

	ISGQ-2003-M0004660
Male 1	Peace be upon you. Welcome. We would like to hear from comrade Tariq on his trip.
Male 2	Sir, the meetings that I held had similar agendas, but the subjects varied. The first meeting has to do with Israel, it has a special link with 986. In New York there were two issues: the 986 Resolution and the relations with Ekeus. With the French the talks included bilateral relations and those relations with Ekeus and the United Nations Security Council...First, I will talk about the Security Council in general and the relations with Ekeus and then we will talk about the second subject.
Male 1	[inaudible]
Male 2	At the Security Council, we met with members, who normally will turn against...
Male 1	[inaudible] open the window [inaudible].
Male 2	At the Security Council, we met with members, who normally will turn against...and the members who will support us such as Nigeria [inaudible] . And I thanked them for their position and I encouraged them to continue to meet with us, and for their effort with respect to the Islamic Conference Organization and the Non-aligned movement. I purposely did not want to meet with the Germans [inaudible] and the Argentines. And I met with new members, Egypt, South Korea, Poland, Chili and Guinea-Bissau, who are going to come in a few days. The event of August was followed by new information, suspicion, amazing and strange stories [inaudible] the Security Council. But it is clear that this [inaudible] embargo, as was the case in last September and October, when the Comrade, the Foreign Minister [inaudible], but this did not end. This is why, our focus during our meetings with members of the Security Council, was that what happened in August will not alter the fundamental reality regarding Iraq's commitment to the Resolution 687, and that the substantial issues from 687, such as destruction and inspection, were achieved. Regardless of how long it takes Ekeus to verify and confirm it, the result will be, as we said previously, and as we announced, that this matter was achieved. This is what we knew and what was under our control. There is no [inaudible]. This subject is unclear to the leadership. The second issue between them and us is the issue of previous programs: What became of them? Who came and who left? What have we purchased? This is, of course, (refers to) some of the matters whose details should not be revealed, and whose details must not be revealed. The people responsible for it are aware of the details. So if they cooperated with the leadership in honesty and clarity, we will become aware but otherwise there will be problems like what happened previously. Truly, regarding the people who are impartial, who were in a higher position and aware of this situation, they said Ekeus must give his second report, because the situation for the Security Council

	and the influence on the Security Council has become stronger than before. We said before that that we have made a serious and real effort on those files. We received help from the delegation that accompanied us, including 'Amir al-Sa'di and Husam [inaudible]. Amir joined us late due to a Visa issue [inaudible]. He helped us thoroughly and in a technical way regarding some of the points that they are following in detail. I believe I cannot say we have achieved much progress on this issue, but we alleviated the suspicious climate that existed before. And we gave them our estimate that we will be able in a short period of time, only months, to close the files. This was very important, because it was a prevalent feeling within the Security Council and because of there are hundreds of thousands of pages: biological and chemical and missile issues [inaudible] a very long-term period. The French delegation [inaudible] said, "Our estimates are between 11 to 18 months." But they saw that this is not the case and that should not take that long, because they said, "we have achieved a lot." Meaning, they supposed so. Of course, this matter depends on our efforts. It is one of the matters that was included in our proposal. What happened in Amman is that equipment was discovered, their destination was supposed to be Iraq. They tried to embarrass us. But we strongly confirmed that we have nothing to do with this equipment.
Male 1	What equipment?
Male 2	Sir, what happened is a Jordanian by the name Bassam Abu-Gharbiyyah. This has a connection with the Industrial Military Organization, including Hussein Kamil. He used to come to the Industrial Military and see what items they needed, whatever they needed. He offered them a gyroscope from Russia.
Male 1	Was it for a range of 150?
Male 2	At the beginning he told them that he will bring them a gyroscope with a range less than 150. The matter is not known clearly. According to the President, the Director of the Organization [inaudible] at Hussein's time. `Amir Rashid says he does not know this man. When `Amir Rashid found out, he put him in a car and took him to the borders, according to his story. But at the same time, the Director of the facility, a person named Tahir [inaudible], meaning 10 to 15, came together with equipment; they did not say anything to them. After the events of August, Lieutenant General `Amir along with Lieutenant [inaudible] held a meeting with them to find out what happened. They informed him that we received small electronic items from Abu-Gharbiyyah [inaudible]. It turns out [inaudible] Special Committee. He gave them instructions [inaudible] special committee [inaudible] transparent central instructions.
Male 1	[inaudible]
Male 3	[inaudible]
	This individual went and brought other quantities along with gyroscopes for long-range missiles. In the province of Amman, the news spread on Thursday or

	Friday, and on Saturday [inaudible]. Saturday or Friday Lieutenant General `Amir Rashid informed me they were talking about that matter. I told him that I heard about it. Ask Mr. Hamid to find out about this news I heard on Friday at my office so that we can deal with it. General `Amir gave details about this story and what happened. General `Amir said he would prepare a report to explain what happened [inaudible]. I asked `Amir, "Who is this person?" [inaudible] with the organization. Then I understood that [inaudible] intelligence to find out who this person is working for and who sent him to us? [inaudible]. According to the discussion at the cabinet. [inaudible] the Director General revealed his cover `Ail al-`Aql with the electronics that are not banned [inaudible] but his prices are [inaudible] such as this pen; he charges five dinars to make it [inaudible].
Male 3	General Director of what?
Male 2	General Director of the Missile Center.
Male 3	[inaudible]
Male 2	This is from the easy investigation, intelligence investigation. I am not sure [inaudible]
Male 3	[inaudible]
Male 1	[inaudible]
Male 3	[inaudible]
Male 1	[inaudible] banned items for the military.
Male 3	[inaudible]
Male 1	I asked him, "Do these missiles have more than a 150-range, because we are allowed to have 150."
Male 2	But we are not allowed to import equipment, Sir.
Male 1	If we are not allowed to import equipment, they come to us at the mill and they will ask us what are you importing? They come to us at the factory and they say what are you importing? What! They ask us about the octane and they say what are you importing? This is against the sanctions. The one who is sanctioned should not be told from every part of the world why are you importing items allowed for your daily needs, and items not allowed for your daily needs.
Male 3	[inaudible]

Male 2	Sir, I want to make the picture very clear to you and to the comrades. This sector is subject to monitoring; the military sector is subject to monitoring.
Male 1	[inaudible] is going according to the restrictions
Male 2	Yes. When they come to see, for example, they realize that we produced missiles of 120 kilometers range that are allowed. These products were made by us but if they know that we imported them we will be in violation, but [inaudible] because there are no restrictions. Do you see the difference, Sir? This sector is subject to monitoring, therefore we must be sensitive and detailed. When we get something we should do it in a method that shows that we did it or that it was in our depots and we should inform the Special Committee. For example, we say we made 10,000 rifles or missiles, according to the category, the material that submits to inspection. In the civilian issues there is no monitoring. If you have a shipment you do not need the approval of the Special Committee. Sir, [inaudible] in the Gulf carrying cargo oil, dates and I don't know what...
Male 1	[inaudible]
Male 2	These are different and they should come in through Ekeus report otherwise Iraqi will be in violation of its commitments. This is politics [inaudible] and there is room for maneuvering. And these subjects are sensitive [inaudible]. at Hussein's times [inaudible] instructions in this direction
Male 1	[inaudible] the allowed range
Male 2	They should have told us, Sir, they should.
Male 3	[inaudible]
Male 1	I mean that there is a full and a partial violation. The full violation is to cross the banned area, meaning instead of 150, go to 300 or 500.
Male 2	Sir, we [inaudible].
Male 1	[inaudible]
Male 2	He should come to the administrative official and tell him that the political official [inaudible] in order to do it in the way [inaudible].
Male 3	[inaudible]
Male 1	Then why? [inaudible]. The biggest liars. [inaudible]. What is the story? Is it real? Where and when?
Male 2	Sir, we will not inform the Special Committee of all our findings. We should study it and prepare an explanation and discuss it. It is a hard decision.

Male 1	[inaudible] in or interest
Male 2	Yes, [inaudible]. Come to `Amir Rashid, to your President and tell him [inaudible]
Male 1	He is 26 years old.
Male 2	Come to `Amir Rashid and tell him [inaudible]. Why did not you tell me?
Male 1	This is part of the changes, and as long as it is not part of the changes it will be hopeless.
Male 2	No. It is known that it is [inaudible].
Male 1	He tells them everything immediately, even if it is the simple development of weapons.
Male 2	We do not know its details and what it is [inaudible]. Of course, this complicated the position. But we stood firm and said we have nothing to do with it. It was an episode. As a political leadership, we have nothing to do with it. If there was a mistake, we will investigate and get the result. This is in regards to the relation with the Security Council and Ekeus. The second subject: the French, is the relationship with the French. I met the French Ambassador in New York before I went to Paris; he was very reserved. The new Ambassador replaced the former Ambassador [inaudible]. We will answer the questions, according to our ability to deal with the subject matter. And this pessimistic climate regarding the closure of files is exaggerated and not true. He told me. Everything comes through Ekeus. [inaudible]. He told me to “keep this until you come to Paris.” I saw that he was cold. When I went to Paris, I expected to confront this cold climate. I met at first with former deputy foreign minister (Serges?), who is our friend and who is still following our file in a swift and honest manner. Those are the two who were always our link with the French Foreign Ministry. We had dinner with them. They told me that after the events of August that there is some sort of backing out, especially from the French Foreign Ministry and you must change this climate through this visit. I felt that, if I go to the Foreign Minister, it is possible that I do not know the man, I do not have any relationship with him, and I mean I may not be successful in my objective. I insisted on this [inaudible] this who was [inaudible] requests from Jacques Chirac in the ‘80s. And when I renewed my contacts with him in ’92-’93, he used to take information from me and bring me news. He brought me news from Jacques Chirac. He used to meet with Jacques Chirac and bring me news. He was a former official [inaudible]. True, I mean, it was successful. [inaudible]. This was given to me by Philip and Patrick, this means the two officials. But my visit after the visit [inaudible]. Remember, sir, this condition was put into place, that any visit should only take place according to Resolution 986. He informed me and said Mr. President said he does not adhere to that condition and you can come. He said to put a request [inaudible] with the date and without conditions.

	<p>I indeed submitted a letter to the President of the Branch Ahmad al-`Izawi. I told him to go to the Foreign Ministry and tell them that I want to come either on the 18th or 19th without any advance conditions. I called him from New York, I told him I will finish on Saturday, and to see if you can get me an appointment on Wednesday, I am free for four or five days [inaudible]. I said: "Please, brother, get me a meeting with the President in any way possible." He told me it was hard. He said: "Look Tariq, next visit we could meet [inaudible]. I said we'd talk on the phone. He left and then came back and said, "My brother is coming. Get ready so that you can speak with him. His brother Philip came [inaudible], and he called Jacques Chirac on the phone for me. He said here is the phone [inaudible]; it is difficult to reach him.</p> <p>[TC: Blank from minute 29:47 – minute 30: 24]</p> <p>This conversation is between you and me, meaning that after I go to New York and come back I will tell Mr. President [inaudible] if the leadership agrees, Mr. President to open [inaudible] in a special way. But he said let's not talk to the press on 986. I said do not talk about 986 with the press at the hotel [inaudible]. In New York, the meeting took place with the British. The British opened the subject, he said, "Why didn't you accept Resolution 986? This is a historic opportunity. You missed it." I told him, " What have we missed? This new Ambassador, I said [inaudible] "why did you get the issue of Turkey into this. What is our relation with Turkey? All the resolution pertaining to us was about Kuwait, why did you involve Turkey?" I said to him, "Answer me." He said: "We do not wish to give a political advantage so you will not be able to get even with Turkey or punish Turkey". I said to him the report does not include this second person. Do you want me to accept this? [inaudible].</p> <p>We can distribute using special equipment in the northern region, but we cannot use distribution equipment like that of Basra, La`mara and Baghdad. [inaudible]. Their names are available, their forces are ready, their agents are ready, and they come to Sulimanyya, to Kirkuk to receive the products. The people of Arbil come to Mosul. The distance is no more than 100 kilometers from Sulimanyya to Kirkuk, and from Arbil to Mosul it is 90 kilometers. And you know the existence of the agencies that make sure whether this food went to the nationals or to the gangs. He said, "We do not want to give you a political advantage." I said: "This means, we do not need the food, the money. The food is from the money of the Iraqi government. And there will be a day when our people will find out that this food is coming from Baghdad. What does this mean? It is as if you are encouraging the state of separation that exists in the north instead of, naturally, recognizing that this is part of the sovereignty of Iraq. And instead of encouraging people to come to their country."</p>
Male 3	[inaudible] regime in Iraq.
Male 2	Regarding Turkey, he said: "You could reach an agreement with Turkey. And send a letter to the Secretary General without mentioning the programs. Leave

	<p>this between us and inform the Secretary General that you have reached an agreement with the Turks regarding the distribution of the northern section [inaudible], you can find a solution through diplomatic creativity.”</p> <p>What I sensed, I mean, he has not repeated the logic of his former colleague. We got involved in this subject matter and showed them our opposition. I mean, the Russian said, “If you wish, we could intervene in your requests to the Secretary General. We are ready to help you to the end.” We were reserved in responding to them. The British gave me this answer: “I do not wish to comment.” [inaudible]. The British were upset, I mean. It is, possibly, a failure on their part.</p>
Male 1	Did you talk with the Brit about the line 32?
Male 2	No we did not, because Britain is an opponent.
Male 1	Because Britain might view things in a different way.
Male 2	<p>We went back to the French. After the French Foreign Minister and I spoke on bilateral relations and the subject matter of Ekeus and the resolutions that will be implemented in a balanced way, he said, “We urge you to accept this resolution. You know that we do not have an objective [inaudible] regarding Iraq. I explained our position to you, we consider Iraq an important country and an essential country and it must replay its role in the region, etc. We do not have ill intentions when we advise you to implement resolution 986.” I asked him: “Your Excellency, why do you want me to accept resolution 986?” I said, “This is the resolution,” I explained, “Do you accept that a country like Iraq has an article that links its economic relations with Turkey based on the resolution? We have always been against the Ottoman occupation and against the British occupation. Do you want to take us back to the Ottoman days? This is not acceptable.” Also, I explained the issue of the Turks to him in detail. He said, “We understand your objections. We completely understand. We are with the unity of Iraq and with its national sovereignty.” I said, “We cannot accept.” He had fixed ideas and said, “Find a way, and enter negotiations with the Secretary General.” I said, “We are not going to negotiate with the Secretary General as long as there is no substance in front of us that will give us a sign that [inaudible] these terms are not included in the resolution and not implemented in a way that will interfere with our national sovereignty.” I said, “I have a question, I would like to ask. I have the right to ask you. This resolution, how do you explain it vis-à-vis article 22, when this resolution was passed, we were worried that it was a substitution for article 22. And article 22 applies. He told me, “We are committed to Resolution 687 and article 22 will remain as part of 687. When conditions allow it, we believe that your implementation of Resolution 986 will make it an easy transition to 687; it is like a deposit. First, all of the statements, talks and propaganda against you will make you a winner by following this route. You will benefit from this. There will be a political opening to the international community. This is our position, and you know our position, as I explained it to you. We are against the</p>

	<p>objectives [inaudible] for the Americans, and we are for the return of Iraq to the world community completely.” He said, “Let’s go talk to the press. I mean you will give a serious talk.” I said, “I am a minister and you are a minister. I want to get in touch with Mr. President today and I will propose to him what I heard from you, and what I heard. And he will give me instructions. You could also inform your President.” We had an agreement on the basis. We heard ideas and proposals. But there is no need to rush to assess them. We close the subject. This is a summary of what we heard, sir, from the French and of what we heard.</p>
Male 1	Comrade Taha Ma’ruf
Male 4	<p>Mr. President, when I came back from New York I gave you, sir, a report. When I was in New York I also met with Boutros Ghali and he approved of this resolution 986 [inaudible] so the Secretary General will have the authority to change the wording of the measures of implementation. Meaning [inaudible]. Among the things that he mentioned is the possibility of changing the conditions and providing the conditions and changing the condition in order to ensure the national sovereignty of Iraq. This was the issue with the Kurds and the issue of the North, as well as other things, but with the condition that Iraq will be satisfied there will be conditions available to assure the national sovereignty of Iraq. This is what he pointed out.</p> <p>The second thing he pointed out is if this resolution is accepted, it will not prevent them from implementing article 22. On the contrary, this will make it easy.</p> <p>What I sensed is that the implementation of article 22 has not become a technical or legal issue for those circles, but I sensed it has become a political issue: submitting to the measures of the United States for the forthcoming year, no matter how many proposals we introduce and the committees that come and go; this is what I sensed. They come up with a new way and new wording. This is why [inaudible] to implement this. And the conditions of implementing this, then the negotiations on the condition of implementation, meaning the Secretary General. I said, “You mentioned that you have a visit coming up to Kuwait. Why don’t you stop in Iraq also and see for yourself this and that. He told me, “If I do not see a positive step from you, I will not come to Baghdad.” This is what I sensed. What he proposed is a general direction toward the subject matter. They would like to see us enter in negotiations, as we did with other negotiations pertaining to other relations that were passed such as 706 and 712. There were negotiations. Yes, we could enter in negotiations as long as the items we request are available to us for the groups, our friends, who also want to see. Also, we want to see the implementation, or a speedy implementation of article 22 and the lifting of sanctions. Because, truthfully, the economic issue and what is perceived as a conspiracy inside Iraq [inaudible] put us a step backward in achieving the objective and improving the economic situation, the economic situation. Any move, even the issue of negotiations regarding the resolution, should encourage companies and countries to aid and cooperate with Iraq to improve the economic situation. Regarding Turkey, this is what the</p>

	<p>Secretary General stated: he said, “You take this resolution and count six months until the Turkish line is open, during this time you will have another outlet [inaudible] on the quantity, and the quantity is small. He said even on the Turkish line, you have two million barrels a day: one million from the Turkish line and the other million will go from any outlet of the Gulf.” This was their opinion about this position. This is why, Mr. President, I believe that the negotiations and entering in the negotiations, even from the psychological point of view, will be helpful to us, and we could silence France and others, as well as any friendly country. This way we could create a harmonious climate for our people and country, should this be the correct way. Thank you.</p>
Male 1	Comrade Taha
Male 5	<p>Mr. President, certainly the visit of Tariq during the last four months of turmoil was significant. Among the results achieved is that our image has improved among most members of the Security Council. The second result is the normalization again of our relationship with France, since they have renewed the contact. By the time the [meeting] of the Council approaches, they will have influence, and the follow-up of 986 and the proposals that exist. Briefly, in my opinion, these are negotiations that are not considered by the other party to have a resolution. But there is willingness to adjust, change, and organize or to delude. Meaning [inaudible] my opinion is this is a positive step for Iraq. When we enter into negotiations, even if we do not agree, it will not be a negative result. But they emphasize that there will be no changes in the resolution. So how do we explain that even if we negotiate our morale will be good? We traveled the entire world and explained all the main articles that exist in the resolution, and now we go back to negotiate? What should we tell the people? We will tell them Boutros Ghali said, “You come, and God will help you!” If the Americans give a statement, Boutros Ghali agrees. This man does not have a minimum of [inaudible] such as noticing the counter results and the negative results on Iraq. He does not take this into consideration. Today, Turkey [inaudible] negotiations for six months with Turkey. The resolution already gives the right to Turkey. How could we negotiate with Turkey? They earned this right, mainly. To agree to the dialogue without any justification. If they come now and ask, “Are you ready to have a dialogue through the channels to confront this issue?” We will then see. If something comes of this, it is good. And if nothing comes of it, it is done. Confirmation that the resolution will stay intact [inaudible] the resolutions will lead. We will agree to it without having an answer for the people. And when we have negative results, or nothing happens, a percentage of the people will be contemplating this [inaudible]. What will the leadership say? This will not be in our interest at all. The second justification, Mr. President, we were certain that the political climate now, and America and the election will not allow article 22 to be imposed. We must find a solution. And the solution is resolution 986. Meaning if one can do nothing, should he put himself in jeopardy? This cannot happen. This path will not take us to article 22, but it will lead us to the worse scenario, which is the path known as the lifting of the sanctions, meaning, the</p>

American way, which is realizing the enemy's objectives to dominate Iraq, to control it and interfere in all the national principles. This is not easy, because later we can never disengage. Not easy. I mean it is difficult, in my opinion. It is easier to fight from beyond the borders, but when it comes between your legs and the people who have interests and interventions, meaning, we will lose a lot of our people. And now the Iraqi political power, even those who do not believe in it, will come from this interference. Truly, when we tell Boutros Ghali to submit article 22, they will not implement it. The resolution, article 22, part of this section contains specific wording. Article 22, categorically, does not determine our exports. They say we can determine a quota with this [inaudible]. Article 22, we export and this distribution [inaudible] in this case let them put the two million, or half a million or four million barrels on article 22 as a step [inaudible] the path of this resolution has nothing to do with article 22. As comrade Tariq said they want to control the arrival of food to [inaudible]. They appoint whomever of the destroyers they want, those existing agents, who come to Mosul, to Kirkuk to get it. It is clear that the intention is to spread mistrust and discord. They want to provoke demonstrations between the Kurdish people, anyway, no need to get into this. They want to control how the agents will distribute it [inaudible]. We should give Boutros Ghali a message, a strong and a clear message, that we will have nothing to do with resolution 986 [inaudible] except with the article that we are not opposing. [inaudible]. In this case, why does he not come forward [inaudible] the program of implementation of resolution 986. Why couldn't our brother Boutros Ghali study this and say we agree with the resolution 986? He should come up with a procedure [inaudible]. This is the requirement; the one who passes the resolution should issue the procedure [inaudible]. We are ready to receive something from him in writing and say yes. But the passed resolution is that Iraq still exists. Moreover, I do not want to sound pessimistic, but [inaudible] the elections in this area, I can say on this dialogue and in this related way to the sanctions background [inaudible]. The implementation of article 22, meaning, what do they think after six months without changes and progress.