it

For customers” in Alshorja market “a market resides in old Baghdad”, our army is big as far as size, as far as readiness , god gives you strength , you have been training now for a reasonable time and we are paying a lot of attention to the training too so we are capable to wage an attacks in a precise plans and careful thinking , so it was determined to wage an attack from the area of the fourth corp , and the summery of the plan was as follows , we will wage an attack on the area of the fourth corp using certain resources from the fourth corp to maneuver with and with resources from the fifth corp , we will attack not for the purpose of preoccupying the enemy but to achieve a certain goal , the land which will give us an advantageous as far as mobilization and as far as the new defensive positions and inflicts huge casualties in the enemy forces and force him to re-calculates its plans and its measures , but more importantly or on the same level of importance is that the enemy will not say that the Iraqis will not attack you so it forces their commanders in the areas of the first, second and third corps not to give any units from their corps to wage an attack because they will say that the Iraqis could attack us like what happened yesterday, the plan was put together ,we agreed on it and its proceeding fine with the commander of the fourth Corp and we also said that we will bring more army units from the fifth Corp to conduct maneuvers before the plan execution because the element of surprise in a long war , its chances according to the human brain is very low, because the affect of the element of surprise in the operational aspect of the battle almost very low but has no affect what so ever on the demographic aspect of this battle but on the other level, the mobilization level , the element of surprise could have some affect , so if we use 10 brigades in the beginning to conduct maneuvers

than we will use 4 brigades so we will use 14 brigades to conduct maneuvers and the enemy does not know about that,

Us so how the will behave, this question must be asked by military commanders ? the enemy will be behaving in one possibility and there is no second possibility may be he will attack us from the region that he is planning to conduct his attacks from or attack us from the region that we are conducting maneuvers from or he will masses up to defend its position and cancel his offensive attacks are there any other possibility :

He..He

If he attacks us from the region in where our forces are masses up there that is exactly what we want the units we prepared for the attack will be moved for the purpose of support and to provide more depth and the rest as an offensive

Force so why we need to conduct maneuvers if the enemy masses up in front of us we can sit there people facing other people, so we said we will leave some of the forces that belongs to the fourth corp let say 4 brigades and put them with the first corp , and the commander of the first corp will put together a medium plan according to the level of his resources plus the four

Brigades in case of some body will try to masses troops against us in this area so in this case we will shoot him so he will have to maneuver in front of the first corp in another our plans must be like a series, so everyday we will do some thing different in order to mess up the enemys arrangements between time to time for the next attack so if he attack us from the operational region he chose and according to our conclusion , the number #1 region most likely will be “Basrah” and the second region for the secondary offensive most likely will be the second corp area , 4 brigades we installed in the area of the first corp in order to use them for maneuvers to cover the second corp on our time choosing quickly if this possibility became reality at the same time the fourth corp is more closer to the third corp from leaving them in the area of the first corp without activating them , so we are ready for all possibilities, during the discussion and the preparation for the plan, we discussed an ambesious plans for the concept of strong and rigid defensive surrounding which include the long defensive surrounding approach of the units of the fourth corp also there are insignificant plans to form the first point or the first base without affecting the other possibility, so we established a compromising conciliation policy and when I say conciliation I do not mean as a rational so we said the plan is put together in its final version in pages, so let put the first page for the insignificant and keep the door open for the ambitious so

If things went all right we will continue our path to cover the other pages and as a result we will be able to reach the thinking of the starting and the thinking of the ending point also we gave legality to the extreme caution practiced by the new administrations, for example , if the corp commander is new, if the military operations assistant new, if the chief of staff new , I do not mean that they are new as fighters but I mean that they are new in their positions , this is a natural case and there is a human factor behind every individual pushing him to success if there is no contradiction with the national duty ..its fine but if there is contradiction with the national duty than the situation will develop to another state , one time I sent after a person and asked him that a certain command is in need to your experience but he replied “My military reputation does not allow me ,Sir, and also the situation there is real mess” so he was more concerned for his military reputation than the future of the country

This is an extreme contradiction , if I do not prove my reputation in this critical time when shall I do? Just when I say pleasing words..

It does not mean anything if we lost our country ..or we lost “Basrah” so I called upon another commander which is commander “ Sa’adi” and I asked and he did not hesitate to go that certain command and things went fine, so in that case there was a huge contradiction between self interest and the national interest but if there is no contradiction with the national interest we will consider it as a natural human state that arise when an individual take the lead so we will proceed in the plan as the following “ we will attack by the fourth corp and the four brigades will conduct battlefield surveillance in the last phases of the fourth corp plan and within its duties with the fourth corp and at the same time will preserve its roles within the first corp to be part in the next phases of the first corp plan so we can use them to maneuver with and by this we will achieve a partial surprise to the enemy because the enemy expected to deal with 10 brigades and not with 4 urgent brigades and in the case that the plan went right for several phases and than we had an opportunity to in the first corp we will attack and than continue the offensive according to the plan phases on the fourth corp as a result if we noticed that the enemy dispersed his forces as we planned like what we wanted, so we do not have to concentrate on one front of the battle so my brothers as a field military commanders we have to bear a responsibility to take a risk on the mobilization aspect of the battle because if we do not we will cause the demoralization of your fighters and also motivates the enemy forces when they see that you do not take action on the enemys’ territories nor on your territories so one of the most distinguishing factors among the military personnel is the ability to attack successfully and defeat the enemy in stead of waiting for the enemy to wage his attack ,I like to discuss the direction of the battle plan but not the details of the plan where we attack ,when we attack and how many military personnel we will use..Is it right that we have to stay the course as defenders with out the ability to choose our goals in some of the military operations theaters for at least to make the enemy military leaders feel the pressure and tell their political leaders that they do not have the power or the capability to wage an attack in this size ..at least as a military personnel you need to give a cover to the enemy military personnel since they are like any other military personnel with military structures ..give them a cover so they can tell their political leaders that they can not wage such an attack.

So we need to bring the enemy to a state of confusion where the enemy military personnel will tell the political leaders that he needs the military units in certain areas and the political leader will say”Well the enemy will not attack us here..” but the enemy military commander will tell him “No ...the enemies “the Iraqis” attacked us here and destroyed us here in the area of the fourth corp and occupied our positions there“ so the political leader under this pressure will have nothing to say but if you stay like this the enemy leaders will start talking about a final decisive battle and the necessity to use all of our strength in this final offensive and the Iraqis will never attack , they will continue their absurd rhetoric ,we told the enemy you are attacking our civilian targets in our cities so we retaliate with same measures but instead the increased his attacks against our cities , this kind of enemy does not understand but the pounding on the head so has to see us motivated and determined with good logic in putting the plan but crazy like him in the execution phase so we have to impress the enemy with our determination, for example ,

military sector #1150, what is the importance of sector #1150 , the importance, we became like the Iranians in their stubborn approach and we said we must retake this sector but if the circumstances were different as you know the terrain of Brigade #51 and Brigade #108 had a well known certain uniqueness in their terrain and could propably told “Hishem” stay put not right now , so my brothers , this is the direction of the general leadership with its brief analyses. So please I like this subject to be discussed and if any one has an objection to it or has some feed backs please go ahead in a very serious manner in which we will be able to prevent the enemy from doing whatever he like or at least prevent him from training his soldiers the way he wishes and if you calculate how much of our lands he occupies and at the same time conducting training for his troops there, these are signs of his strength and signs of our weakness. Let us start the discussion...

Unidentified Male: Sir, I just have to major comments , and as you know before the start of this war during our meetings we have many military questions that we do not have answer for because we lack the practical experience

Saddam Hussien: It is too hot here ...I know that..

Unidentified Male: we are entering this war now for the fourth year so all the questions we had before the war we supposed to have an answer for them now because our experience before the start of this war was based on the books and publications dealing with wars lasted 2 or 3 weeks and the international bodies were able to stopped it. Sir I like to comment on your first point of this discussion that this war is a very rich experience to our armed forces and its lesson and its consequences is much different than the ones we had during our wars with the Zionist entity and that is why your excellency is concentrating on the different structures between this war and any war that could be triggerd with Israel , it will be different in style , approach and consequence and the action and reaction from other commands each one from its unique position I remember the time before the war me and my brothers including comrade “Sa’adi” and the rest of my colleguese between a unit commander and a brigade commander, I remember staff brigedear “Mohammed Salih Yunis “ the commander of brigade #30 and comrade “Sa’adi” the commander of Brigade # 16 who told me during one of systematic meeting that he could establish a tank battalion within 45 minutes “Huddo” within 45 minutes.

Sir, we entered the enemy territories and stayed there for almost 2 years and than withdrew through political decision ...

Saddam Hussien”Interrupted”: we did not withdrew because of the enemy

But because we wanted to provide a psychological cover to our army , I swear in god, if the whole world wanted us to withdraw we will never withdraw and we stay there and fight the enemy the same way but because of some losses our army suffered we decided to withdrew.

Unidentified Male: We started the infantry advance on the 9/23/1980 and on the days of 28th and 29th most of our forces reached their Goals with the exception of the town of "AlMuhammera" and we were able to drive up a nice vehicle, when we passed the borders lines known of our soldiers has set a foot on the enemy territories, so when we decided to withdraw back to our borders we fought while we are withdrawing in some cases and in other cases no..we just withdrew with no accident to our borders, from the area of the "Kerkha AlA'amyaa" river to our borders but in the area of the tenth division and the first division we were fighting from "AlShoush" region to "Alsen AlSakri" Region to our borders so our field commanders were able to fight the enemy inside his borders, on the borders and inside our borders in a very difficult terrain so with any suspicious all of fields commanders and our military personnel are very familiar with the terrain by foot and by reconnaissance and based in that they can determine the critical point in the enemy position and predict the way the enemy will behave in the future so according to the available information and our calculation, it looks like the enemy is preparing to wage his decisive attack on the area of eastern "Basreh" ...

Saddam Hussien: unless we attack him first and make him change his Mind and his plans...we are expecting him to attack us on the day of 11th of the month On the area of the fourth corp..right?

Unidentified Male: I think Sir, on the 12th

Unidentified Male: If they wage their attack I believe the casualties percentage between us and them could 3:1 or may be 2:1 despite the fact that they out number us 5:1 in some areas so my brothers we need to take responsibility and take risk some times to achieve the element of surprise in attacking the enemy in a very quick and decisive manner like what happened in the battle of "Badra" which lasted 5 to 6 days especially with

What the Iranian leaders are indicating to the media about the incoming decisive battle. Saddam Hussien : My brothers, we need all the military commanders to prepare military plans in advance so we will be able to make advantage of the element of surprise and at the same time it will shorten the time either preparing plans consists of several pages or a plan that is only one page.

Like for example, the plan to attack a military position some where in the first corp area requires no more than 2 infantry brigades in a small plan no more than one page but if you want to wage an attack on the level of a division than you want a plan that consists of several pages.

Unidentified Male: For example Sir, we were waiting for the climate elements to coporate in the area of the first corp in order to his the enemy hard in the area of "Kerdemend" and retake this area from and push him back towards the area of "Haj Omran" and as far as the decision making and our fear in making decisions I believe that your excellency approach from this issue is the correct one.

Saddam Hussien: O.K.than ...liberate ..liberate the land first and let us know here in the general leadership about your schemes , we could say you did a good job continue or we will say no stop here pull out some of these Brigades ,My brothers as long as our army has strong morals and has an ability to wage an attack there is no fear even if the enemy was able to occupy some of our lands, as long as we are strong we can get these lands now, a year from now or 2 years from but if we loose our morals and our ability to wage an attack than we could loose the whole Iraq.

Unidentified Male: Sir ...the people fought here in the battles of eastern Basrah and the battles of AlFekkah and AlSheeb Battle are totally different in their training and in their armament and now the Iraqis are totally different from one year ago , I know that caution from the commanders is needed but when it gets to the point that will form a burden on the commanders shoulder than we need to act,

Saddam Hussien: We are here in the general leadership , I never recall that I hold one of our military commanders who did not get a permission from his superiors, responsible because he waged an attack or took action to liberate a land but may we just questioned his decision , I do not held and one responsible unless there are Situations where the people did not defend the way they should or they did not attack the way they should and this is natural situation.

Saddam Hussien: General Thabit...

General Thabit: “unaudible”

Saddam Hussien: You did great ...you did great job...you brought up an essential point which is timing that I like to discuss with you with regard to your plan after you complete your arrangements , me personally I like the day timing for an attack but at the same time we could use the technicalities of the night attack as a substitute so we will be able to find our way around , we will be able to see the eyes , see the face these are an essential factors.

General Thabit: ”unaudible”

Saddam Hussien: On this subject that we discussed I stressed two essential points the maneuvers and the ability to wage an attack to disperses the enemy effort and this state has being agreed on by all the military commanders and if they have any point of views in a final consensus the need to take risk in the process of decision making with an understanding of the psychological and the technical aspect of our army because I live with my army in a very precise details so my final point is that we have to wage attacks on the enemy forces and by this will take the initiative from the enemy and at the same time we can train our soldiers and keep their morals high , like I said before I would prefer a lost land with good trained army rather than we have the land but also we have a weak army because With the strong army we can get the lands back not now but a year from now.

I also stressed the destructive affect of the delay in putting the plans, id the enemy is massed up in front of us and we have Hilecopters ..why do not we call the corp commander and put together a plan to attack the enemy within 72 hours instead of waiting 3 months to wage an attack ..come back ..go there ..bring this ..bring that ...this is not the right way to conduct a war so what is the solution for this problem?

The solution is that the field commanders should have the ability to make a decision during the battle without going back to their corps commanders even if there is %30 incorrectness but in the normal circumstances we could discuss our plans through the regular channels but excuse me this is very back ward methods , we need to be there on the ground to during the attack and before during the planning phase , all of us remember general “Hisham” when he left his home town of “Nainva” to take part in the battle of the first corp.

One of the notorious ill of the long war is the dependence factor, during the long war it could take us 2 full weeks to put a plan but no I want our commanders to be able to put a plan within 48 hours like a decisive war so if we have a decisive war lasts for one month, we will be defeated for sure because every body will be worry about him and each command has its own worry, everyday we are discovering that this position has a strategic value ..Is that reasonable that after 4 years stationed in these territories

We will find out that now so our ability to wage an attack could based on a Certain plan or could be just a reaction for an enemy action with all the calculations and the fire power and I can recognize the tanks battalions..why general Thabit the tanks battalions ?because the tanks battalions now are liberated and could be used to wage an attack against the enemy in a counter attack, so from you own resources you could ...